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Some Observations on the Persian Wars. 1.—The Campaign of Marathon

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2013

Extract

It may seem bold to re-open the question (or questions) of the campaign of Marathon so soon after the publication of the monumental chapters of Busolt, of Hauvette, of Macan. But the labours of these scholars at once invite and facilitate farther discussion. They focus many scattered arguments, contribute new suggestions, put the humbler student abreast of recent researches, and show him where his own conclusions differ from accepted views. How much I owe to them will be obvious without particular references.

The theory here put forward, although independently reached, is not altogether new—perhaps no theory of Marathon could be—but I was not aware, until it was written, how closely certain of its main features had been anticipated by Busolt in a work published twenty years ago (Die Lakedaimonier pp. 355–369). That eminent historian has, however, since then twice changed his views, so that it may be useful to recall his readers to what I still consider to be his best solution of the problem. Perhaps the discussions of the interval have reinforced it in some respects. On one important point I find myself in agreement with Professor J. B. Bury's article on the Battle of Marathon in the Classical Review, March 1896, and even where we disagree, we must often have asked much the same questions.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1899

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References

page 185 note 1 Busolt, , Griechische Geschichte, Bd. II.2, 1895Google Scholar. Hauvette, , Hérodote, 1894Google Scholar. Macan, , Herodotus, Books IV., V., VI., 1895Google Scholar, especially Appendix X.

page 185 note 2 Carystus, like Virgil's Mantua, was unfortunate in its neighbourhood.

page 186 note 1 Herodotus, v. 73.

page 187 note 1 I assume the identity of the Diacria with ἠ μεσόγειος χώρα of the Aristotelian ᾿Αθηναίων πολιτεία Their identity seems to be clearly implied, and to be historically necessary. It is not inconsistent with Hesyehius' rough description: ἠ χώρα Διακρία ἡ ἀπὸ Πάρνηθος ἔως Βραυρῶνος The Diacria would be a horse-shoe shaped district round the three land sides of the central plain. The name was obviously given from the point of view of Athens; it signifies the country beyond the hills, i.e. the ridges of Parnes, Pentelicus, and Hymettus. The only precise and positive definition of the three divisions, the Plain, the Shore, and the Trans- or Ultra-montane, is given by the distribution of the trittyes.

page 188 note 1 ‘Of the Acropolis,’ adds Mr. Bury. But I am not yet convinced that Athens was without Walls.

page 189 note 1 The Athenians, with the Plataeans, and probably a few thousand light-armed thetes or ‘δοῦλοι,’ may have numbered about 15,000. Herodotus gives the Persians 600 ships besides the horse-transports. Busolt allows 50,000 as a probable estimate for their army. Perhaps we may reckon the Persian loss at Marathon (6,400) at about one-third of the troops engaged, for the wings were not pursued, whereas the centre must have been almost annihilated. This calculation would put the combatants at about 20,000. If half the army was engaged (see below), the whole force would be about 40,000. Even 30,000 might be enough for our theory. Attempts to reduce the number of the Persians are generally based on the assumption that their whole army fought at Marathon.

page 189 note 2 From the movements of Philippides and the Spartans it appears that the Athenians must have faced the Persians at Marathon for at least seven days. They would reach Marathon on the 8th of the (lunar) month at the latest, and the battle was fought on the 16th at the earliest.

page 189 note 1 Probably Datis was to stay and Artaphrenes to go. In the first place Artaphrenes was the higher in rank, and would naturally undertake the more responsible and glorious task of receiving the submission of Athens. Secondly Pausanias seems to imply that Artaphrenes was in command of the cavalry (see below). Thirdly the prominence of Datis in the tradition indicates that it was he, and not Artaphrenes, who was vanquished at Marathon. The Parian Chronicle names only Artaphrenes, but probably as supreme commander-in-chief of the expedition.

page 193 note 1 It is perhaps possible that Herodotus was misled or misunderstood his information. The signal might be put after the embarkation of half the Persian army for Phalerum (assuming that that was the plan contemplated). To Herodotus' informant the words ἐοῦσι ἤδη ἐν τῇσι νηυσὶ might have meant ‘when that half was aboard and ready to sail.’ To Herodotus, who had no notion of any division, they could only mean ‘after the battle and the embarkation of the survivors.’ But this refinement is not necessary and makes no difference to the alternatives,

page 194 note 1 The cavalry may after all have had a good deal to do with the choice of Marathon as a landing point. It is one of the few places in Attica where there is pasture to be found in the autumn.

page 194 note 2 This point has not escaped Mr.Macan, reviewer in the Athenaeum, Dec. 21st, 1895Google Scholar, and Mr. Bury.

page 195 note 1 Mr. Macan very justly vindicates the value of Suidas on the χωρισμὸς of the cavalry.

page 196 note 1 The Persians, be it noted by the way, appear to have been quite ready and in orderly array. They were not taken off their guard.