The function of a legal test is to navigate the court through various possible solutions to achieve the optimum result in the application of a legal principle. It therefore forms part of the process for securing a just result to a controversy in adversarial proceedings. A well-articulated legal test should reflect the judicial policy on the principle it applies. Such a test should generally yield results that are just and are in consonance with the policy behind the principle. If the test fails in this respect, it ceases to be functional. It is against this background that the one test used by Nigerian courts to determine standing to sue in all doctrinal contexts will be examined.

Few countries in the world can claim to be free from corruption and none of these is to be found in Commonwealth Africa. Even though administrative incorruptibility was one of the boasts of the British colonial service, low-level corruption was common during the colonial period and indeed served to bolster the colonial system. Since African states obtained political independence, levels of corruption have markedly increased, regardless of official ideology or economic approach, and in many countries corruption is both pervasive and endemic. Changes of government are often accompanied and, in the case of military coups, justified by commitments to eradicate the corrupt practices that allegedly characterized the previous regime. Corruption is an obstacle to economic development and to political integration, and most African governments (cynically or not) avow the need to combat it. Pressure on governments to act has increased in recent years and comes from two sources. The emergence of pro-democracy forces has drawn large numbers of people into the arena of political debate and organization and this in turn has led to demands for openness and accountability on the part of government. Moreover, foreign donors and international financial institutions are today less willing to condone corrupt practices on the part of African governments. They stress the importance of good governance and accountability and the need to link economic reconstruction with institutional reform.

Benjamin Disraeli took a calculated “leap in the dark” in 1867, when he extended the right to vote to almost all British men. With hindsight, his leap can be seen to have been a necessary (but not sufficient) means of defusing discontent and promoting democratization. Ethiopia seems poised for an even bigger constitutional leap into a murkier realm, into an ethnicized attempt at democratization. To gain acceptance, a new constitution like Ethiopia's must seem to be all things to all people and, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, the end of the Cold War has seen an explosion of ethnic nationalisms similar to the one occurring in Europe late in the 19th century. Without benefit of hindsight one can only make informed guesses about the effects of a new Ethiopian “constitutionalism” on events which are largely beyond the drafters’ control. I will argue that there are grounds for a guarded optimism over Ethiopia's leap.

The attitude of courts to previous inconsistent statements of witnesses is primarily informed by the premium placed on the most credible evidence. A vintage rationale for this attitude states that:

“The character of a witness for habitual veracity is an essential ingredient in his credibility: for a man who is capable of uttering a deliberate falsehood is in most cases capable of doing so under the solemn sanction of an oath. If therefore it appears that he has formerly said or written the contrary of that which he has now sworn (unless the reason of his having done so is satisfactorily accounted for), his evidence should not have much weight….”

The contours of human rights, especially labour rights, have undergone significant shifts in the recent past in Southern Africa. Labour law regimes have been overhauled, resulting in large-scale changes, liberalization of controls over trade unions, loosening of strictures relating to the right to strike, freeing collective bargaining from excessive governmental interference and the extension of protective legislation to previously excluded workers. These developments have been a function of dramatic changes throughout die region. The transition in Soudiern Africa has encompassed die political, economic and legal fabrics of most countries. It has been under way since die late 1980s and is being extended daily. In die constitutional zone, diere is a discernible trend towards the constdtutionalization of social rights, thus settling the debate regarding positive and negative rights in favour of the interdependence, indivisibility and interconnectedness of human rights. The transformation in Soudiern Africa is emblematic of three critical developments: democratization, economic liberalization and paradigmatic transitions in law.

Development in all its forms is a pervasive theme in the study of modern Africa. The meaning, objectives and methods of development are issues which have entered into every discipline concerned with the study of that continent. The study of law is no exception. Broadly speaking there are three “paradigms of law” which have special relevance to debates on African development. These can be characterized as the instrumental model, the pluralist model and the customary law model.

“First of all, the idea of multi-parties is not a new one in Africa. Here in Uganda, we had multi-parties between 1962 and 1966. The generals took over power all over Africa because the multi-parties had failed: this is a historical fact. Their failure was, however, not surprising because we are talking about systems from completely different societies. In Africa, we still have pre-industrial societies without any significant level of social stratification [and] therefore, we are still dealing mainly with tribal groups. Political pluralism will come to Africa, no doubt, but not at a forced pace.”

Over 20 years ago, the Federal High Court was created. It is today the only Court with jurisdiction in matters relating to admiralty in Nigeria. This has, however, not been without some teething problems. Disputes arose over what matters fell within the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts and also as to which courts had admiralty jurisdiction. The recent Admiralty Jurisdiction Decree of 1991 addresses these issues by providing a comprehensive local code in line with the International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-going Ships, 1952. This article traces the development of the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal High Court and examines the scope of its jurisdiction today.

“There is no doubt that once, twice or even several times in your life, you have had to stop for a moment in a street or as you enter into a village, to express sorrow over the lot of a man, a woman or a child looking haggard, badly dressed, underfed and not knowing where to go. Then, you were overwhelmed with a feeling of compassion and a sigh of sadness gripping you by the throat. You could not help but felt concerned and said to yourself it was your duty to ‘make a gesture’ thus listening to the dictate of your conscience.”

Dr Peter Onu, OAU Assistant Secretary General

The extent to which customary law restricts the freedom of testamentary power (if at all) has given rise to a spate of cases right up to the Supreme Court, in which the courts have attempted to interpret and apply section 3(1) of the Wills Law (1958) of Western Nigeria, which currently applies to Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Ondo, Edo and Delta States. Section 3(1) of the Wills Law of all these States provides thus:

“Subject to any Customary Law relating thereto, it shall be lawful for every person to devise, bequeath or dispose of, by his will executed in a manner hereinafter required, all real and all personal estate which he shall be entided to, either in Law or in equity, at the time of his death and which if not so devised, bequeathed and disposed of would devolve upon the heir at law of him, or if he became entided by descent, of his ancestor, or upon his executor or administrator”.

The Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (the Ninth Congress), was held in Cairo, Egypt from 29 April to 8 May, 1995. It followed the sequence of United Nations quinquennial congresses on the prevention of crime and die treatment of offenders which began in 1955 as a direct continuation of die international penitentiary congresses that had been organized by the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission (IPPC) since the 19tii century. The congresses are convened by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on die basis of General Assembly Resolution 415(V) of 1950. The Nindi Congress was attended by delegates from 138 states, several United Nations offices and organs, including specialized agencies, various inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and over 190 individual experts. This was die first time the Congress was held on the African continent.

In the period since the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) was voted into government in 1991 by an overwhelming majority, the Lands Bill, 1994 (hereafter referred to as “the Bill”) easily stands out as the most publicly discussed piece of proposed legislation. When the Bill was introduced to Parliament debate was deferred sine die because most members of Parliament (MPs) demanded more time to examine its provisions and consult over proposed changes. Postponement was followed by a one-day seminar on die Bill organized by the Ministry of Legal Affairs. Thereafter, the government initiated a programme to explain the Bill to the public: on 29 September, 1994, a chiefs' workshop was arranged at Mulungushi International Conference Centre, Lusaka, but this came to nothing because invited chiefs did not attend. Then the government conceived provincial programmes for die public discussion of the Bill, but diese were then postponed indefinitely, as explained below.

The enactment of the Ombudsman Act, 1995, marks Botswana's belated, albeit welcome, membership of the world-wide movement to enhance governmental administration. The Act brings to fruition the deliberations of an international conference on the suitability of the Ombudsman institution in Botswana held in Gaborone in 1993. The need for such an institution to complement the country's democratic institutions was made clear at that conference by the then Minister for Presidential Affairs and Public Administration who was quoted as saying:

‘The wide acceptance of the Ombudsman institution and the fact that it has been incorporated in recent constitutional reforms in other countries requires that we in Botswana give serious consideration to it at this point in time.’