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Reason and necessity:1 Thucydides iii 9–14, 37–48

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2013

C. W. Macleod
Affiliation:
Christ Church, Oxford

Extract

The speeches concerning the Mytilenean revolt in Thucydides III present three speakers trying to justify or commend a decision: they are, in Aristotelian terms, examples of symbuleutic oratory. The purpose of such oratory is naturally to identify the right course of action, to achieve ϵὐβουλία. But Thucydides is writing about facts; he is also intensely aware of human nature, a force more powerful than reason. So his characters cannot be simply models of wisdom. They are human beings, and they feel the pressure of war or empire. Thus the rhetoric which they employ to convince their hearers is for the historian a way of discovering to his readers the limits, or the failures, as well as the powers, of reasoning; and in this exposure of human weakness Thucydides' work is both rationalistic and tragic, an analysis of human error, be it corrigible or otherwise. If, then, he puts into his speakers' mouths the arguments he himself thought they should have used (i 22.1 τὰ δέοντα), he does so in the service of historical truth (i 22.4 τὸ σαφές). Reality is portrayed realistically, through a portrayal of the minds of those who were part of it; for all action must originate from beliefs and be contemplated through them. Further, the complex or problematical nature of reality is mirrored in his speakers' opposing interpretations of the issues at stake.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1978

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References

2 For much of this paragraph, cf. Schneider, C., Information und Absicht bei Thukydides (Göttingen 1974) 137–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar, including a valuable account of Thuc. i 22.

3 Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1399a28 ff.; Soph. El. 172b36 ff.; Plat. Corg. 483a, and Callicles' whole argument there.

4 Cf. Gomme on 11.2.

5 Cf. Thuc. i 76.2–3; iv 61.5; v 105.2; Democritus D.-K. B 267; Gorgias, , Helen 6Google Scholar.

6 On the meaning of this, see de Ste. Croix, , Hist. iii (1954/1955) 1621Google Scholar.

7 E.g. Plat. Gorg. 507e–508a; Lysis 214 a–b; Arist. EN 1158b1, 1161b8–10; EE 1241b12 f. Note also the irony that the Mytileneans' being ἰσόψηφοι (11.3) supplied Athens with a justification of her empire; but they were all the weaker διὰ πολυψηφίαν (10.5). On the meaning of ἰσόψηφοι see de Ste. Croix, op. cit. 305–7. He comments on the Mytileneans' argument; ‘Their main excuse … is not a convincing one. Athens could hardly have coerced a coalition of Samos, Chios and Mytilene, had these states cared to offer real opposition’. Thucydides himself suggests this criticism in the words διὰ πολυψηφίαν; and his narrative (2.3) has already revealed disunity among the allies. He also indicates the reason for it: so long as Athens displays her power and her subjects their weakness, they are understandably afraid to support revolt and feel obliged to join in crushing it. This is implied by 11.4 and illustrated in 6.1; cf. in general terms v 96–7.

8 In the words that precede these ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνοις εἶναι should not be emended. The sentence means: ‘why should we ever, from a position of equality, have been in their power/at their mercy?’ (for the use of ἐπί, cf. vi 22; Antiphon v 3; Xen. HG vi 3.11). It is echoed by ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνοις δὲ ὅντος, where ἐπί+dat. is used in a slightly different way, of an action, not a person, being in someone's power. This repetition with a change of sense or nuance can be parallelled in Thucydides and contemporaries: cf. ii 61.2 (μεταβάλλετε … μεταβολῆς); iv 92, 4; Hdt. i 45.3; Antiphon, Tetral. iii γ 1Google Scholar; Isoc. iv 119; Plat. Grg. 472e7; Legg. 909b2–3; for Sophoclean examples, and a valuable discussion of the phenomenon, see Easterling, P. E., Hermes ci (1973) 19Google Scholar, 21, 24–5, 28–9. It is significant here because it implies a necessary connection that features the Athenians' power and the allies' helplessness, i.e. the law that the stronger cannot but dominate (cf. n. 5 above). ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου is used in the same sense as ἐκ τοῦ ἵσου which it reinforces; the variatio (the same idea in different words) in these two phrases counterpoints me paronomasia (the same words expressing a different idea) in the double ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνοις.

9 Cf. Hist. xxiii (1974) 391–2.

10 Cf. Gomme on 13.4.

11 Cf. Artium Scriptores, ed. Radermacher, L., SÖAW 227.3 (1951) B II 20Google Scholar; Antiphon, . Tetral. iii δ 2Google Scholar; Rh. ad Al. 1429a28–30.

12 Cf. esp. Solon fr. 13.65–70 West. Also Hdt. vii 10.δ.2 (ironic in a passage recommending ϵὐβουλία).

13 Cf. [Cic.] Ad Her. iv 48 and Caplan ad loc.; Dover, K. J., Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford 1974) 24–5Google Scholar. On 38.4 (αἴτιοι δ᾿ ὑμεῖς) see Burckhardt, A., Spuren der attischen Volksrede in der alten Komödie (Diss. Basel 1924) 57Google Scholar f.

14 Cf. Thuc. vi 38.2; Eur. Med. 446; Ar. Vesp. 1265 f.; Isoc. iv 1; Alcidamas, , Odysseus 1Google Scholar.

15 Cf. Hdt. i 60.3 (and implicitly vii 102.i); Plat. Apol. 29d; Prot. 319b.

16 Cf. Plat. Prot. 337d; Eur. Med. 829.

17 Cf. Isoc. iv 45–6; xv 295. It is contests such as these which Thucydides spurns in denying that his work is an ἀγώνισμα ὲς τὸ παραχρῆμα (i 22.4); for history at this time could easily be considered a branch of epideictic oratory (cf. Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285d–e; Isoc. iv 82; xii 1), especially since recording the past (including the μυθῶδϵς of Thuc. i 22.4) was normal practice in funeral-speeches and panegyrics; and Herodotus probably gave recitations: see Jacoby, F., RE Supp. i 242Google Scholar; also Canfora, L., Belfagor xxvi (1971) 657–60Google Scholar.

18 For a similar contrast of epideictic and symbuleutic, cf. v 101; Isoc. v 12–13; Dem. xiv 1–2. κριταί (37.4) is used of those who decide on policy: cf. Thuc. ii 40.2; iii 43.5; v 85; vi 39.1.

19 Cf. Gundert, H., Die Antike xvi (1940) 104–14Google Scholar= Wege der Forschung xcviii (1968) 122–34; Flashar, H., SHAW 1969 (1)Google Scholar.

20 Thus Cleon, 's echo of the Periclean ἐγὼ ὁ αὐτός ϵἰμι (ii 61.2῀iii 38.1)Google Scholar serves to contrast his pig-headedness with Pericles' firmness.

21 Cf. Thuc. vi 18.7; Dem. xxiv 24; Aeschin. i 6, iii 6.

22 Cf. Gomme on 37.3; Dover on Thuc. vi 14 (points (i) and (iii) on p. 239). There is similar equivocation in Sophocles' Antigone. For Creon, his decree, ratified by the chorus of γέροντϵς (211–14, cf. 576 f.), is νόμοι (191, 449, 481); for Antigone, merely κηρύγμα(τα) (8, 454). In the end Creon has to admit that the true νόμοι are not his (1113). Cleon, 's whole argument, and the situation, recall Soph. Aj. 12461252Google Scholar, a passage which has the flavour of contemporary political oratory.

23 Cf. Arist. Pol. 1292a4–7, with Jones, A. H. M., Athenian Democracy (Oxford 1957) 50–4Google Scholar.

24 Cf. Maia xxv (1973) 274.

25 Cf. Gorg. Hel. 13, exemplified in his ‘On Not Being’ or Plato's Euthydemus.

26 Cf. Ar. Thes. 383; Dem. viii 1. Lys. xxxi 2 and Rh. ad Al. 1436b34–6 are close to Cleon's words.

27 The claim that the opponent is merely a clever speaker is common in the orators: cf. Dover, Greek Popular Morality 25 f. Characteristically, Thucydides makes out of the rhetorical commonplace a historical theme, i.e. the place of rational argument in Athenian political deliberation.

28 For similar pseudo-antitheses, where the two sides of a disjunction are meant to be combined rather than opposed, cf. [Cic.] ad Her. iv 40 and Caplan ad loc.; Gorg. Palam. 3; Cat. lxvii 25–8; Hor. Ep. ii 1.83–5.

29 E.g. Pind. Pyth. iii 20 ff.; This quality of the Athenians is also castigated by Nicias (Thuc. vi 10–11, 13.1).

30 Cf. v 87; Isoc. xiii 7–8; further, Hist. xxiii (1974) 391 and below on ch. 42.

31 Cf. Wassermann, F. M., TAPA lxxxvii (1956) 31–2Google Scholar= Wege der Forschung xcviii (1968) 483–4, who also comments usefully on Cleon in relation to Pericles.

32 Cf. Saar, H. G., Die Reden des Kleon und Diodotus und ihre Stellung im Gesamtwerk des Thukydides (Diss. Hamburg 1953) 41Google Scholar. I owe my knowledge of this work, perhaps the most helpful study there is of the Mytilenean Debate, to the kindness of the Librarian of me Seminar für klassische Philologie in Hamburg University.

33 Cf. Saar, op. cit., 10 f.

34 In 425/4 B.C. the Chians were compelled to pull down their walls by Athens, because of a suspicion of disloyalty (Thuc. iv 51). But that was much less than Mytilene had to endure (iii 50.1–2). Note too vi 85.2.

35 Cf. Artium Scriptores C 53; Isoc. ii 35, iv 9; Arist. Rhet. 1359b30–3.

36 Cf. Navarre, O., Essai sur la rhétorique grecque (Paris 1900) 305Google Scholar f.

37 For the arguments of 39.5–8, see below on chs. 45–7.

38 Cf. Stevens, E. B., AJP lxv (1944) 125Google Scholar, which is based on a discussion of 40.2–3.

39 On the style and force of this passage, cf. Ebener, D., WZHalle v (1956) 1110–12Google Scholar; cf. above on 38.2 and Ebener, , art. cit. 1097Google Scholar.

40 Cf. Plat. Menex. 244e; Dem. xxiv 170–1.

41 Winnington-Ingram, R. P., BICS xii (1965) 77Google Scholar; cf. Saar, op. cit. 57.

42 See further on these Bodin, L., RÉA xlii (1940) 3652Google Scholar.

43 See further Kitto, H. D. F., Poiesis (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1966) 286–8Google Scholar.

44 This problem is discussed philosophically in the pseudo-Platonic Sisyphus. It is, in effect, a fresh statement of traditional Greek doubts about human planning (cf. n. 12 above). For an attempt to answer it, see Isoc. viii 8, xv 271 and Mathieu ad loc.

45 For attack on slander in general terms, cf. Moraux, P., LÉC xxii (1954) 17Google Scholar; also Hdt. vii 10.η.2; Lysias xix 5. Again the rhetorical commonplace becomes a basis for historical analysis.

46 With Classen-Steup, I take ἀξιοῦν in 43.4 to mean ‘expect, assume’ and its subject to be ὑμᾶς (understood). Diodotus is not saying what the orators ought to think it right to do, nor even what the people should require of them—neither of which would be enough to defend them—but what the people should expect or assume that they do do. But the possible ambiguity of ἀξιοῦν may be meant to uncover the weakness of his argument: he is speaking of what should be, not what is the case.

47 Deceitful speakers were solemnly cursed at the opening of assemblies: see Ar. Thes. 356–60; Dem. xviii 282 and Goodwin ad loc. That makes Diodotus' words the more surprising (note also Plat. Lach. 178a–b). And the oxymoron ψϵυσάμϵνον πιστὸν γϵνέσθαι is disturbing, like μὴ ἐμφανοῦς φράσαι (42.2).

48 In general on Thucydides' concern with the public spirit of Athens' leading politicians, cf. Bender, G. F., Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides (Würzburg 1938) 21–6Google Scholar, 53–7, 74–81.

49 Cf. vi 53.3, 60.1 with 59.2 (the δῆμος τύραννος, misusing its knowledge of the past, merely behaves with suspicion like the Pisistratid tyrants, instead of taking warning from their example); Soph. OT 584–6; Eur. Ion 624, fr. 605 N; Xen, . Hieron ii 10, vi 56.Google Scholar

50 Cf. Hdt. iii 80.3, 6; Ar. Vesp. 587. In general, on the demos as lacking responsibility and blaming speakers, see Thuc. ii 59.1, viii 1.1; Ar. Eq. 1356 f.; Eccl. 193–6; [Xen.] Ath. Pol. ii 17; Lys. xx 20; Dem. Proem. xxvi 2 (cf. Moraux, , art. cit. 18Google Scholar n. 49). ‘Deceiving the people’ was a crime punishable by death: Hdt. vi 136.1; Dem. xx 135.

51 Cf. Navarre, op. cit. 269; Moraux, , art. cit. 20Google Scholar n. 55; Ar. Nub. 1075 and Dover ad loc.

52 For ἔλπις, ἔρως and τύχη, see iv 65.4, vi 11.5, 24.3–4; also compare iii 45.6 (καὶ μϵτὰ πάντων … ἐδόξασϵν) with vi 31.1. Further, Kitto, op. cit. 343–9.

53 This is not the place to tackle the vexed question of the loyalty of the allied demoi to Athens. But it seems clear that Thucydides means his readers, and gives them the evidence, to question Diodotus' over-confident view. For a sober vindication of the historian, see esp. Romilly, J. de, BICS xiii (1966) 112Google Scholar. For Thucydides', implicit criticism of Diodotus, cf. Ar. Ach. 642Google Scholar: καὶ τοὺς δήμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δείξας ὡς δημοκρατοῦνται (mentioned by Romilly, de, art. cit. 9Google Scholar). The Athenians congratulated them selves on giving democracy to their allies (see de Ste. Croix, art. cit. 39Google Scholar n. 3); but Aristophanes in the Babylonians ‘showed what sort of a democracy the demoi in the subject cities have’. It is clear from what follows that this line refers to something that was dangerous to say in Athens, but welcome to the allies, i.e. Aristophanes showed up Athenian oppression of them, felt by their demoi as much as anyone else. On the Athenians' cultivation or imposition of democracy in allied cities, see Meiggs, R., The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972) 207–19Google Scholar.

54 Winnington-Ingram, , art. cit. 79Google Scholar sees the incongruity. But αἰσχρὸν and τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ in 42.2 do not, as he claims (p. 78), constitute an appeal to moral considerations in conflict with Diodotus' prudential programme (which has anyway not yet been formulated), καλός and αἰσχρός are used without specifically moral force: cf. i 33.1, 120.5; ii 84.2; Hdt. vii 10.δ.2; viii 144.1. τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ is also a polemical echo of καλῶς in 37.4 and 38.4, as εὖ … εἰπεῖν is of τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων (38.4): ‘speaking well’ for Diodotus means offering good advice, for Cleon merely specious manipulation of words.

55 This is tentatively suggested by Ebener, , art. cit. 1141Google Scholar.

56 For a broad and illuminating contrast of the two writers, see Reinhardt, K., Vermächtnis der Antike (Göttingen 1966) 184218Google Scholar.

57 Contrast Thucydides' view of the usefulness of history with the more shallowly optimistic view of orators and rhetoricians (see n. 35 above), which was no doubt familiar to him. In general, see Rivier, A., MH xxvi (1969) 129–45Google Scholar = Études de littérature grecque (Geneva 1975) 399–419; Romilly, J. de, Entretiens Hardt iv (1956) 4166Google Scholar.

58 I owe very valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article to Dr D. C. Innes and Dr C. B. R. Pelling.