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Nigeria: Political Non-alignment and Economic Alignment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Extract

It is commonly claimed by critics both within Nigeria and outside that, while the present Government preaches political non-alignment, it does not practise it, and indeed cannot because of Nigeria's economic alignment with the west. The present article seeks to assess the validity of this thesis. Three separate propositions are involved: first, that Nigeria professes but does not pursue a policy of non-alignment; secondly, that Nigeria is economically tied to the west; and finally, and most important, that there is a causal connexion between the two.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1964

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References

Page 247 note 1 House of Representatives Debates (Lagos), 20 08 1960,Google Scholar col. 2670.

Page 248 note 1 Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release, 5 10 1960.Google Scholar The Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, said in 1963, à propos the suggestion of an African bloc at the United Nations, that ‘we in Nigeria hate the idea of blocs … the whole idea of blocs is revoluting’, though it appeared that it was more the name than their nature which he found offensive. Summit Conference of African Heads of States, Addis Ababa, 24 May1 1963.

Page 250 note 1 Ibid. Similar views had been expressed by Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh in the House of Representatives over a year earlier: ‘We will warmly welcome help from whatever quarter it is offered provided only that there are no unacceptable strings attached. We know that in the world today external aid is normally tied to specific projects and sometimes also the purchase of capital goods required for those projects. This is understandable… These then are the sort of conditions, although naturally we would prefer to do without them, which we are prepared to accept… Further ties, particularly those involving political or economic strings, we are not prepared to accept.’ House of Representatives Debates, 29 03 1962, col. 535.Google Scholar

Page 251 note 1 Ibrahim, Waziri; Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release, 31 05 1962.Google Scholar

Page 251 note 2 U.S. Government, Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Washington, 1951);Google Scholar my italics.

Page 251 note 3 Control of Exports Order in Council, 10 December 1950; Official Gazette (Lagos), 1951, p.398.Google Scholar These regulations were tightened up on 10 February 1954.

Page 252 note 1 Official Gazette, 8 11 1962, p. 1664.Google Scholar The amendment to the regulations was dated 25 October 1962—three days before Chester Bowles arrived in Lagos to discuss the American aid programme in Nigeria. It is not clear whether the Nigerian Government was aware of the Battle Act at the time it accepted the American aid offer.

Page 252 note 2 Country Agreement initialled Agreement signed

Although negotiations with the Poles and the Russians began in June 1961 and with the Czechs in June 1960 (well before independence), the Polish agreement was the only one signed prior to the announcement, on 12 December 1961, of the U.S. offer of $225 million assistance to Nigeria. The Nigerian Economic Mission which visited Peking in June 1961 agreed to ‘explore the possibility of concluding a trade agreement’ with China, though columbite was not on the list drawn up at the time of ‘commodities which can be exported from Nigeria to China’. Okotie-Eboh, F. S., Report of the First and Second Stages of the Tour of the Nigerian Economic Mission (Lagos, 1962), pp. 26 and 38.Google Scholar

Page 252 note 3 Official Gazette, 1962 Supplement, pp. B 163 and 205.

Page 253 note 1 Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951. Fifteenth Report to Congress (Washington, 1962), p. 33.Google Scholar

Page 253 note 2 The Times, 18 09, 1963.Google Scholar The reported accreditation of a Ghanaian trade mission to East Berlin on 16 September led to the recall of the West German ambassador in Accra for consultations. The following month, Ghana's Foreign Minister visited Bonn to emphasise ‘that Ghana's trade mission in East Berlin was there merely to fulfil economic tasks, and that there was no intention of conferring on it a diplomatic or consular status’. According to the joint communiqué of 11 October 1963, ‘the German representatives expressed satisfaction with these statements.’

Page 254 note 1 Africa Diary (New Delhi, 1963), pp. 945–6.Google Scholar

Page 254 note 2 During the economic negotiations carried on in Lagos during November-December 1962, West Germany appears to have attempted to tie German aid to the acceptance of a proposed code of conduct concerning maritime and air transport. This was resisted. In the end, a modified Protocol ruling Out discrimination against the German flag was initialled. Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release, 7 12 1962.Google Scholar

Page 254 note 3 Chief S. O. Masi, Provincial Commissioner for Onitsha, crossed over to East Berlin briefly in June 1963. A number of trade unionists have also visited East Germany, and quite a number of students are studying there. The National Secretary and National Administrative Secretary of the N.C.N.C. planned a visit in the autumn of 1962, partly in connexion with the alleged victimisation of Nigerian students by the G.D.R. authorities, but the trip did not take place.

Page 255 note 1 Nigerian trade with the Soviet bloc for 1962:

Page 255 note 2 Mallam Aminu Kano, Second Committee, U.N. General Assembly, 18 October 1961.

Page 255 note 3 House of Representatives Debates, 24 09 1962, col. 2712.Google Scholar It is a measure of the misunderstanding that existed on each side on this question ofassociation that the E.E.C. members expected that the offer of a voice in shaping Community policy on Africa would appeal to the English-speaking African states, whereas it proved to be one of the principal obstacles, being interpreted as a sinister plot to entangle African countries in European affairs.

Page 256 note 1 Service with Overseas Governments (London, 1960), Cmd. 1193;Google Scholar Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release, 4 03 1961 and 7 08 1962.Google Scholar

Page 256 note 2 Chief Awolowo's allegation was first made at a press conference in Lagos on 3 May 1960, and subsequently repeated in Parliament. House of Representatives Debates, 19 11 1960, col. 100.Google Scholar It was equally angrily denied by all other leaders involved, including Chief Awolowo himself on one occasion; ibid. 14 January 1960, col. 38.

Page 257 note 1 Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release, 12 08 1961.Google Scholar Earlier, he had told Parliament: ‘There are occasions when we cannot help contrasting the massive financial aid which is poured into countries which are in danger of joining the communist bloc, particularly by the Government of the United States. It is our impression that a country has only to appear to be flirting with the communist bloc and substantial financial assistance is immediately forthcoming from the Western Democracies. We in Nigeria, who have always admired the democratic way of living and who have firm and lasting attachments to the Western Democracies find it difficult to understand such an attitude whereby the staunch friends are ignored and the waverers are given every assistance. We sincerely hope that this is an attitude which will change, for how much more valuable is it to strengthen those who are already one's firm supporters rather than to invest in countries which may well prove unreliable allies?’ House of Representatives Debates, 22 02 1958, cols. 229–30.Google Scholar

Page 258 note 1 Address to Nigerian students in London and Oxford, May 1957.

Page 258 note House of Representatives Debates, I4 01 1960, col. 35.Google Scholar

Page 259 note Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release, 28 07 1959.Google Scholar

Page 259 note Ibid. and 1 October 1962.

Page 259 note 3 Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference, Lagos; ibid. 8 November 1962. Six months earlier, the Eastern Nigerian Premier had also called for a Commonwealth common market; News from Eastern Nigeria, 24 05 1962.Google Scholar

Page 259 note 4 The other wasJeddah, in Saudi Arabia, though the ambassador resided in Khartoum. The sixth mission to be opened was in Moscow.

Page 259 note 5 Earlier the High Commissioner in London had been named non-resident ambassador to Belgium, but this arrangement did not prove entirely satisfactory as he did not have direct or regular contact with the E.E.C.

Page 260 note 1 The most important of these was The European Common Market and the Nigerian Economy—a report to the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Nigeria (Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1962),Google Scholar which was financed by U.S. A.I.D.

Page 260 note 2 House of Representatives Debates, 24 09 1962, cols. 2715–16.Google Scholar

Page 261 note 1 Federal Ministry of Information, Press Releases, 4 and 17 05 1961.Google Scholar The Minister of Commerce and Industry had called on Nigerians not to be too emotional: ‘As a result of our break with France, overseas territories associated with France are not as friendly as they should be and winning their cooperation may be difficult.’ House of Representatives Debates, 8 04 1961, col. 1035.Google Scholar In 1960, the transit trade amounted to £4·6 million in imports to these countries and £6·4 million in exports. Nigerian Trade Summary (Lagos, 1960), pp. 236–7.Google Scholar

Page 261 note 2 The N.C.N.C. called for full economic sanctions and a boycott of French goods and shops. N.C.N.C., Press Release, 26 04 1961.Google Scholar

Page 262 note 1 Nigerian trade with France:

Page 262 note 2 Western Region, Press Release, 17 07 1963.Google Scholar

Page 263 note 1 Davies, H. O., Nigeria: Prospects for Democracy (London, 1961), p. 123.Google Scholar