The rise of the new economic history has provoked a vigorousdebate on methodology. At issue is the validity of the effort of econometric historians or cliometricians, as practitioners of the new work are sometimes called, to apply the mathematical models of economics to the study of history. Some older historians have attacked the use of such models on the ground that they violate the empirical character of the discipline. In this view, the models employed by the cliometricians represent an unwarranted intrusion of speculation into an area of research previously limited to the careful collection and presentation of facts. The most severe criticism has been directed at the propensity of the new economic historians to deal with questions of the counterfactual-conditional type, that is, with questions which ask how the development of the economy would have been altered by the absence of one or more of its observed features. It has been asserted that the models which underlie the answers to such questions are “figments” and that they cannot be verified. Consequently counterfactual models are held to be a direct threat to the integrity of economic history as an empirically confirmed description of the economic development of nations.

The rate of urban growth in the United States reached its highestlevel in the twenty years before 1861. Nevertheless in the five preceding decades, 1790 to 1840, those coming just before the railroad age, the cities of the nation grew at a remarkably rapid rate. It is true that during one 10-year period of relatively slow growth, 1810–1820, the city population increased at a pace slightly below that for the total population. But in the other four decades, 1790–1800, 1800–1810, 1820–1830, and 1830–1840, the rate of increase in the number of people living in cities was almost double that for the whole population and exceeded the urban growth rate attained in any post-Civil War decade. This study makes available detailed statistics on urban population changes from 1775 to 1840, directs attention to the differing contributions to urbanization made by four city groups, and notes some of the influences affecting urban population expansion in the years before the railroad became a dominant influence.

This article deals with the interrelations between the economyand the government of the expanding Spanish empire in the era of overseas expansion during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Specifically, it attempts to show how the government reacted to the phenomenon of the growing empire. In a full treatment it would be necessary to show how the various Spanish territories of the Peninsula were unified by the process of the “reconquista” and by the marriage policy of the Catholic Icings; how during the sixteenth century Navarre and Portugal were joined; how the overseas expansion of Spanish power, beginning in the late Middle Ages, continued during the sixteenth century; and how Spain, as a consequence of Hapsburg marriage policy, built an important bridge of possessions from the Netherlands to Italy. Obviously, these questions cannot be dealt with in detail in one article, but they form the background for the following discussion.

Italy's rapid industrial growth, which began in the mid-1890's, was preceded and accompanied by important developments in her financial institutions, including in particular the establishment of several industrial credit banks on the German model. The role of such banks in French and German industrial growth before 1914 has been the subject of considerable study. It is the purpose of this article to examine the effects of these banks on the rate and direction of Italian development between 1894 and 1914, and to consider the relation between their near-monopoly of industrial credit and the emergence of concentration of ownership and control in the new and rapidly growing sectors of the industrial structure.

In a recent issue of this Journal Peter Temin has offered a challenging analysis of American labor scarcity and the choice of technology. He deserves our gratitude for attempting to increase the analytical rigor in discussions of this matter, but his analysis is puzzling and, I think, profoundly misleading. This note is meant as a comment upon certain of its oddities.

My article on Prussian public finance in the December 1966 issue of this Journal contained some errors of calculation which partially affect the arguments I advanced there and which provide an excellent object lesson in the hasty use of quantitative evidence. After unaccountably converting current prices into constant ones by multiplication instead of division, I rushed the results off to the editors without checking them.

Shipping tonnages have been frequently used as a basis for inquiries covering a wide and increasing range of topics in economic history. For example, industry studies, descriptions of shipping routes and trade flows, colonial balance of payments estimates, and an analysis of the sources of productivity change in shipping have all been based–at least in part–on tonnage figures. A major problem in using tonnages as a means of historical quantification is that the term “ton” (either a shipping ton or a commodity ton) has varied substantially over time. This is especially true for the Colonial Period, when it was defined differently depending on its usage or the agent or the country reporting it. Fortunately, several recent research efforts have greatly improved our understanding of the meaning and limitations of historical tonnages.