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ADS-B: Probabilistic Safety Assessment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 March 2017

Busyairah Syd Ali ,
Washington Yotto Ochieng  and
Arnab Majumdar
Busyairah Syd Ali*
Affiliation:
(University of Malaya, Malaysia)
Washington Yotto Ochieng
Affiliation:
(Imperial College London)
Arnab Majumdar
Affiliation:
(Imperial College London)
*
(E-mail: busyairah@um.edu.my)
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Abstract

In the effort to quantify Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system safety, the authors have identified potential ADS-B failure modes in Syd Ali et al. (2014). Based on the findings, six potential hazards of ADS-B are identified in this paper. The authors then applied the Probabilistic Safety Assessment approach which includes Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Importance Analysis methods to quantify the system safety. FTA is applied to measure ADS-B system availability for each identified hazard while Importance Analysis is conducted to identify the most significant failure modes that may lead to the occurrence of the hazards. In addition, risk significance and safety significance of each failure mode are also identified. The result shows that the availability for the ADS-B system as a sole surveillance means is low at 0·898 in comparison to the availability of ADS-B system as supplemental or as primary means of surveillance at 0·95 and 0·999 respectively. The latter availability values are obtained from Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (DO-242A).

Keywords

ADS-BFault Tree AnalysisImportance AnalysisFailure modes
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Navigation , Volume 70 , Issue 4 , July 2017 , pp. 887 - 906
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Navigation 2017 

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