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SISTEMI ELETTORALI, SISTEMI PARTITICI CAUSE E CONSEGUENZE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2018

Adriano Pappalardo

Introduzione

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In un passaggio frequentemente citato, Giovanni Sartori definisce il sistema elettorale «il più specifico strumento manipolativo della politica» (1968, 273; 1996, 11). In questo articolo, mi propongo di verificare le più tipiche «manipolazioni» attribuite al maggioritario o alla rappresentanza proporzionale, quelle sul sistema partitico. Al riguardo, è ancor oggi utile partire da Duverger (1954), il quale distingueva oltre cinquanta anni fa effetti psicologici ed effetti meccanici. Gli effetti psicologici entrano in causa prima, o al momento, del voto, condizionando la decisione degli elettori di votare o meno e, in caso affermativo, per quale partito. In questo, evidentemente, ha un plausibile peso la percezione che ogni sistema fornisce incentivi, o pone vincoli, a certi comportamenti, ed esige, quindi, una misura di adattamento alla sua logica di funzionamento. Date le alte soglie di rappresentanza associate ai sistemi maggioritari, l'adattamento si manifesta empiricamente sotto forma di voto strategico, cioè con la tendenza degli elettori a votare «utilmente», disertando i partiti senza possibilità di vincere e concentrandosi sui più forti.

Summary

Summary

The article provides a systematic test of the consequences of the electoral system for the format of the party system and the frequency of single-party majority cabinets. The test is based on Lijphart's 1994 data set (extended from 1990 up to November 1st 2002), but excludes some of his cases, and introduces an additional indicator of the number of parties. Thanks to these changes in the research design, the variance explained by multivariate regression turns much higher than Lijphart's results, especially as long as the elective parties (i.e., the psychological effects of the electoral system) are concerned. At the same time, the post-1990 data show a decline of the predictive power of the main independent variable («effective» threshold). In order to explain this decline, the author argues that the growing destructuration of western parties and party systems occurring since the early nineties should be taken into account. Indeed, entering into the regression an indicator of such a process (total net volatility) compensates for most of the threshold's lost explanatory power, thus suggesting that destructuration is a far more significant variable than previously recognized by the relevant literature.

Type
Saggi
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , August 2003 , pp. 195 - 224
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna 

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