The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of economic relations between Latin America and the United States in the 1970s and to suggest the implications of this evolution. The central proposition is that a shift in relative strength took place during this period that created the potential for achieving a new balance of economic power. This shift also created tension in the old pattern of inter-American security links. The process of transforming potential power into real power had relevant implications for economic, political, and security interests.

Recent violence, civil war, revolution, and economic crises have focused attention on Central America. Analyses of these crises vary widely. Class struggle, Soviet or U.S. imperialism, geopolitical balance of power, the energy crisis, and the general malaise of the West all contribute to the turmoil on the isthmus. Yet the bitter political and economic realities of contemporary Central America are deeply rooted in the past. The present conflicts are neither recent in origin nor conducive to short-term military, economic, or political solutions. This article offers a historical interpretation of modern Central America as an explanation of the current crises. The hypothesis of this overview is that the current crises all represent the inevitable collapse of political, economic, and cultural structures erected in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to serve the interests of the elites who commanded the Liberal Reforms or Revolutions of that era, but that fail to meet the demands of the societies they created.

In contemporary Latin America whenever there are successive free elections turnover tends to occur at every opportunity. That is, incumbent parties or coalitions seldom win; if they do, they almost invariably show diminished electoral support compared to that of the previous election.

The frequency of incumbent defeat seems especially remarkable in view of the traditionally strong Latin American presidency. The history of some Latin American countries has been replete with continuismo (the perpetuation of a president or regime in office through manipulation of formal constitutional procedures). Even in those polities with a record of frequent adherence to constitutional norms, the president has tended to be “strong,” at least compared to other governmental institutions, such as legislatures, courts, and state or local governments. Unsatisfied with the term “presidential,” in the North American sense, Jacques Lambert calls Latin American governments “regimes of presidential dominance” (Lambert, 1967).

The October 1983 crisis in Grenada left little doubt that the Soviet and Cuban presence had been expanding in the Caribbean basin. But the October crisis did not answer questions regarding the extent of their actual influence there, nor the direction it might take in the future, nor even what the most appropriate U.S. policy responses should be to that influence elsewhere in the region. Therefore, in the wake of the U.S. occupation of Grenada and the evidence it uncovered about the degree of Soviet and Cuban activity there, it is useful to examine the kind of situations that have encouraged the Soviets to expand their presence and/or influence in Latin America. At the same time, it equally is useful to examine the limitations or constraints on such an expanded presence or influence.

Clearly, Soviet policy in Latin America has been the product of two conflicting forces or tendencies.

Haitians have been migrating to the United States in significant numbers since the rise to power of Francois Duvalier over a quarter century ago. A few who have been able to meet the strict eligibility criteria of U. S. immigration law have entered as legal immigrants. Perhaps as many as 300,000 others have entered illegally, or have overstayed the terms of their temporary visas. A diverse population composed of professionals and businessmen, students and shopkeepers, journalists, small land holders, and illiterate peasants, it is impossible to capture their individual reasons for leaving Haiti and coming to the United States in a single all-inclusive phrase.

Haiti is the poorest country in this hemisphere. Nearly all who leave to come to the United States are aware that they are trading malnutrition, negligible educational opportunities, and a subsistence standard of living for the greater opportunities afforded by life in America.

In recent years, a violent social and political upheaval has been underway in Central America. A revolutionary regime has taken power in Nicaragua, and leftist guerrilla forces have begun to threaten the survival of the existing governments in El Salvador and Guatemala. Geographically surrounded by these three politically unstable countries, Honduras, in contrast, has remained remarkably free of serious internal revolutionary pressures. Although Honduras shares many of the problems of poverty, inequality, dependency, and authoritarian tradition that are associated with its neighbors, Honduran authorities have managed to maintain political order.

The crushing weight of Brazil's foreign debt and the enormous role of state enterprise in the economy have led to sharp criticism of public economic policy. Private entrepreneurs and many social scientists complain that the state has become virtually autonomous, subjecting society to its will. The “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” has taken advantage of two decades of authoritarian rule to concentrate power and “mordomias” (perquisites). According to critics, they have thereby caused the national private sector to atrophy and development to halt. The solution suggested by many Brazilians today is redemocratization; by making the state more responsive to civil society its economic presence can be diminished and the private sphere strengthened.

The study of Brazil's past experience with changes of regime casts doubt on the possibility of restricting the scope of the state in the economy. It is true that the traditional interpretation argues that the Republican Revolution of 1889 dramatically reduced the state's economic role.

The Reagan administration is sending mixed messages on its policy in Central America, leading some observers to label the policy “schizoid” and influencing yet others to give the president the benefit of the doubt until policy implications become clearer or unavoidable. Commenting in July on White House policy as it has been iterated in the first half of 1983, Senator Christopher Dodd (1983), a leading administration critic, asserted that “there is total confusion in Washington as to what the administration's policies are, and there is a total confusion in Central America as to what U.S. intentions are.” Similar charges have been made from both sides of the aisle in Congress.

Almost sadly, these charges are not part of an opposition's political ploy, but in fact are rooted in speeches, position papers, and actions formulated by the president and his Central America policy team.

The violence in Central America has displaced an unprecedented number of people in the area. While the majority of the approximately two million displaced individuals remain within their native countries, hundreds of thousands have fled to neighboring countries and to the U.S. where they create serious economic and political problems for the host governments. This article explores Mexico's policies toward the estimated 250,000 Central Americans who are seeking protection from the violence of their homelands.

There is considerable controversy over whether these individuals are political refugees. The 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees defines refugees as those individuals who “due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion have left their country of origin.” The convention's emphasis on individuals singled out for political persecution would seem to disqualify many of the Central Americans fleeing generalized conditions of violence.

Between 1945 and 1947, Argentina posed a complex and exasperating problem for the United States as it endeavored to develop policy to guide its relations with Latin America. Among the questions involved were how to deal with an alleged neofascist dictator in Argentina, how to preserve the aura of the so-called Good Neighbor policy, whether to provide arms and economic aid to Latin America, and whether to enter into a collective security agreement for the western hemisphere.

Widespread malnutrition persists in Guatemala despite substantial economic growth since 1960. Indeed, there was a deterioration in the living standards of many (for example, the Indians in the Western highlands) even prior to the destruction caused by the government's pacification campaigns of the early 1980s. Chronic and widespread malnutrition has not been the result of just “natural causes”; to the contrary, it is the intent of this study to document that Guatemala's extraordinarily high level of malnutrition is the result of structural transformations and public policy, as well as demographics.

This argument has been documented best, in a Central American context, by two excellent works on El Salvador. Durham (1979: 21-51) presented a thorough analysis that demonstrates that land scarcity has not been primarily the result of a high rate of population growth (although that certainly contributes) but, instead, of increasing land concentration.

Trade policy has played a larger role in the internal and international relations of Canada than of the United States, certainly in the last half century. There are many reasons for this: The Canadian economy is more open than that of the United States (e.g., merchandise exports as a percentage of gross national product were 30% in Canada and 7% in the United States in 1982); the United States is far more dominant in Canada's trade than any single country or group of countries such as the European Economic Community is in U.S. trade (in recent years about 70% of Canada's exports have been sent to the United States and more than 70% of its imports came from the United States; for the United States, about 15% of its exports in recent years went to Canada, its major trading partner, and between 15% and 20% of its imports have come from Canada); and with this double dependence on trade and on a single market, a selfinterested foreign policy must concentrate on trade policy (Grey, 1981: 3-4).

The possible correlation between religious affiliation and economic status and development has long interested social scientists. The purpose of this study is to analyze the potential contribution of Protestantism to the agricultural and economic development of Latin American agrarian communities.

The effects of religious affiliation on economic behavior have been studied most extensively in Western Europe and the United States. Max Weber (1958: 35) concluded in his pioneering study, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, that in nations of mixed Catholic-Protestant religious composition the business leaders, owners of capital, and higher grades of skilled labor were “overwhelmingly Protestant.” Weber's initial intent was not to compare Protestant and Catholic economic achievement in Germany but, rather, to provide a non-Marxist interpretation of the rise of industrial capitalism and the attendant expansion of urbanization.

During most of its history, the Brazilian Catholic Church has been closely allied with the dominant classes and the state. Conversely, the Church traditionally has had tenuous linkages with the popular classes, and its practices with these classes generally have been paternalistic and authoritarian. This situation began to change somewhat in the 1950s as the institution made new efforts to reach the popular sectors.

In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars interested in studying Latin American politics inevitably were drawn to the study of military coups d'etat and their causes. In the 1980s, a number of the countries in Latin America whose civilian political regimes were overthrown by military regimes may undergo or attempt to consolidate processes of democratization or redemocratization. Thus scholarly interest has tended to shift away from seeking to understand the causes for military overthrows of civilian regimes toward the study of prospects and processes of democratization or redemocratization in Latin America. In this context, the reexamination of earlier examples of durable transitions from authoritarian military regimes to civilian regimes may shed light on the relative importance of different factors in determining particular outcomes. This article carries out such a re-examination for the case of Colombia, analyzing the transition from rule by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) through the crucial period of the interim military junta (1957-1958) to the consociational National Front political regime.

On October 21,1983, an ominous two-column news story ran on page A12 of the New York Times. Datelined the previous day from Brasilia, the item off the Associated Press wire, noted that Brazilian President João Baptista Figueiredo had responded to a national congressional defeat of a government-supported austerity package by issuing a decree to replace the rejected legislation. President Figueiredo had also invoked emergency measures just before the vote, calling on police to enforce a ban on public gatherings in the Brazilian capital.

Facing a $90 billion foreign debt and a world financial community insistent on forcing down a 200% inflation rate as a condition for the release of billions of dollars in international loans, the Brazilian government apparently saw little alternative to ruling by decree once again, and backing its decisions by force. Over 19 years of military rule, unpopular policies have often been imposed on Brazilians in just this fashion.