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Introduction to the Special Issue on the Evolution of Institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

MARK BLYTH
Affiliation:
The Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON*
Affiliation:
University of Hertfordshire Business School, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK
ORION LEWIS
Affiliation:
Rohatyn Center for International Affairs, Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont, USA
SVEN STEINMO
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence, Italy

Abstract:

How can evolutionary ideas be applied to the study of social and political institutions? Charles Darwin identified the mechanisms of variation, selection and retention. He emphasized that evolutionary change depends on the uniqueness of every individual and its interactions within a population and with its environment. While introducing the contributions to this special issue, we examine some of the ontological positions underlying evolutionary theory, showing why they are appropriate for studying issues in economics, political science and sociology. We consider how these ideas might help us understand both institutional change and the formation of individual preferences.

Type
Introduction
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2011

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