¹ For bibliography 1939–59, see H.Friis Johansen in Lustrum vii (1962), 232–43, with 96–7 (‘Bibliographica’) for reference to earlier studies. For work between 1959 and 1977, see Hester, D.A., ‘Oedipus and Jonah’, PCPS xxiii (1977)Google Scholar, n.29. The following works are cited by abbreviation only: Scodel = Scodel, R., ‘Hybris in the second stasimon of the Oedipus Rex’, CP lxxvii (1982), 214–223Google Scholar; Carey = Carey, C., ‘The second stasimon of Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus’, JHS cvi (1986), 175–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Winnington-Ingram = Winnington-Ingram, R.P., Sophocles: an interpretation (Cambridge, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burton = Burton, R.W.B., The chorus in Sophocles’ tragedies (Oxford 1980)Google Scholar; Sophoclea = Lloyd-Jones, H. and Wilson, N.G., Sophoclea: studies on the text of Sophocles, Oxford 1990.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Editions of the plays are cited in the form Kamerbeek (1967).

² Carey (n. 1).

³ Despite recent support for Blaydes' emendation ὔβρις φυτεύει τύραννις by e.g. Dawe (1975, 1982), Winnington-Ingram 192, Burton 164, Diggle, J.CR xxxii (1982) 14.Google Scholar Recent supporters of the paradosis are Scodel, Carey, Long, A.A., Liverpool Classical Monthly iii (1978) 49Google Scholar, Austin, C., CQ xxxiv (1984) 233CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990) and Sophoclea 100.

⁴ Lloyd-Jones and Wilson Sophoclea 100 write: ‘even if the Chorus suspects that Oedipus may have been guilty of hybris, this can have nothing to do with his being or becoming king. So the sense cannot be that a king or tyrant is a product of hybris…’. This seems to assume that ‘hybris breeds a tyrant’ would necessarily have to refer to Oedipus, against which see Carey (n. 1) 176–7. The authors go on to use the argument against Blaydes' emendation and for an interpretation of τύραννος as a ‘kenning’ for κόρος. Carey 176 n.12 argues effectively against this view. See also Friis Johansen 142 on Waern, I., Γής όστέα: the kenning in pre-Christian Creek poetry, (Diss. Uppsala, 1951)Google Scholar: ‘Sophocles uses this particular kind of periphrasis more sparingly than either Aeschylus or Euripides’. Fraenkel's ὔβρις φυτεύει τύραννον ὔβριν depends heavily upon A. Ag. 763–6. But the play shows no sign of interest in cycles of crime (unlike the Oresteia) and it is hard to see why the child should be spoken of as τύραννος. I am grateful to Professor Sommerstein for drawing my attention to Aegisthus' hybris and tyranny in Aeschylus. See further n. 44 below.

⁵ 179.

⁶ Long (n.3), 49. Cf. Gellie, G.H.AJP lxxxv (1964), 115.Google Scholar

⁷ 179.

⁸ 176 and 177.

⁹ Scodel 218–20 sees Laius' murderer as the potential tyrant. Kamerbeek, J.C.WS ixxix (1966) 87Google Scholar had also suggested this. See further below pp. 119–21. Scholars have argued strongly against a reference to Kreon. E.g. Scodel 218 (‘While the Chorus does not, of course, believe in Creon's guilt…’), Carey 177 (‘The quarrels with Creon and Tiresias are far removed in theatrical time, and have given way to a far more important issue, whether Oedipus is the murderer of Laius’. See below pp. 108, 113, 116. Both Burton 162 and Lloyd-Jones, H., The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley 1971) 110Google Scholar say that Teiresias and Kreon have been suggested before, but the only reference is that of Lloyd-Jones to Errandonea, I., Hermes lxxxi (1953) 130Google Scholar, who says: ‘Einige moderne Kommentatoren beziehen das Stasimon auf Teiresias, einige mehr auf Kreon…’, with no references. The only scholar who took this view, so far as I know, was Gilbert Murray, but only in the stage-directions of his London 1911 translation of the play (50–1.). At 872 he writes: ‘They wonder if these aims be all due to pride and if Creon has guilty ambitions…’, and at 882 ‘Or if Tiresias can really be a lying prophet with no fear of god; they feel that all faith in oracles and the things of God is shaken…’. Sheppard (1920) xliii–iv argues against Murray's view. ‘But is it the natural interpretation?…Is it not natural also, even for a modern reader…to think of Oedipus when he hears the words “Insolence it is that breeds a tyrant”? I hope to show that for an ancient audience the connection with Oedipus was not only possible, but obvious.’

¹⁰ Unless φονεὺς ὦν τοῦδε τὰνδρὸς ὲμφανῶς refers to Laius. It is slightly awkward for φονεὺς to mean ‘intending killer’ and for τοῦδε τάνδρὸς to mean ‘me’ (cf. S. Ant. 1034) when sandwiched between τὰς έμὰς in 533 and τῆς έμῆς in 535. The rhetoric of 534–5. fits better with two charges on separate crimes already committed (the Teiresias prophecy is the one which makes him already a ληιστής…ὲναργὴς 535). Oedipus is presented as a tidy thinker (cf. 836f.). The progression of thought between 346–9. and 370f. matches well with a picture in which Kreon was always the seeker after power. 534 would mark the tidying up of this hypothesis. At 622f. and 641, the same punishments as are envisaged by Delphi (100–101, 308–9), death or exile, are considered as options for Kreon's punishment. It might be said that Kreon does not respond, at least directly, to this charge, and that the talk of death or banishment may allude to recognised penalties at Athens for plotting tyranny (Arist. Ath.Pol. 16.10, Andok, i 96–8. See Sommerstein [1983] on Ar. V. 417). But when Oedipus is forced to accept Kreon's ἀρά, he twice specifies the result as his death or exile (658–9, 669–70), and this certainly indicates the penalty he would have to pay as Laius' murderer, since in his view the whole purpose of Kreon's ‘plot’ with Teiresias is to depose him by fixing the blame for Laius' murder on him. So it would be neater if the repeated penalties all referred to the same crime, viz. Laius' murder. This reading is supported by the following considerations. 1) Kreon repeats the full Delphic provision at 641, even though Oedipus said at 623 that he must die (622–3 in any case still imply this choice of penalties). 2) The textual/interpretative problem at 640 may yield to this analysis. δυοῖν άποκρίνας κακοῖν is hard to understand as ‘selecting for me one of two ills’ (Dawe [1982] ad loc.), ‘the participle needs some such object as ἔν, and the verb is not one we should expect’ (Sophoclea 94) and δυοῖν is nowhere else monosyllabic (see Dawe and Sophoclea loc.cit. ). If the text of 640 is nonetheless sound then it might mean ‘rejecting me for two crimes’ (see LSJ s.v. άποκρίνω III), viz. killing Laius and plotting against Oedipus, and refer back to 534–5. But it is more likely to be corrupt, and if so ἀποκρίνας could be a gloss on κρίνας ‘accusing’ (LSJ s.v. HI.2, cf. II ‘pick out’, ‘choose’). Something will have been lost before δυοῖν κρίνας κακοῖν, perhaps περὶ (cf. Isoc. xv 129). In either case, the object of the participle would be μ' (639) and the infinitives in 641 would be construed with δεινά in 639 and not with κακοῖν. On the problem of the repeated penalties see Dawe (1982), 14. See further n. 56 below.

¹¹ E.g. Carey 177, Winnington-Ingram 194.

¹² Winnington-Ingram 190.

¹³ 178.

¹⁴ 179.

¹⁵ Cf. Scodel 222 and see below pp. 113, 120–1. Carey's conclusion goes even further (179): ‘In insisting that every oracle must come true the chorus merely sharpens the antithesis between order and disorder in the world’. If this is the message, then it is also asking for the literal fulfilment (cf. χειρόδεικτα 902) of the oracles given to Oedipus at Delphi (787–93.) This would be odd, and so it must be specifically the Laius oracle which is of concern. See below p. 120.

¹⁶ 178.

¹⁷ 175. Cf. McDevitt, A.S., C&M xxx (1969), 90.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Carey 175, McDevitt (n.17), 89, Winnington-Ingram 182, Müller, G., Hermes xcv (1967), 272.Google ScholarKnox, B.M.W., Oedipus at Thebes (New Haven 1957) 174.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Carey 175. Müller (n. 18) gives the same reason. See the remarks of Sourvinou-Inwood, C., JHS cix (1989) 135.Google Scholar

²⁰ Papageorgius, P.N., Sophocles: Scholia velera etc. (Leipzig 1888) 195–8Google Scholar, scholia on 863, 873, 901, 906. For modern scholars see Friis Johansen 242 on Maddalena and Schlesinger.

²¹ Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990) and Sophoclea 101. If ‘Σ φθίνοντα] ὰντὶ τοῦ παλαιὰ, παρεληλύθοτα may be taken to suggest that it (i.e. παλαιὰ) originated as a gloss on φθίνοντα’ (pace Dawe, R.D., Studies on the text of Sophocles [Leiden 1974] i 246)Google Scholar, and ‘it is likelier that something is missing after γὰρ than after Λαίου’ we have a gap requiring If we accept Triclinius’ τὰ before Λαίου (cf. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson's supplement καὶ πάλαι τὰ and τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μαντεῖα 405–6), then there is space for a subject for ὲξαιροῦσιν, e.g. δεσπόται (cf. Eur. Suppl. 636) or κύριοι (cf. S. Aj. 734). Since κύριος was later used of gods (LSJ s.v. B.3), it might have been ejected as an adapted gloss on κρατύνων or πάντ᾿ ἀνάσσων.

²² Winnington-Ingram 185. Cf. Lloyd-Jones (n.9), 109–10.

²³ Winnington-Ingram 189.

²⁴ So also Burton 160–1. For the meaning of hybris see MacDowell, D.M.G&R n.s. xxiii (1976) 14–31Google Scholar; Fisher, N.R.E.G&R n.s. xxiii (1976) 177–93Google Scholar and n.s. xxvi (1979) 32–47. In those of the poetic texts cited in n. 25 where ὔβρις has an antonym, it is either Εὐνομίη or δίκη. This strongly suggests that at least in poetry hybris means ‘disdain for νόμος or δίκη’.

²⁵ Also Hom. Od. i368–80, xxiv351–2, Archilochus, fr. 177 West (I owe this reference to an anonymous referee), Solon, fr. 13.11f. West, Pindar, Olympian 13.6–10, Bacchylides 15.50–63 Snell, A. Supp. 879–81, cf. Herodotus, viii 77.

²⁶ Carey 177. Cf. Jebb³ (1893), Winnington-Ingram 188, 190–1, Burton 157–8. Kamerbeek (1967) supports the scholion (ἤ γοῦν τὴν ζήτησιν τοῦ φόνου τοῦ Λαίου). Long (n.3), 49–53 relates it to Oedipus and Kreon's argument.

²⁷ For a discussion of this triad, see Doyle, R.E. in Traditio xxvi (1970), 293–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ Van der Ben, N., Mnemosyne xxi (1968), 10–15Google Scholar, even tried to introduce the word ἄταν into 877 (K. Kuiper, Leyden 1903 was first with the conjecture).

²⁹ See Dover, K.J., JHS xciii (1973) 65–6.Google Scholar

³⁰ 177 n. 21.

³¹ Van der Ben (n. 28), 12–13.

³² Winnington-Ingram 193. The traditional explanation (Hesychius) is that the word implies the status of a metic within Athenian society (cf. 411). Professor Sommerstein has suggested to me that it is better to take προστάτης as ‘champion’ (A. Sept. 408 etc.), since that keeps the god as the actual wrestler. But the phrase τὸ καλως…ἔχον πόλει πάλαισμα seems to me to be an allusion to something quite specific (Δίκη–see next paragraph) and separate from, though controlled by, the god. This would be a typical way for choral lyric to evoke the well-known relationship between Zeus and Dike (see further n. 57).

³³ See the references above n. 25, but exclude Horn. Od. i and xxiv and A. Supp.

³⁴ It is the opposite assumption which so often leads to interpretations of the tyranny theme as relating to Oedipus and the oracle theme to Jokasta (e.g. McDevitt [n.17], 91f.).

³⁵ I interpret the antecedent of ὦν as λόγων ἔργων τε πάντων. It will be governed by πρόκειμαι in the sense ‘be established to prevent’ (lit: ‘be set up in front of). Cf. Th. iii 45.1 ἐν οὖν ταῖς πόλεσι πολλῶν θανάτου ζημία πρόκειται. ὅμως δὲ τῆι ὲλπίδι κινδυνεύουσι.

³⁶ Carey 175. Kamerbeek (n.9), 83f.

³⁷ Carey (ibid.), Winnington-Ingram 186.

³⁸ See Parker, R., Miasma (Oxford 1983) 149.Google Scholar

³⁹ See also Winnington-Ingram 187 with n. 21 and Jebb³ (1893) on 863.

⁴⁰ See Winnington-Ingram 187 (‘It seems that Oedipus is, or may be, in breach of the laws which demand purity…’), Burton 160.

⁴¹ E.g. Carey 177, Scodel 215.

⁴² Carey 175 argues that the prayer is ‘intended to prepare for the contrast which follows’. But an audience could not be expected to grasp this without some indication (say, μέν).

⁴³ Sommerstein (1989) on A. Eu. 617.

⁴⁴ See Burton 163f., Dawe (1982) on 873, Sophoclea 100 (on 873) for the genealogical relationships between hybris and koros. Presumably πολλων is wealth and the point of ἄ…συμφέροντα is that the hybristes is a fool and cannot use his ὅλβος properly, so that it is not opportune or beneficial to him (cf. Solon, fr. 6.3–4 West τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν ὅταν πολὺς ὅλβος ἕπηται / ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοις μὴ νὸος ἅρτιος ἠι. Cf. Theognis 153–4 West, Pindar Pythian 2.25–30). A hybristes may also obtain wealth by means of hybris (cf. e.g. Solon, fr. 13.9–16. West), but this idea does not suit the order of events here, because the satiety precedes the climb which images the unjust deed.

Nevertheless, the salient points about κόρος are contained within πολλῶν ὑπερπλησθῆι (cf. 779, Hippocrates, Int. 10, Arist. EN 1118b7). μάταν and ἃ…συμφέροντα are unpointed and unnecessary expansions, relevant in a discussion of how κόρος produces ὕβρις, but not germane when the point is how a τύραννος is produced by them. Moreover, the way that the πολλά are described is odd, since conventionally it is not the wealth itself which is a problem (unless gained by hybris—and that is the wrong sequence here), but the mind of the person who owns it (cf. 541–2 for the place of wealth in gaining tyranny). Such flabby writing is uncharacteristic of Sophoclean lyric. I suspect the original text read: ὔβρις φυτεύει τύραννον, ὔβρις, εἰ πολλῶν ύπερπλησθῆι. μάταν/ ἅ μὴ ᾿πίκαιρα μηδὲ συμφέροντα. ‘It is hybris which begets a tyrant, hybris, if it is overfilled with many things. (Done) in vain are (acts) which are not timely or beneficial (to the city)’. For μάτην used predicatively see A. Ch. 521, E. Ion 275 and for the sentiment cf. Solon, fr. 13.16 West ού γὰρ δὴν θηντοῖς ὕβριος ἕργα πέλει. The objection (of an anonymous referee) that συμφέροντα is tautologous is invalid, since in the stanza the Chorus focuses on the conflict between private and public good (ὔβρις is characteristic of an individual pursuing private aims at the expense of the law which protects everyone, while τὸ καλῶς ἔχον πόλει πάλαισμα, i.e. Δίκη, asserts the communal good: cf. Pl. Lg. 875a f. for a discussion of the notion of τὰ συμφέροντα in the context of τὸ ἵδιον versus τὸ κοινόν, with an illustration involving tyranny). Both ἐπίκαιρα and συμφέροντα express the actions of the hybristes as seen by supporters of Δίκη. With συμφέροντα (see the first part of this note) if a beneficiary is not expressed, it must be inferred. On this interpretation, the μηδὲ συμφέροντα are not beneficial to the city. For the textual implications of this repunctuation for 876f., see the end of n. 45.

⁴⁵ Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990) print Wolff's ἀκρότατα γεῖσ᾿ at 876. Cf. Sophoclea 100: ‘a great merit is that it removes the εἰσ– to εἰσαναβᾶσ᾿, which is not easy to explain’. If emendation is necessary (Lloyd-Jones and Wilson note that ‘Wilamowitz could still accept what is transmitted’), γεῖσ᾿ does suit the image well (cf. E. Ph. 1180). But since ΕΙΣΑΝΑ also occurs in the next line (ΕΙΣΑΝΑΓΚΑΝ), ΕΙΣ– might be a parableptic error. In that case AN (scanned ̮) could be the beginning of what has been lost. It is worth suggesting ἄνους (cf. ΟΥΣ in ΩΡΟΥΣΕΝ just before ΕΙΣΑΝΑΓΚΑΝ), since folly is characteristic of hybris (cf. μάταν 874, ματάιζων 891, Bacchylides 15.57–9. [Snell] ἃ δ᾿ αἰόλοις κέρδεσσι καὶ ἀφροσύναις / ἐξαισίοις θάλλουσ᾿ ἀθάμβης / Ὕβρις, Hes. Op. 217–8. δίκη δ᾿ύπὲρ ὔβριος ἴσχει / ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω, Pindar, Pythian 2.27 μαινομέναις φρασὶν.). If the repunctuation suggested in n. 44, paragraph 2, is valid, there must be a change of subject hidden in the corruption. ANHP would be the easiest supplement (cf. Sheppard [1920]). The text would read ἀκρότατ᾿ (perhaps understood as an adverb) ἀνὴρ ἀναβὰς (the reading of G^ac). The objections (of an anonymous referee) that the resulting text of 872–9 is less powerful, fluent and consistent than the traditional reading do not seem overwhelming. The stops at 873 and 875 are no more disruptive than those at 879 and 880 and could be regarded as highly effective musical punctuations, where the performers draw breath as they drive the argument home with powerful short blows. The change from abstract to concrete (with ἀνὴρ) and back to abstract is clearly articulated by the pattern of general proposition, counter proposition and specific illustration in the first part (expressing a traditional view, that κόρος leads to ὔβρις and these produce the τύραννος, but that ὕβρις never prospers, its works ending in ἅτη) and by δὲ at 879, which on this reading would register a contrast with ἃ…συμφέροντα, a description of acts motivated by hybris to the city's detriment.

⁴⁶ Denniston, , The Greek panicles ² xlvi §3. Cf. Dawe (1982)Google Scholar on 881: ‘the connection with the rest of the antistrophe looks at first sight tenuous…’. The link between the two sentences is strengthened by the echo μήποτε / οὐ…ποτε. But pace Dawe (loc.cit.), the final line cannot mean ‘I will always regard (sc. the god) as the protector of the city’ (my italics), because neither ἴσχω nor ἔχω seem to be firmly attested in this sense (see LSJ s.v. ἔχω 11.14 for the only example in pre-New Testament Greek, a highly dubious conjecture in Sappho 25.3 [Diehl], rejected by e.g. Lobel and Page [PLF 218]).

⁴⁷ Carey 177. See id. 175 for agreement that ‘a duet (i.e. 649–96) need not have the act-dividing function of a stasimon’.

⁴⁸ Is he the killer of Laius? Carey 177. See below.

⁴⁹ See Carey 176–7 on Oedipus’ suspicions as ‘the natural conclusion’ in the circumstances. Athenians were also quick to spot political plots. Cf. Ar. V. 488f.; Th. vi 27.3 and 60.1).

⁵⁰ E.g. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990). Contra, Carey 177 n. 23, Winnington-Ingram 194 n. 45.

⁵¹ At 892f. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990) print the θυμοῦ of some mss. (against θυμῶι) and Hölscher's τεύξεται (against mss. ἕρξεται and Musgrave's εὕξεται). But it is difficult to explain how θυμῶι entered the text and by rejecting it we lose the possible means by which people at present get divine justice to work (by uttering angry imprecations, cf. 887—8, 897f.). We would have to construe ψυχᾶς with ἀμύνειν, not the normal Attic construction. Alternatives involving θεῶν (Hermann, Kennedy) are no better in a context where the argument requires not warding off divine justice, but getting divine justice to operate at all. It may be better to follow Kamerbeek some way (n. 9, 88–9); we might retain θυμῶι (cf. S. Ant. 1085), but construe ‘by his anger’ (i.e. his angry prayer to the gods, cf. 887–8, 897f.); we could construe βέλη with ψυχᾶς (cf. Σ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κακίας) as ‘shafts aimed at life’ (cf. καρδίας τοξεύματα S. Ani. 1085). Though Musgrave's εὔξεται is tempting, we should prefer Hölscher's τεύξεται for the reasons given in Sophoclea 100. The resulting text would yield the sense: ‘what man in these circumstances will ever any more by his anger succeed in warding off shafts aimed at (someone's) life?’. I.e. ‘whose passionate appeal to the gods will ever successfully protect someone threatened by an act of hybris?’ Cf. A. Eu. 508f., a parallel suggested to me by Professor Sommerstein.

⁵² Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990) print Blaydes' θίξεται at 891, but say nothing in its defence in Sophoclea (n.l). Winnington-Ingram 197 n. 57 dissents, but his reasoning is tied up with the desire to see άθίκτων as a hint at Oedipus’ marriage (against which see Carey 178). His defence against Blaydes’ main line of attack (the proximity of ἔρξεται), ‘whatever we do, we are left with jingling futures’, is sound enough, however (and this obtains even with Hölscher's τεύξεται). So I would retain the ms. ἓξεται. An additional reason would be that the correction rests on the assumption that there is no specific point of reference, but if there is, it must be to the ‘Kreon plot’, which involves not merely touching, but keeping a grip on, things untouchable.

⁵³ Carey 177–8. The arrogance attributed to this person is part of the evocation of his hybris, for arrogance is as much a symptom of hybris as are folly (see n. 44 above) and gain. Cf. Bacchylides, 15.57–63 (Snell): ἃ δ᾿ αίόλοις κέρδεσσι… θάλλουσ᾿ ἀθάμβης Ὕβρισ… κείνα καὶ ὔπερφιάλους Γᾶς παῖδας ὥλεσεν Γίγαντας (and compare the use of ὕπερφίαλος for the hybristic suitors in the Odyssey, i 134 etc.).

⁵⁴ Carey 178. ἀρμόσει does not necessarily refer to the fit between oracular predictions and reality. See e.g. S. Ant. 1317–18.

⁵⁵ For the suggestion that the oracles of Apollo mentioned in the preceding scene by Oedipus (791–3) are also included in the Chorus' concerns, see e.g. Gellie (n.6) 118. There are other ways than the literal for oracles to come true (cf. e.g. 969–70, 980–2, Herodotus i 120.1–3), but it is hard to see the Chorus' χειρόδεικτα πᾶσιν…βροτοῖς (902–3.) as anything but a request for an unequivocal outcome. And only in this instance would such a complete and literal outcome alone be useful.

⁵⁶ If Oedipus did accuse Kreon of Laius' murder also (see n.10 above), then Jokasta's revelation of the Delphic oracle has allowed the chorus to take over Oedipus' analysis of matters completely, changing only the principal suspect.

⁵⁷ Zeus is regarded as closely connected with Δίκη, sometimes as her father (A. Th. 662: ή Διὸς παῖς παρθένος Δίκη, A. Ch. 949f. ἐτήτυμος Διὸς κόρα–Δίκαν δέ νιν προσαγορεύομεν καλῶς, E. fr. 151 τήν τοι Δἱκην …παῖδ᾿ εἵναι Διός), sometimes as the force which drives the law of divine justice (e.g. A. Ch. 639f, cf. S. Ant. 450–1). Perhaps an ancient audience might understand θεὸς in 871 and 881 as references to Zeus rather than to e.g. Apollo (Winnington-Ingram [n.l], 193) or a generalised deity. Cf. S. Ant. 604f. and see above n. 32.

⁵⁸ See Carey 178 for the meaning of ἐξαιροὺσιν.

⁵⁹ So the contention that this ode constitutes a criticism of Aeschylus' theology, e.g. Winnington-Ingram 202f. and Müller (n.18), 269–91, is unlikely to be correct. See Carey 179. For what it is worth, cf. also Ar. Ra. 786–94 and 1515–19.

⁶⁰ 222.

⁶¹ Id., 223.

⁶² Passim, especially 178 on vocabulary.

⁶³ Scodel 223.

⁶⁴ This paper began life in an undergraduate Greek class, and my thanks are due in the first place to the students in it, Kieran McGroarty, Linda Hogan, Pat Colgan and Anne Bannon. Audiences in Dublin and Cork made useful points. For discussion and help I am grateful to Dr. Peter Jones, Professor Gerard Watson, Dr. Martin Pulbrook, Professor A.D. Fitton Brown and Dr. Maureen Alden. My gratitude is due to Dr. N.R.E. Fisher for kindly allowing me to see his draft chapter on this ode from his forthcoming study of hyhris. I owe my greatest debt to Professor P.E. Easterling, Professor A.H. Sommerstein, and to the anonymous referees who have made many useful suggestions and saved me from many errors. None of the above mentioned should be assumed necessarily to agree with the views expressed here, for which I take full responsibility.