This address urges Americanists to take the post–World War II era on board as economic history, using the Civil Rights Revolution to set an example. The speed and sweepof the movement's success illustrates the dynamics of an “unanticipated revolution” as analyzed by Timur Kuran, to be grouped with famous historical surprises such as the triumph of British antislavery and the fall of Soviet communism. The evidence confirms that the breakthroughs of the 1960s constituted an economic as well as a political revolution, in many respects an economic revolution for the entire southern region, as well as for African-Americans.

For long periods, and in line with recent theoretical literature, the rabassa morta sharecropping contract successfully reduced problems of moral hazard and opportunistic behavior, and provided incentives for sharecroppers to respond to market opportunities. However, from the late nineteenth century, technical change, rising wages, and weak wine prices all increased the incentives for postcontractual opportunistic behavior on the part of the sharecropper, leading to conflicts and loss of trust between the principal and agent.

During the late nineteenth century, competition from cheap American grains undermined agricultural economies across Europe. This article investigates how similar forces of globalization in the production of Mediterranean fruits and nuts dampened economic prospects across southern Europe and in some cases contributed to outright economic and political crises.

The first domestic food to be regulated by the federal government in the United States, margarine had a unique regulation history. No other food products has been so harshly treated throughtout the world. The American margarine policy up to the 1950s is generally considered remarkably severe. The Canadian policy was even more stringent and more enduring. The province of Quebec, and until very recently of Ontario, still prohibits the yellow coloring of margarine. This article compares the history of margarine regulation in the two countries and uses the interest-group theory of government to investigate why it was so stringent.

The Glass-Steagall Act may have increased the cost for corporations of raising external funds for investment spending. Significant differences are found in the way financial institutions influenced corporate investment spending. Investment regressions for a sample of companies affiliated to financial institutions are estimated and compared to those for a control sample. Prior to Glass-Steagall, affiliated companies do not display any sensitivity between investment spending and internal measures of liquidity, whereas the control sample does.

Between 1890 and 1938 Japan experienced rapid economic growth. India stagnated. This national divergence was reflected in the performance of both countries' leading modern industiy, cotton textiles. The parallels between national and industry performance suggest the problems of the Indian textile industry may have been those of India as a whole. Weak management is widely blamed for poor performance in textiles. An analysis of managerial decisions in Bombay shows, however, that on all measurable dimensions Indian managers performed as well as they could. The problem instead was one factor they could not change—the effort levels of Indian workers.

Few systematic studies of the effects of patronage on public-sector employees' wages and working conditions exist. Exploiting a sample of nearly 90,000 workers, this article provides systematic evidence: Where patronage was widespread, state and local employees earned 40 percent more per hour; worked 16 to 17 percent fewer hours; and earned 22 percent more per week than comparable private-sector workers. Public-sector wage premia varied; low-skilled workers, and workers in Baltimore and New York, enjoyed relatively large wage premia. Wages were less dispersed in the public sector than in the private, suggesting that pay scales reflected politics, not marginal products.