Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 May 2015
This article unveils the continuous and productive relationship that developed between Chile and the IMF during Salvador Allende's presidency (1970–73). This counter-intuitive relationship was made possible by the systematic depoliticisation and technocratisation of the ties between them. By downplaying ideological discrepancies and keeping a high degree of autonomy, the IMF and Chilean technocrats blurred rigid Cold War divides and circumvented the US-imposed embargo against Allende's regime. The examination of this relationship sheds new light on Allende's positioning in the international arena and provides a unique prism to reconsider dichotomist perceptions of the Cold War in Latin America.
Este artículo muestra la continua y productiva relación que se desarrolló entre Chile y el FMI durante la presidencia de Salvador Allende (1970–73). Esta peculiar relación fue posible por la sistemática despolitización y tecnocratización de los lazos entre ellos. Al poner de lado las discrepancias ideológicas y mantener un alto grado de autonomía, el FMI y los tecnócratas chilenos hicieron menos claras las rígidas divisiones de la Guerra Fría y circunnavegaron el embargo estadounidense en contra del régimen de Allende. El examen de dicha relación ofrece una nueva perspectiva sobre el posicionamiento de Allende en la arena internacional y provee un enfoque único para reconsiderar las percepciones dicotómicas de la Guerra Fría en Latinoamérica.
Este artigo desvela a contínua e produtiva relação que se desenvolveu entre o Chile e o FMI durante o mandato de Salvador Allende (1970–1973). Este relacionamento contra-intuitivo tornou-se possível devido à sistemática despolitização e tecnocratização da relação entre as duas partes. Minimizando as diferenças ideológicas e mantendo um alto nível de autonomia, o FMI e os tecnocratas do Chile ofuscaram as divisões da Guerra Fria e contornaram o embargo imposto pelos Estados Unidos contra o governo de Allende. A análise desta relação apresenta uma nova visão sobre o posicionamento de Allende na arena internacional e oferece um ponto de vista único para se reconsiderar percepções dicotômicas sobre a Guerra Fria na América Latina.
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58 Del Canto to Managing Director, ‘Recent Modifications to Chile's Exchange Regulations', 23 Dec. 1970, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 2, IMF Archives.
61 State Department, ‘Memorandum for Mr Henry A. Kissinger. The White House’, 4 Dec. 1970, S/S 16364, 52–53, National Security Archive, available at www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc20.pdf.
62 Phone Conversation no. 517–020, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and John B. Connally, June 11, 1971, in The Nixon Administration's Response to Salvador Allende and Chilean Expropriation, available at http://nixontapeaudio.org/chile/chile.pdf.
63 Fernando A. Vera to Managing Director and Deputy Managing Director, ‘Visit to Chile’, 3 Feb. 1971, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
72 ‘Chile – Staff Report and Proposed Decision for the 1971 Art. XIV Consultation’, 11 Aug. 1971, SM/71/209, IMF Archives.
75 ‘Observaciones del Banco Central de Chile al informe del personal del FMI sobre consultas del Art. XIV con Chile, 1971’, (no date) WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
76 Marshall to Barnouin, Note, 5 Oct. 1971, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
78 The quotation is from Carlos Sansón to Acting Managing Director, ‘Mission to Chile, 7 Nov.–6 Dec.’, 11 Dec. 1973, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 4, IMF Archives.
79 Marshall to Barnouin, Note, 5 Oct. 1971.
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86 Vera to Del Canto, ‘Chile’, 5 No. 1971, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
89 Barnouin to Managing Director and Executive Managing Director, ‘Mission to Chile, November 10–16, 1971’, 19 Nov. 1971, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
92 Enrique Cosio-Pascal, ‘The Emerging of a Multilateral Forum for Debt Restructuring: The Paris Club’ (UNCTAD Discussion Papers, no. 192, Nov. 2008), pp. 1–12.
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99 Barnouin to Vera, ‘Chile – Debt Renegotiation’, 24 Nov. 1971, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
101 Barnouin to Vera, ‘Chile – Debt Renegotiation’, 24 Nov. 1971, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
102 Chilean Embassy in Washington DC to the IMF Managing Director, 29 Nov. 1971, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
103 Confidential, ‘Chile – Use of Fund Resources', Prepared by the Research Department and the Western Hemisphere Department (In consultation with the Exchange and Trade Relations, the Legal, and the Treasurer's Departments), 3 Dec. 1971, EBS/71/325, IMF Archives.
104 Cable, IMF to Chile Central Bank, 10 Dec. 1971, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
105 Cable, Reuter to Western Hemisphere Department, 31 Dec. 1971, WHD-Chile, Box 49, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
106 Fund Staff Mission to Chile, 28 Dec. 1971, EBD/71/442, IMF Archives.
107 Confidential Briefing for Mission, 27 Feb. 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 1, IMF Archives.
110 Confidential Briefing for Mission, 27 Feb. 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 1, IMF Archives.
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113 Confidential Briefing for Mission, 27 Feb. 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 1, IMF Archives.
114 Office Memorandum, Del Canto to Managing Director, ‘Briefing for Visit to Chile’, 13 April 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 1, IMF Archives. In March 1972 Ambassador Letelier informed the US State Department that an IMF mission was assisting Chile in the elaboration of ‘acceptable alternatives to a stand-by’: see ‘Conversation between Ambassador Letelier and Dept Asst Secretary Crimmins', telegram from Department of State, 9 March 1972, Box 1149, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numerical Files, 1970–1973 Economic, INCO 15–2, RG 59, U. S. National Archives and Records Administration.
115 Confidential Action Memorandum, The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Attached to a memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger, 4 Oct. 1971, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 289, Treasury, Volume II 1971. Confidential. SUBJECT: U. S. Expropriation Policy in Multilateral Institutions, available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/iv/15575.htm.
116 Harmer, Allende's Chile, pp. 161–3.
117 Alberto Eguren to Enrique Lerdau, ‘Back-to-office-report – Paris Club Meeting on Chile's External Debt’, 13 April 1972; file unit 1596218, World Bank Archives.
118 ‘Agreement on Chile's Debt Reportedly Signed in Paris', Washington Post, 20 April 1972; ‘Agreement on Rescheduling Foreign Debt’, The Times, 20 April 1972; Office Memorandum, David Finch and Barnouin to Managing Director, ‘Final Chilean Debt Meetings: Paris, April 17–19’, 21 April 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 1, IMF Archives.
121 Barnouin to Del Canto, Office Memorandum, ‘Telephone conversation with Jorge Marshall’, 30 June 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 1, IMF Archives.
124 Until 1973 1 SDR was equivalent to US$1.
125 Confidential Office Memorandum, Managing Director to Members of the Executive Board, 28 July 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 1, IMF Archives; Chile – Gold Tranche Purchase Transaction, 27 July 1972, EBS/72/245, IMF Archives.
126 Walter Robicheck to Barnouin, Office Memorandum, ‘Negotiations with Chile’, 17 Aug. 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 2, IMF Archives.
127 Office Memorandum, Barnouin to Del Canto, Meeting with Ambassador Letelier, 3 Nov. 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 2, IMF Archives.
131 Cable, Chile Central Bank to Interfund, 14 Dec. 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 2, IMF Archives.
132 Office Memorandum, Barnouin to Del Canto, ‘Chile – Export Performance and Second Use of Compensatory Financing Facility’, 10 Nov. 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 2, IMF Archives; Confidential, Secretary to Members of Executive Board, ‘Chile – Use of Fund Resources', 13 Dec. 1972, EBS/72/388, IMF Archives.
133 Cable, Interfund to Chilean Central Bank, 20 Dec. 1972, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 2, IMF Archives.
134 Office Memorandum, Barnouin to Del Canto, ‘Fund Participation in the next Chilean debt meeting’, 5 April 1973, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
135 ‘Briefing for Mission to Chile’, Approved by Del Canto and David Finch, 16 April 1973, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
136 Confidential, ‘Staff Report for the 1973 Article XIV Consultation’, Approved by Jorge Del Canto and David Finch, 13 June 1973, SM/73,141, IMF Archives.
137 ‘Supplementary Staff Report and Amended Proposed Decision for the 1973 Article XIV Consultation’, Approved by Del Canto and David Finch, 3 July 1973, SM/73,141 Supplement 1, IMF Archives.
139 ‘Briefing for mission to Chile’, 16 April 1973.
141 Confidential Letter, Eduard Brau to Managing Director, ‘Chilean Debt Meeting – Paris, July 12–13’, 19 July 1973, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 3, IMF Archives.
143 Office Memorandum, Barnouin to Del Canto, ‘Fund Visit to Chile’, 5 Sept. 1973, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 4, IMF Archives.
144 Office Memorandum, Linda Koenig to Del Canto, ‘Fund Visit to Chile’, 10 Sept. 1973, WHD-Chile, Box 50, Folder 4, IMF Archives.
145 Cable, Barnouin to Del Canto, 12 Sept. 1973, WHD-Chile, Box # 50, Folder 4, IMF Archives.