The nature of party contention and public discourse in the late nineteenth century is one of the least understood and most elusive subjects in American history and historiography. In the period itself many critics condemned the intense partisanship of the two major parties as a sham battle, aimed more at filling offices than fulfilling ideals, and all too often tainted with corrupt motives and methods. In the classic formulation of Englishman James Bryce, “neither party has any principles…. [P]oints of political doctrine … have all but vanished …. All has been lost except office or the hope of it.”

In recent years scholars from various disciplines have begun to explore new questions concerning the role of the state in society. This article is related to two aspects of this emerging scholarship, namely, the work of scholars interested in the relationship between the state and the production and utilization of knowledge and the related work of what has been called the historical institutional group. Scholars working on the role of the state in the production of knowledge have abandoned an earlier model that saw the state as a passive recipient of knowledge from the private sector and now emphasize interaction: the state is seen as both a consumer and producer of knowledge. Recent research also suggests that the modern state is increasingly dependent on knowledge in order to demonstrate a rational basis for policy decisions: without such justification, the actions of the state lack legitimacy and are open to challenge and opposition. Related to this increased dependence of the state on knowledge is the conundrum of whether knowledge is acquired in order to develop policy or whether policy is adopted first and knowlege then sought in order to justify action.

In August 1945 the Truman administration faced a host of dilemmas when it moved to demobilize the American economy and dismantle the system of wartime economic regulations. The new President and many of his top officials lacked executive experience, having assumed their positions less than six months earlier. Given Japan's sudden and surprising surrender, they also had not yet prepared detailed reconversion plans, since most had expected the Pacific War to continue for at least six months to a year longer. And within the administration there was no consensus on two key issues—whether price controls would help or hinder the transition to peacetime, and whether inflation or unemployment was the main threat to postwar prosperity.