The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights1 (hereinafter the “African Charter” or “Charter”) was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1981. It entered into force on 21 October, 1986, after a majority of OAU member states had ratified the Charter. At present, 52 of the 53 member states have become parties: the only non-ratifying state is Eritrea.

Multinational oil corporations (MNOCs) are a strategically important group of multinational corporations (MNCs). There are now many MNOCs operating in both the private and public sectors with remarkably diverse characters, strategies and objectives. Handling large budgets, revenue and capital, and complex advanced technology, they are responsible for exploration, crude oil production, refining, and distribution. These very capacities enable MNOCs to make a number of positive contributions to the economic growth and development of the developing oil-producing countries in which they operate. In that regard, MNOCs engage extensively in joint marketing operations with their host countries in various parts of the world, and foreign funds injected by MNOCs' operations relieve the shortage of financial capital and make greater production possible.

Are “traditional” or “indigenous” land rights an obstacle to development? The question seems simple enough. And the liberal economic perspective currently being advanced by free market advocates such as the Bretton Woods institutions answers: yes, to the extent that those traditional relations hinder the free exchange of land, they do slow development. But of course the question is more complex and requires answers to a number of subsidiary and ancillary questions. Some are definitional and empirical: what are these “traditional land rights”? To what extent do they, rather than codified law or administrative practices, define the relationships of social actors and groups to land and to each other through land? Other questions are more hypothetical: what are the alternatives to the current regime, what costs would installing them incur, and what would be their costs and benefits, once in place? Finally, there are ancillary, but still central questions: what other factors, such as ecological conditions, state policies and non-state institutions, may account for development or the lack thereof, apart from land tenure regimes?

Data collected by comparative legal scholars show that legal transplants usually take place from more complex societies to less complex ones. By contrast, the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement that has recently developed in modern societies has been described as a return to a simple model of dispute settlement used in the past and in modern non-Western societies. Does this mean that we are experiencing a new kind of legal transplant, a transplant from less complex to more complex societies? In this article I will argue that this is not the case. Far from being a transplant from the southern to the northern hemisphere, ADR seems indeed to be a modern legal institution born from the retreat of the state from some of its traditional functions. A different question thus needs exploring: is ADR, at least, an institution that can easily be transplanted to Africa where the original transplant of the Western state has failed? In other words, is conciliatory ADR more similar to the African way of dealing with conflicts and consequently to be recommended as the dispute resolution mechanism for modern African states? The question appears to be appropriate in situations such as the one in the Horn of Africa—particularly Eritrea—where the new political leadership is confronting the difficult task of building a new legal system.

One of the crucial theoretical problems confronting human rights is the perception of its historical derivation related to the universal or relative character of the rights declared. Limited views on the origin of the concept are widespread and easily exploited to stymie die quest for human rights. Cultural-monopolist derivations of its origin have fed relativist but apologist arguments in developing countries. A cultural-universalist conception is not only possible but preferable. A contrary position would both contradict and deter the cause of human rights. To arrogate the concept to some groups, cultures and civilizations to die exclusion of others would be deleterious to the momentum toward universal consensus on human rights in at least two major ways. It would harden or ossify divisive tendencies and provide ammunition for apologist justification of violations.

In English law, since 1977 at least, the term “application for judicial review” has come to refer to the special method of applying for public law remedies in the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over inferior courts and administrative bodies or authorities. Moreover, die fine expositions flowing from that jurisdiction—comprising judicial decisions, dicta and learned writings alike—have tended to sound at points as if “judicial review” might be more or less coterminous with “supervisory review”. A useful introduction to the subject, ostensibly setting out “to examine the various different review jurisdictions vested in die English courts”, however, ends up acknowledging and treating only the appellate and supervisory jurisdictions.

State v. K [1998] 1 LRC 248 (High Court (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) South Africa)

The accused had been convicted of sodomy committed with another consenting adult male. A criminal review raised the question of whether the continued proscription of sodomy was constitutional.

State v. Hassen and Another [1998] 1 LRC 49 (Supreme Court of Soutfi Transvaal Provincial Division)

The appellants had been apprehended as a result of a police trap, and were charged and convicted of contravening section 20 of the Diamonds Act, 1986. They appealed on die grounds that entrapment and the use of evidence obtained as a result of a police trap contravened their right to a fair trial provided by section 25(3) of the Constitution.

State v. Angula, State v. Lucas [1998] 1 LRC 14 (High Court, Namibia)

The appellants had applied in the respective magistrates’ courts for discovery of state witnesses’ statements and other material relevant to the defence. The courts had refused to order discovery and the appellants appealed to the High Court on the grounds that such a refusal was in breach of their right to a fair trial under Article 12(1)(a) of the Constitution.

United Parties v. Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs [1998] 1 LRC 614 (Supreme Court of Zimbabwe)

In 1992 the Political Parties (Finance) Act was passed which made provision for the state funding of political parties. Section 3(3) provided that all political parties would be entitled to state funding in proportion to the number of their members elected to parliament, so long as they had a minimum of 15 elected members. At that time ZANU(PF) candidates were elected to 117 of the 120 parliamentary seats and in the 1995 general election this increased to 118 out of 120 seats. The effect of section 3(3) was that only ZANU(PF) qualified for state funding. The applicant was a recognized political party formed in 1994. It had no members of parliament and thus did not qualify for any state funding. It sought a declaration that section 3 infringed the constitutional right to freedom of expression and was therefore invalid.

A Joint Colloquium sponsored by the Commonwealth Legal Education Association, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Commonwealth Lawyers' Association and Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association was held at Latimer House, near London, on 15–19 June, 1998. It was attended by legal academics, parliamentarians, judges and legal practitioners from around the Commonwealth, including seven African Countries.