This article examines, from a comparative perspective, those electoral practices labelled as ‘corrupt’ in Latin America between 1830 and 1930, in order to gain a fuller appreciation of the significant role played by elections in the history of the region. The article starts by using the term ‘electoral corruption’ in its general sense, as often used by contemporaries themselves when referring to the various practices that, in their view, distorted the vote, and therefore the meaning of suffrage. From this general definition, the article moves on to distinguish between the different types of corrupt practice, with the aim of identifying the extent to which they affected electoral competition. By offering a revision of the assumptions that have hitherto served to undermine the historical meaning of the suffrage, this article aims to encourage the study of electoral history in the region. The examination of electoral corruption is therefore preceded by a brief survey of the historiography of Latin American elections.

Those natures which, when they meet, quickly lay hold on and mutually affect one another we call affined. This affinity is sufficiently striking in the case of alkalis and acids which, although they are mutually antithetical … most decidedly seek and embrace one another, modify one another, and together form a new substance … It is in just this way that truly meaningful friendships can arise among human beings: for antithetical qualities make possible a closer and more intimate union.

Goethe, Elective affinities (1809)

A linear mode of historical understanding relegated alchemy to a ‘pre-scientific’ era, with the enlightenment's New Chemistry creating a break between ‘empirical’ and ‘scientific’ metallurgies. Similarly, Bolivia's early Republican silver-production has been regarded as ‘stagnant’ and ‘colonial’ from the ‘modern’ perspective of late nineteenth century liberalism. This article questions both periodisations by documenting an ‘alchemical renaissance’ in Bolivian silver-refining methods during the first part of the 19th century. The relaunch of Alonso Barba's ‘hot method’ of amalgamation in copper cauldrons (1609), and its associated technical discourses, expressed a creole desire for an independent ‘modernity’. This rediscovery of a seventeenth century technology, carried out shortly before the Independence War in the Potosí provinces (Chichas), and slightly later in Oruro and Carangas, is distinguished from the version reinvented in Central Europe by Ignaz von Born (1786), as well as from two pre-Bornian experiments in Potosí and New Spain. Its nineteenth century consolidation was, in part, a little-known reaction to Nordenflicht's failure to introduce the new European method of rotating barrels to the Andes during the 1790s. The article shows that this ‘alchemy of modernity’ held its ground for several decades, suggesting a fresh approach to America's postcolonial ambiguities from the perspective of a comparative history of technology.

This article examines direct appeals to Portuguese monarchs and how this extrajudicial option was invoked by slaves and free persons of African descent in colonial Brazil. It also addresses the production and content of appeals and what these reflect of the lives of Afro-Brazilians, relations between slave and owner, manumissions, judicial and individual abuse of women and popular perceptions and expectations of a monarch. The pros and cons of this appellate recourse are discussed in the context of colonial governance and of how royal acts of private justice reinforced the moral authority of monarchs, the sacred quality of monarchy and those personal qualities of magnanimity and compassion associated with the ideal of kingship.

This article examines the ideas of Mexican elites about the international market during the porfiriato (1876–1910), an age marked by imperialism and monopoly capitalism. It focuses specifically on their thoughts about foreign trade, investment and workers. They viewed the international economy as a Darwinian battle for survival, but were not isolationists. In keeping with opinions articulated by US imperialists, they maintained that foreign blood, money and goods were essential to Mexico's economic progress. But they also feared that foreign economic penetration would undermine sovereignty. To resolve this dilemma, they championed state regulation of foreign economic interests. Thus, rather than extol the virtues of laissez-faire, members of the Porfirian intelligentsia were ambivalent internationalists.

To date, factor endowments or comparative advantages in the international economy, have been at the centre of explanations for the economic performance of Argentina in the nineteenth century. Historians have focused on the increasing volume of rural exports and the availability of land on the frontier. Yet, the contemporary fiscal and monetary events have been ignored. From the 1820s to the 1860s, the state was mainly financed by issues of inconvertible paper currency. Hence, depreciation and high volatility of the means of payment became a basic feature of the Buenos Aires economy. This article will reassess the expansion of the rural economy in the light of the impact of inflationary finances.

This article provides an analysis of royalist strategy in the viceroyalty of Peru during the four years between the arrival of José de San Martín's invasion force in September 1820 and the battle of Ayacucho of December 1824. It pays particular attention to royalist policy from July 1821, when viceroy José de la Serna evacuated Lima, the viceregal capital, leaving the city open to San Martín, who declared independence there on 28 July. Its focus differs, therefore, from that of most previous commentators on Peru's transition to independence, who have tended to neglect royalist policy and activity during these crucial final years in favour of a concentration upon the activities of San Martín, Antonio José de Sucre, Simón Bolívar and their Peruvian allies. The article begins with a brief contextual discussion of the historiography of Peruvian independence and subsequently analyses the main features of historical developments in the viceroyalty in the period 1810–20. Following substantive discussion of the period 1820–4, it concludes with observations on the historical legacy in Peru of the royalists' elevation of the city of Cusco to the status of viceregal capital in 1822–4.

The predominant interpretation of nineteenth century Latin America is to see the failure of constitutional democracy in the region in terms of the inability of liberal elites to break with an authoritarian past. Against these views, we argue that the divorce between liberalism and democracy in Latin America was the unintended outcome of the institutions created by the liberal elite in response to the problems of territorial fragmentation and factional conflict that emerged after the fall of the Spanish empire. Using the cases of Argentina and Mexico, we support this proposition by focusing on the creation of a centralised form of government and a system of electoral control by the ruling elites as the main factors that through time prevented the evolution of the liberal regime into a competitive democracy.

There is no good faith in America, nor among the nations of America. Treaties are scraps of paper; constitutions, printed matter; elections, battles; freedom, anarchy; and life, a torment.

Simón Bolívar

This article examines the way in which politics amongst the indigenous population became nationalised between the years 1826 and 1921. The problem of land ownership is presented as the catalyst of a process of public action and apprenticeship combining rebellions, legal battles and patronage agreements. The joint analysis of these actions allows, first, the refutation of the image of the Indians as pre-political, passive, incomprehensible and alien to all that was Western; second, to emphasise the important effect the national discourse had on the response of the Indians; and, third, to show the indigenous interest in taking part in the prevailing national project.

From 1910 to 1927 workers in the Mexican cotton textile industry took advantage of the larger surrounding revolution to create a revolution of their own. Based on a significant and persistent challenge to workplace authority, millhands radically transformed the labour regime in Mexican industry. Although owners combated the workers' rebellion, they never inflicted a decisive defeat. As a consequence, the conditions of work in Mexican mills improved dramatically. Among the advancements workers fought for, and obtained, were a sharp reduction in the working day from fourteen hours to eight, mandated medical care for work-related accidents and illnesses and union control of hiring and firing. The latter included the union shop and a system of tripartite boards that made it virtually impossible to fire workers who enjoyed union support. The new labour regime reflected changes in the formal and informal institutions of work, but its final institutionalisation empowered unions more than the rank and file workers who fought to change the social relations of work.

This article examines the role of the Supreme Court in the development of the Mexican political system. The judiciary provided an important source of regime legitimation, as it allowed for the consolidation of a state of legality and a claim to constitutional rule of law, at least in discourse. However, the judiciary was in effect politically subordinated to the logic of dominant party rule through both specific constitutional reforms since 1917 that weakened the possibility of judicial independence and a politics of institutional and political co-optation. The constitutional reform of 1994 has significantly altered the nature of the relationship between the executive and the Supreme Court.

Two of the most striking aspects of social change in recent decades in Latin America have been the rise of indigenist movements and the spread of evangelical Protestantism. To date they have been analysed separately, but this article shows that a comparison of the two in the context of Bolivia can prove highly productive. Although in many respects evangelismo and katarismo are diametrically opposed, there are some striking similarities. They draw their adherents from the same social base, undermine the notion of a homogeneous nation-state and also clearly reject the position of cultural mestizaje at the root of Bolivian state ideology. Thus, at a time when ‘hybridised’ cultural forms are supposed to be becoming more common in Latin America and around the world, these two social movements explicitly contest hybridity.

This article uses both new and published data on Mexico's foreign trade to measure terms of trade and to investigate the relationship between trade and the early growth of domestic industry. This analysis yields five conclusions: (1) Mexican terms of trade declined, largely due to the dramatic fall in the price of silver; (2) the growing diversity of Mexican exports significantly cushioned the short-term impact of silver depreciation; (3) declining terms of trade did not characterise the entire era, but instead were concentrated in two periods: 1891–97 and 1912–21; (4) although net barter terms of trade declined, Mexico's capacity to import – measured by the income terms of trade – improved markedly, and (5) this proved absolutely crucial in financing the concurrent process of incipient import-substituting industrialisation. In other words, the Porfiriato witnessed a development process in which trade growth and the spread of domestic manufacturing were highly complementary. Without the former, industrialisation would have been severely handicapped.

One of the most persistent and influential concepts in Andean studies during the last few decades has been that of dualism at different levels of Andean cultural and sociopolitical life. How dualism works and the manner in which it has evolved have been the subject of much debate. Within this context, Jesús de Machaqa in highland Bolivia has been recognised as a region of primary importance for investigation, because of its enduring socio-political structures. However, a study of its ‘traditional’ structure carried out in the 1970s showed that important changes had taken place. New studies of intra-communal structures and recent studies of Aymara spatial organisation, together with information held in colonial documents and oral traditions help to shed more light on the question of dualism. Drawing on all these sources, this article aims to contribute to wider debate by examining key aspects of the ‘traditional’ structure and setting out some of the methodological problems faced by those who seek to reconstruct the past of indigenous communities, in particular problems related to the combined use of colonial documents and oral traditions.

For around 15 years Latin America has been undergoing an unprecedented conjunction of political and economic change, from authoritarianism to democracy and from a state-centred matrix of economic development towards free-market economies. This article takes up the theme of the links between politics and economic change in contemporary Latin America. More specifically, it examines the relation between ‘old politics’ and ‘new economics’. It has two main purposes: The first is to re-examine some of modernisation theory's assumptions about the relations between political and economic modernisation. The second, more specific to the Latin American debate, is to question some of the dominant views about the nature of democracy in the region, particularly Guillermo O'Donnell's influential ‘delegative democracy’ model.

This article examines how Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar emerged as the ‘strong man’ of Cuba. Historians have pointed out that from 1934 to 1940 Batista's primary support came from the army and the police. We also know that, like many other Latin American leaders at the time, Batista went through a ‘populist phase’. Populists acknowledged the reality that ‘the masses’ were a new force in society and that ‘the people’ were at the centre of the nation and the state. Populist discourse functioned to construct a ‘people’ out of fragmented and scattered populations. Batista was very aware that in order to rule Cuba he had to appeal to ‘the people’ and to the revolutionary sentiments of 1933. But we need more information about exactly what Batista's political ideas were and how he put them into practice. This article shows how Batista became, in his own words, the ‘architect’ of the post-revolutionary state between 1937 and 1940. Batista supervised Cuba's transition from a military dictatorship in 1934 to a nominal constitutional democracy in 1940. The aim is to shed some light on how this remarkable transition took place.

This article highlights a number of themes useful in the gendered analysis of democratic consolidation in Latin America by means of a comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile. It starts from the assumption that much of the work on democratisation in Latin America – both orthodox and the literature concentrating on women and transitions – produced up until now, has been too voluntaristic in its approach. It argues that what is needed, particularly in the study of democratic consolidation, is an analysis not only of the impact of women and women's organisations on institutions and structures but also of how these institutions and structures can shape and change gender relations and different women's activities. Any gendered analysis of democratic consolidation must begin by examining the terms of transition which, while they can be subject to some renegotiation later, affect the nature of the subsequent system and the space available to different actors. It is argued that a number of characteristics of the post-transition system are significant: first the impact of more arbitrary populist or presidential systems, second the importance of women's organising both inside and outside the state and party systems and third the existence of an institutionalised party system.

This article analyses the role of the economic team known as the ‘Chicago Boys’ and of the main political faction in Pinochet's Chile, the ‘Gremialists’, founded by Jaime Guzmán in the Catholic University in 1966. These two sectors of the elite had a common professional and political career and were the principal civilian groups of the dictatorship who developed a long-term political strategy that deeply influenced both the economic and political orientation of the military regime. They shared a long-term power strategy, that was basically defined by the ‘Gremialists’. The article focuses on the role played by ODEPLAN in shaping the economic reforms. It demonstrates that the coherence of the economic model inherent in the implementation of its policies is to be found in the integration of the policies with a political project, articulated by the ‘Gremialists’.

I want to make it clear that I am convinced that the main responsibility for all that is going on in Chile lies not with the military, but rather with the civilian advisors and the whole climate of adulation and servilism that the economic right has created around them, The ideology of the government was born in the most traditional circles of the economic right, disguised under the sign of ‘nationalism’ and shielded behind ‘the courage to declare oneself anti- Marxist’.

This article offers an interpretation of the crisis of the Bolivian Left in the mid-1980s, perhaps the most spectacular of all those suffered by the Latin American Left over the course of the decade. The author shows that the main distinguishing feature of the Bolivian case was the exceptional political power of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). It was this that enabled the union federation first to impose a highly expansive wage policy on the Unión Democrática y Popular (UDP) government, and then to veto its attempts to move towards a more realistic financial policy. The author goes on to argue that, in this second period, when the undesired consequences of the government's economic policy were sufficiently obvious to persuade the union to change its original strategies, the institutional structure that the COB had inherited from the past restricted and ultimately eliminated the union's strategic capacity. In this interpretation, the power of the union vis-à-vis a weak government, coupled with the union's own weakness as a corporate actor, gave rise to an accelerated process of institutional decline under the UDP government. This process was marked by the increasing prevalence of particularist and partial rationalities over the collective rationality, taking Bolivia to a Hobbesian situation, in which any actor capable of imposing a new order – however authoritarian or exclusive – would enjoy widespread support and legitimacy.

Although Chile is a relatively small country, writings about the Chilean party systems have long been better and more voluminous than is the case with most party systems in Latin America. Several orthodoxies have emerged in this literature: that Chilean parties are strong, that the party systems have been divided into three roughly equal parts, and that they have been relatively stable. The purpose of this article is to challenge these three orthodoxies. These orthodoxies are not completely wrong, but they need to be qualified.

The dominant view that Chilean parties are strong has been overstated. They have been strong in some respects and for some periods, but not in others. Parties have traditionally dominated mechanisms of representation in Chile's democratic periods, overshadowing unions, social movements, and other forms of representation. Party penetration in the electorate, however, has not been powerful. Parties have appeared and disappeared with frequency, and most parties have been relatively weak organisationally. More so than is the case in Uruguay, Venezuela from 1958 until the 1990s, Costa Rica or most of Western Europe, Chile's democratic periods have allowed space for anti-party populists to develop successful political careers, including capturing the presidency.

Latin American fish production has expanded significantly in recent years. Unfortunately, as management systems in the three major Latin American fish producing countries have not developed at the same pace, all three countries now experience problems of overfishing and industrial overcapitalisation. This article examines the distinctive national fisheries development programmes that have led to this ‘tragedy of the oceans’. By comparing and contrasting the Peruvian, Chilean and Mexican management styles, it offers a critical assessment regarding the likely direction of future Latin American fisheries policy.