The problem of the relations between religious and political organizations and systems has been of long standing in the broad field of comparative historical studies and in the sociology of religion. The work of Max Weber, although more explicitly focused on the relations between economics and religion has, of course, contained many general and concrete analyses on the interrelations between religion and politics in general and between specific types of religious and political systems in particular. Some of the recent works dealing with this area have been devoted to the more general problem of “The State and Religion.” These discussions have emphasized the problem of their interdependence and mutual influence, especially in the more “developed” forms of both religious and political institutions, but have not always specified the exact types of religious and political structures whose interaction formed the object of the analysis.

The distinctive, albeit controversial, role of the individual in history has given rise in the West to the development of biography as a special field of literature and historical writing. In China, the writing of biography has for many centuries also occupied a special position, a position shaped both by the forms and purposes of Chinese historical writing and by the fabric of Chinese society. The papers of this symposium, presented originally at the 1961 annual meeting of the American Historical Association, offer a preliminary assessment of the place of biographical writing in China and may serve to suggest avenues for further fruitful study and research.

This study starts with three assumptions. First, inasmuch as the concept “absolutism” which is often used in writing about premodern Chinese history needs clarification, it will be helpful to study imperial power at the level of actual administrative operations. Second, within the framework of general political and ideological institutions, administrative operations have dynamics of their own. Finally, a new understanding of these dynamics as a contributing factor will add to our knowledge of the working of the dynastic cycle in Chinese history.

The Social organization of the Chinese in Singapore is so complex that many studies of it will have to be made before we can understand it as a whole. Three anthropologists and one sociologist have worked among the Singapore Chinese, two of them concentrating on religious organization. In this essay we try to give an outline of the sociology of Chinese religion in Singapore, making use of our incomplete knowledge and pointing out what seem to be reasonable conclusions from it.

Two approaches have dominated the study of Chinese industrial history. Work of the kind Professor Joseph Needham has done in his Science and Civilization in China attempts to trace the history of Chinese scientific and technological achievement from the earliest times. Recently some interesting investigations have also been made of industrialization along modern Western lines since 1800. Needham has collected valuable data about all periods but neglects the relation of technology to general economic history. From the other work we get a more or less comprehensive view of nineteenth century economic development, but this tells us nothing about an earlier era of significant growth and change. The purpose of this article is to outline the importance of iron and coal during the remarkable economic and industrial expansion which took place in the 166 years from 960 to the Jurchen conquest of North China in 1126 A.D.

The 1857 uprising, by shattering many of Britain's most cherished beliefs about India, introduced a decade of controversy and reappraisal in many fields. At the center of this controversy stood land policy, for the land revenue was the heart of the administrative system, and the form through which outside events made their influence felt most strongly upon the structure of society. In collecting the land revenue, the Government had of necessity to settle responsibility for its payment on some person, and in so doing to define the rights in land of the various classes of society. This had a profound effect on the distribution of power within Indian society. Whichever class obtained the land settlement, and the rights and privileges it entailed, was in effect proprietor of the land, able to reduce all others to dependence upon its generosity. The British could insure the dominance of either peasant or landlord simply by manipulating the Record of Rights and assessment rolls.

Whatever the source of the generally accepted classification of Indian philosophical systems, its six divisions do not appear to most scholars in this field to stem from logic. As a systematic attempt to deal with theoretical problems of metaphysics, logic, epistemology, and related topics, the “six systems” account has several glaring deficiencies. Two of these will be mentioned briefly.

Any historian approaching the subject of traditional Chinese biography may be confident of at least one fact: he will be overwhelmed. The sheer volume of this material available in the Chinese sources is exceedingly large.

In discussing Chinese historical writing, it is customary to point first to the chengshih, the so-called “standard histories,” dealing with all of Chinese history down to 1644. There are twenty-five histories, all bulky, in this “official” group. All contain large collections of biographies, elaborately sorted out: loyal officials, villainous officials, imperial concubines, writers, hermits, virtuous wives, and filial sons. In the History of the Ming Dynasty, that portion which is biographical in nature runs to 197 out of a total of 332 chapters–in actual pages about sixty percent of the whole. We encounter the same phenomenon outside of the “standard histories”–in local histories, for example, of which there may be several for one small district. All of this material I shall call “historical biography.”

“Biography,” in the words of Hu Shih, “is the least developed branch of Chinese literature.” This statement would, at first sight, seem to have little justification when we take into account the enormous quantity and wide variety of Chinese biographical literature produced during the past two millennia, and when we consider the voluminous biographical output and the keen popular interest in biography in twentieth-century China.

For underdeveloped countries bent on accelerating their economic development, there are two alternatives: one is a mixed economy compatible with democracy, the other is planned development under totalitarianism. What has been happening in Communist China during the past few years is a striking example of the latter case, and its degree of success will undoubtedly have far-reaching influences on other economically backward countries desiring rapid economic development. Since rapid economic development is unattainable without substantial investment, the sources of investment funds are of crucial importance in the whole development program. The purpose of this paper is to explore how public investment was financed in Communist China, and to estimate which population groups bore the burden of such financing.

In recent years, the influence of the military on modern Japanese history has been the subject of several excellent analyses.1 Since these studies have sought to explain the major events of the prewar period, they concentrated more on the significance of army factionalism vis a vis political developments, than on the nature of this factionalism. The purpose of this article is to explore the tangled web of factionalism within the Imperial Army in the 1932–36 period. Since this topic presents many complex problems, it may help to review briefly the sources of information on army factions that appeared immediately after the end of the Pacific War.

Representative Government was an institution dear to the hearts of nineteenth-century Englishmen. It was their pride and, they affirmed, the source of their national strength that they lived under this form of constitution. They were eager that others, especially their colonies, should enjoy its benefits. There were few obstacles in the way of the establishment of representative institutions in the white colonies: the land was different but the people were the same. But in India neither the land nor the people resembled those of England. Nonetheless, the British determined to train an educated, Westernized elite which would make possible the establishment of representative institutions there.

Saionji Kimmochi was often called the last bulwark against complete usurpation of power in the civil government by the Japanese military in the early and middle 1930's. As the last of the Genrō he represented also leadership which had developed in the Meiji period centering in a small group of able men who carried Japan from isolation to intimate involvement in world affairs. Not as well known is Saionji's role in the Meiji period; its study brings rewarding insight into the pattern of leadership and the development of political life during those years. It is the purpose of this paper to describe Saionji's background and to analyze his role in the movement for popular rights and a constitution which culminated in the issuance of the Imperial Rescript of October 12, 1881, the Rescript which promised a constitution and the establishment of a parliament.

One of the weaknesses of comparative studies of the development of an entrepreneurial class is the lack of detailed data. Often such studies make use of census data which indicate the growth of this class in general but fail to show clearly the origins of new entrepreneurs. Available case studies, on the other hand, do not cover enough ground thus precluding generalizations.

Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830–1878) emerged as the dominant figure of the Meiji oligarchy in November 1873. He retained that uneasy position until his death under his assassins' swords on May 14, 1878. During the four and one-half year interval Ōkubo served Japan well, although the fact of his assassination and public reaction to it revealed that he was anything but a popular figure in his lifetime. As Home Minister (Naimukyō) during most of that period, he advanced the process of political centralization substantially and channelled state energies and resources into economic development. Authoritarian political techniques inherited from the feudal past enabled him to force the pace of modernization for his country.

Biography in the People's Republic of China is not exempt from the ubiquitous slogan: “politics in command.” It is a highly purposeful craft, but rarely, if ever, is its primary purpose to portray an individual personality for his own sake, to inform objectively, or to entertain. The aim, instead, is to convince, enshrine, or inspire. Biography is didactic, hagiolatrous, or propagandistic. It is but one among many methods used in Communist China to support Marxist-Leninist views of history, provide sanction for the leaders of the Chinese Communist party, and fire enthusiasm for the acceptance and fulfillment of party programs. The accuracy, art, treatment of character, and probably even the quantity of biography published are limited by party preconceptions and enforced through party control over all media of information.