Among the Many Obstacles that confront the government of the United States in its global battle against international drug trafficking, drug-related corruption of foreign governments ranks as one of the most troublesome. It is present in virtually every country. In many of the less developed countries in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, it is pervasive. Not just policemen and customs officials, but judges, generals, cabinet ministers and even presidents and prime ministers are implicated. Corruption in most of these countries is, of course, nothing new—although the temptations posed by the illicit drug traffic are unprecedented. Nor are US diplomats unaccustomed to dealing with foreign corruption. Their experience in this regard dates back to the origins of US diplomacy.

In Less than Twenty Years Brazil has become one of the ten largest exporters of conventional armaments in the world. How the Brazilian armaments industry has achieved such success offers a rich case study of an effective division of labor between state and firm. With the state acting as technological agent and ambassador to external markets, the firms have become innovators of internationally competitive armaments systems. Rather than being forced, by military control, to produce highly sophisticated weapons systems, Brazilian defense firms receive support to develop products which cater to an international demand for those conventional armaments which occupy a niche just below the technological frontier defined by the superpowers.

Five Years after the lapse that occurred in European-Latin American relations as a result of the Malvinas/Falklands conflict (Rhein, 1983; Bodemer, 1985), and two years after the entry of Spain and Portugal into the European Community (CE), it would appear appropriate to review the relations between the European Community and Latin America. At the suggestion of the president of the Spanish government, Felipe González, who, among European heads of state, not only has a strong personal interest in Latin America, but also displays the most differentiated knowledge of the region, the European Council decided, in 1986 at The Hague (La Vanguardia, 1986), to charge the Commission of the European Community to come up with new guidelines regarding EC relations with Latin America.

One of the Most Notable Aspects of the Crisis in Central America has been the opportunity it has offered a number of actors, both within and without the region, to become involved in an area long considered a traditional reserve and zone of influence of the United States. Over the last decade, no European Socialist or Social Democratic party has been more important or influential with respect to Central American issues than the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD or Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). Despite being in the opposition since 1982, the West German Social Democrats have retained their prominence on international issues—particularly on Central American ones—for a number of reasons, such as: (1) having a solid electoral base (37% of the votes in the 1987 Bundestag elections); (2) having leaders who are internationally prominent; (3) having a well-organized foreign policy apparatus at their disposal (the well-financed Friedrich Ebert Stiftung foundation); (4) having connections to a similarly endowed trade union movement, organized around the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund(DGB); as well as (5) having persisted in their efforts to coordinate joint initiatives with other Socialist and Social Democratic parties, both within the European Economic Community (EEC) and through the Socialist International (SI).

The Term Which best sums up the current international economic situation is the word “crisis.” This crisis exists not only in the economies of the South, harassed over the past five years by external debt and the adjustment measures which it has spawned, but also in the economies of the North, often saddled with substantial deficits.

Surrounding the state of crisis is a general sense of confusion as to the proper direction to take to deal with this crisis. The future appears opaque, which renders the choice of remedies even more difficult than would normally be the case under better circumstances.

This Article Will Discuss some of the implications of Mexico's indebtedness, particularly those which derive from the connection between the foreign debt and the rapidly growing domestic debt. The debt of developing countries is one of the great barriers to the recovery of the world economy: it cancels markets which would otherwise be open to the exports of industrialized countries, and it relegates a very large portion of the world to a situation of low growth or stagnation. Without doubt, Latin America is the region worst hit by the world debt, a continent which, only two decades ago, offered one of the most promising areas for expansion: it had a relatively advanced industry and urban sector, with political democracy and a large middle class. All this seemed to fall apart after the debt crisis of the 1980s, but the problems which led to this crisis began back in the late 1960s, when democratic governments began to be supplanted by military ones.