In general, we are all aware of the shortcomings of historical statistics. But this may be the moment, as the cliometricians dust off their computers, to take a closer look at one of the more attractive series, the statistics for foreign trade. Assuming that foreign trade figures exist at all and that they are not distorted beyond average by misrepresentation or fraud, the most difficult problems of interpretation are likely to arise over the origin and destination of the trade, the system of valuation of the products traded, and the classifications employed.

The most recent as well as the most comprehensive book on the statistics of the Atlantic slave trade has been written by Professor Philip D. Curtin. The Atlantic Slave Trade, A Census is a work which applies modern techniques and sophisticated analysis to the very difficult historical problem of the magnitude of the Atlantic slave trade. As Curtin himself states: ‘The dimensions of the nineteenth century slave trade have always been a matter of controversy — political controversy at the time and historical controversy since’. Professor Curtin's book will not put an end to the controversy, but it does suggest further areas for research. More work needs to be done on the historical sources from which the statistics of the slave trade are derived. This article examines the main sources available for assessing the importation of slaves into Cuba from 1790 to 1867 and analyses the statistics which these sources yield in the light of Curtin's conclusions.

The military coup d'état which installed General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez as President of El Salvador during December 1931 created a crisis involving the 1923 Washington Treaties. By the terms of these accords, the Central American nadons had pledged to withhold recognition from governments seizing power through force in any of the isthmian republics. Although not a signatory of the treaty, the United States based its recognition policy on this principle. Through this means the State Department had attempted to impose some stability in Central America, by discouraging revolts. With the co-operation of the isthmian governments, United States diplomats endeavored to bring pressure to bear on the leaders of any uprising, to deny them the fruits of their victory, and thus reduce the constant series of coups and counter-coups that normally characterized Central American politics.

Recent explanations of the crisis in Uruguay have tended to focus either on the inadequacies of economic policy in the 1950s, or on the financial and moral implications of the social legislation of Uruguay. This article puts forward an alternative interpretation of the crisis, finding the fundamental causes of it in the manner in which modernizing forces were reconciled to traditional structures in the early decades of this century. The first section discusses the nature of the economic crisis, its immediate causes and some of its political repercussions. The second analyses Uruguay's reputation for political and social modernity. The third suggests the origins of the crisis in the policies of José Batlle y Ordóñez and the consequences they have had. The sections, therefore, broadly correspond to three different perspectives on the crisis–the first economic, the second political, the third historical.