Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-747cfc64b6-hfbn9 Total loading time: 0.199 Render date: 2021-06-14T12:57:46.646Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true }

Institutions, rules and equilibria: a commentary

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 December 2014

KEN BINMORE
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Bristol University, Bristol, BS8 1TN, UK
Corresponding
E-mail address:

Abstract:

This brief note is a commentary on Hendriks and Guala's (2014) unification of the institutional theories of Lewis, North, and Searle. It argues that the equilibrium theory of Lewis is fundamental and that the kind of equilibrium best suited in this role remains the orthodox notion of Nash.

Type
Article Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.

References

Aumann, R. (1976), ‘Agreeing to Disagree’, Annals of Statistics, 4: 12361239.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Binmore, K. (2005), Natural Justice, New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, K. (2008), ‘Do Conventions Need to be Common Knowledge?’, Topoi, 27: 1727.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, K. (2010), ‘Game Theory and Institutions’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 38: 245252.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandenburger, A. (2014), The Language of Game Theory: Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedell, M. (1969), ‘On the structure of shared awareness’, Behavioral Science, 14: 2839.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greif, A. and Kingston, C. (2011), ‘Institutions: Rules or Equilibria?’, in Schofield, N. and Caballero, G. (eds.), Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting, Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
Guala, F. (2012), ‘Reciprocity: Weak or Strong? What Punishment Experiments do (and do not) Demonstrate’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35: 115.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hindriks, F. and Guala, F. (2014), ‘Institutions, Rules, and Equilibria: A Unified Theory’, Journal of Institutional Economics, Published online: 16 October 2014, DOI: 10.1017/S174413744000496.Google Scholar
Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998), Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hume, D. (1739/1978), A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1969), Conventions: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Maynard Smith, J. (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, L. (1997), Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Schelling, T. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Searle, J. (1995), The Construction of Social Reality, New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Young, P. (2001), Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
6
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Institutions, rules and equilibria: a commentary
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Institutions, rules and equilibria: a commentary
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Institutions, rules and equilibria: a commentary
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *