Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-544b6db54f-prt4h Total loading time: 0.175 Render date: 2021-10-22T17:38:03.051Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

Oskar Morgenstern and the Heterodox Potentialities of the Application of Game Theory to Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2009

Extract

In its brief history, the relation between game theory and economics has been characterized by phases of feverish elaboration of new contributions followed by periods in which an open skepticism concerning its usefulness prevailed. Moreover, this vaguely cyclical pattern of evolution has affected various research areas. After an initial period in which game theorists focused their attention on competitive market models, in the 1970s and 1980s they turned to the problems of oligopolistic markets and bargaining. Today the latter research areas are going through a phase of sedimentation and selection while other fields of study receive a strong impulse from the application of game theory.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Allen, R. G. D. 1938. Mathematical Analysis for Economists, Macmillan, London.Google Scholar
Arrow, K. J. 1987. “Oral History I: An Interview” in Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, edited by Feiwel, G. R., New York University Press, New York, 191242.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arrow, K. J. 1989. “Von Neumann and the Existence Theorem for General Equilibrium” in John von Neumann and Modern Economics, edited by Dore, M., Chakravarty, S. and Goodwin, R., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1528.Google Scholar
Arrow, K. J. and Debreu, G.. 1954. “Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive EconomyEconometrica, 22, 265–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aumann, R. J. 1964. “Markets with a Continuum of TradersEconometrica, 32, 3950.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aumann, R. J. 1985. “What Is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?” in Frontiers of Economics, edited by Arrow, K. J. and Honkapohja, S., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 2776.Google Scholar
Aumann, R. J. 1987. “Game Theory” in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, edited by Eatwell, J., Milgate, M. and Newman, P., Macmillan Press, New York, 460–82.Google Scholar
Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York.Google Scholar
Battigalli, P., Gilli, M. and Molinari, M. C.. 1992. “Learning and Convergence to Equilibrium in Repeated Strategic Interactions: An Introductory SurveyRicerche Economiche, 3–4, 335–76.Google Scholar
Campbell, R. and Sowden, L.. 1985. Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation. Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver.Google Scholar
Debreu, G. 1959. Theory of Value. An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium, John Wiley and Sons, New York.Google Scholar
Debreu, G. and Scarf, H.. 1963. “A Limit Theorem on the Core of an EconomyInternational Economic Review, 4, 235–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dore, M. 1989. “The Legacy of John von Neumann” in John von Neumann and Modern Economics, edited by Dore, M., Chakravarty, S. and Goodwin, R., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 8299.Google Scholar
Edgeworth, F.Y. 1881. Mathematical Psychics, C. Kegan Paul, London.Google Scholar
Elster, J., ed. 1985. The Multiple Self, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
Feiwel, G. R. 1987a. “The Many Dimensions of Kenneth J. Arrow” in Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, edited by Feiwel, G. R., New York University Press, New York, 1115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feiwel, G. R. 1987b. “The Potentials and Limits of Economic Analysis: The Contributions of Kenneth J. Arrow” in Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, edited by Feiwel, G. R., New York University Press, New York, 1187.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hammond, P. 1976. “Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic ChoiceThe Review of Economic Studies, 43, 159–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. C. 1956. “Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's TheoriesEconometrica, 2, 144–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hicks, J. R. 1939. Value and Capital, Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Ingrao, B. and Israel, G.. 1987. La mano invisibile, Laterza, Roma-Bari.Google Scholar
Innocenti, A. 1993. L'introduzione della teoria dei giochi nell'economia dalle origini al 1959, Università di Firenze, Ph. D. thesis.Google Scholar
Kreps, D. M. 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modelling, Clarendon Press, Oxford.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. and Wilson, R.. 1982. “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's DilemmaJournal of Economic Theory, 27, 245–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kuhn, H. W. and Tucker, A. W.. 1958. “John von Neumann's Work in the Theory of Games and Mathematical EconomicsBulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 64, 100–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kydland, F. and Prescott, E.. 1977. “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal PlansJournal of Political Economy, 85, 473–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lehrer, E. 1988. “Repeated Games With Stationary Bounded Recall StrategiesJournal of Economic Theory, 46, 130–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leonard, R. J. 1992. “Creating a Context for Game TheoryHistory of Political Economy, 24, Annual Supplement, 2976.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McClennen, E. F. 1990. Rationality and Dynamic Choice. Foundational Exploration, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKenzie, L. 1954. “On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive SystemsEconometrica, 22, 147–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mirowski, P. 1992. “What Were von Neumann and Morgenstern Trying to Accomplish?History of Political Economy, 24, annual supplement, 113–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgenstern, O. 1928. Wirtschaftsprognose, Eine Untersuchung ihrer Voraussetzungen und Möglichkeiten, J. Springer, Wien.Google Scholar
Morgenstern, O. 1935a. “Vollkommene Voraussicht und wirtschaftliches GleichgewichtZeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 6, 337–57; English translation: “Perfect Foresight and Economic Equilibrium” in Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern, edited by Schotter, A., New York University Press, New York, 1976, 169–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgenstern, O. 1935b. “Das Zeitmoment in der WertlehreZeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 5, 433–58; English translation: “The Time Moment in Value Theory” in Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern, edited by Schotter, A., New York University Press, New York, 1976, 151–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgenstern, O. 1936. “Logistik und SozialwissenschaftenZeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 7, 124; English translation: “Logistics and Social Sciences” in Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern, edited by Schotter, A., New York University Press, New York, 1976, 389404.Google Scholar
Morgenstern, O. 1941. “Professor Hicks on Value and CapitalJournal of Political Economy, 49, 361–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgenstern, O. 1948. “Demand Theory ReconsideredQuarterly Journal of Economics, 62, 165201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgenstern, O. 1949. “Economics and the Theory of GamesKyklos, 3, 294308.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgenstern, O. 1972. “Thirteen Critical Points in Contemporary Economic Theory: An InterpretationJournal of Economic Literature, 10, 1163–89.Google Scholar
Morgenstern, O. 1976. “The Collaboration Between Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann on the Theory of GamesJournal of Economic Literature, 14, 805–16.Google Scholar
Nash, J. F. 1950. “Equilibrium Points in N-Person GamesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36, 48–9.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S.. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
Neumann, J. von. 1928. “Zur Theorie der GesellschaftsspieleMathematische Annalen, 100, 295320; English translation: “On the Theory of Games of Strategy” in Contributions to the Theory of Games, edited by Tucker, A.W. and Luce, R.D., IV, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959, 13–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neumann, J. von. 1937. “Ber ein ökonomisches Gleichungs-System und eine erallgemeinerung des Brouwerschen Fixpunktsatzes” in Ergebnisse eines Mathematischen Kolloquiums, Deuticke, Lipsia, edited by Menger, K.; English translation: “A Model of General Equilibrium” Review of Economic Studies, 13, 19451946, 19.Google Scholar
Neumann, J. von. and Morgenstern, O.. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton; 2d ed., 1947.Google Scholar
Peleg, B. and Yaari, M.. 1973. “On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes Are ChangingReview of Economic Studies, 40, 391401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phelps, E. S. and Pollak, R. A.. 1968. “On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium GrowthReview of Economic Studies, 102, 185–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Punzo, L. 1989. “Von Neumann and Karl Menger's Mathematical Colloquium” in John von Neumann and Modern Economics, edited by Dore, M., Chakravarty, S. and Goodwin, R., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2965.Google Scholar
Punzo, L. 1991. “The School of Mathematical Formalism and the Viennese Circle of Mathematical EconomistsJournal of the History of Economic Thought, 13, 118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Radner, R. 1986. “Can Bounded Rationality Resolve the Prisoner's Dilemma?” in Essays in Honor of Gerard Debreu, edited by Mas-Colell, A. and Hildenbrand, W., North Holland, Amsterdam, 387–99.Google Scholar
Rellstab, U. 1992. “New Insights into the Collaboration between John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern on the Theory of Games and Economic BehaviorHistory of Political Economy, 24, annual supplement, 7794.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubinstein, A. 1991. “Comments on the Interpretation of Game TheoryEconometrica, 59, 909–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sargent, T. J. 1993. Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics, Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Schmidt, C. 1990. “Game Theory and Economics: An Historical SurveyRevue d'Economie Politique, 100, 589618.Google Scholar
Schotter, A. 1992. “Oskar Morgenstern's Contribution to the Development of the Theory of GamesHistory of Political Economy, 24, annual supplement, 95112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schotter, A. and Schwödiauer, G.. 1980. “Economics and the Theory of Games: A SurveyJournal of Economic Literature, 18, 479527.Google Scholar
Selten, R. 1985. “Comment” on “What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?,” in Frontiers of Economics, edited by Arrow, K.J. and Honkapohja, S., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 7787.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Holden-Day, San Francisco.Google Scholar
Shubik, M. 1953. Competition and the Theory of Games, Princeton University, Ph. D. thesis.Google Scholar
Shubik, M. 1959a. “Edgeworth Market Games” in Contributions to the Theory of Games, IV, edited by Tucker, A. W. and Luce, R. D., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 267–78.Google Scholar
Shubik, M. 1959b. Strategy and Market Structure. Competition, Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, John Wiley and Sons, New York.Google Scholar
Strotz, R. H. 19551956. “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility MaximizationReview of Economic Studies, 23, 165–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tani, P. 1987. “Matematica” in Dizionario di Economia Politica, 13, edited by Lunghini, G., Boringhieri, Torino, 63186.Google Scholar
Tietz, R. and Weber, H.-J.. 1972. “On the Nature of the Bargaining Process in the KRESKO-Game” in Sauermann, H., ed., Beiträge zur Experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, (Contributions to Experimental Economics), 3, Tübingen, 305–34.Google Scholar
Weintraub, E. R. 1983. “On the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium: 1930–1954Journal of Economic Literature, 21, 139.Google Scholar
3
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Oskar Morgenstern and the Heterodox Potentialities of the Application of Game Theory to Economics
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Oskar Morgenstern and the Heterodox Potentialities of the Application of Game Theory to Economics
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Oskar Morgenstern and the Heterodox Potentialities of the Application of Game Theory to Economics
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *