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A Weakest Link Marked Stopping Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

Steven A. Lippman*
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
Sheldon M. Ross*
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
Sridhar Seshadri*
Affiliation:
New York University
*
Postal address: Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA.
∗∗Postal address: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA. Email address: smross@usc.edu
∗∗∗Postal address: Department of Information, Operations, and Management Science, Leonard Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012, USA.
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Abstract

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We consider a model in which we have k items to be sold. Potential buyers make offers in a sequential fashion. Once made, the offer is either rejected or marked for acceptance. Once k items have been marked, the items are then sold to the buyers whose offers were marked, but at a price equal to the minimum of the k marked offers. Assuming that the successive offers are independent and identically distributed according to a specified distribution and that there is a fixed cost incurred whenever an offer is rejected, we determine structural results about the optimal policy, present computational approaches for finding the optimal policy, and give some heuristic policies.

Type
Research Papers
Copyright
Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 2007 

References

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