On 13 September 1993 Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter “PLO”) signed on the lawn of the White House in Washington, in the presence of United States President William J. Clinton, a “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” (hereinafter “the DOP”), the text of which had been initialled the previous month in the Norwegian capital Oslo, following several months of secret negotiations. This occurred almost exactly fifteen years after the signing at the White House, on 17 September 1979, by the President of Egypt, Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadat, and the Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, of the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East” that had been negotiated and agreed at Camp David, Maryland (hereinafter “the Framework”).

Both the Framework and the DOP aim at resolving one of the most complex conflicts of our time, namely, the dispute that first developed between the Arab and Jewish communities in Mandatory Palestine and which widened, with the establishment of Israel in 1948, into a conflict between Israel and the entire Arab world. While both agreements provide for interim arrangements (and the DOP even stresses this aspect in its title), pending the negotiations for a definitive solution, and while both even use similar terms, the basic concepts underlying each of these agreements widely diverge.

Seen in the context of the Middle East peace process, the security aspects of the Israel/PLO Agreements constitute a small, but important step within this process. Formally, the security arrangements in the bilateral agreements have to be distinguished from the issue of security in terms of strategic needs and arms control dealt with in the multilateral negotiations. However, bilateral security arrangements will in the long run, influence and be influenced by the content of the multilateral negotiations in the field of security. It appears to have become customary in Middle East peace negotiations, that only once an agreement has been reached on a larger issue, do teams of experts deal with the details of security arrangements. This was the case in the negotiations of the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, and of the Israel/PLO Agreements. The approach adopted by Israel in relation to Syria concerning the Golan Heights, is also similar in character.

In each one of the three main agreements which Israel has concluded to date with the PLO as part of the current peace process, the issue of foreign relations has received special treatment. This reflects the fact that, while the transfer of a number of spheres of authority to the Palestinian autonomous entity has serious practical ramifications, the treatment of the sphere of foreign relations has an added effect on the very nature of the autonomous entity itself, because full capacity to conduct foreign relations is one of the accepted indicia of sovereignty and statehood. Any arrangements reached with regard to the sphere of foreign relations are, therefore, of critical significance.

The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993 (the “DOP”), which establishes the framework for the settlement of the conflict between the parties, sets the stage for a gradual transition towards a peace settlement, or the “permanent status” as referred to in the DOP. The interim arrangements outlined in the DOP provide for a step-by-step assumption of responsibilities by Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, signed in Cairo on May 4, 1994, prescribes at length the arrangements for the first steps to be taken towards that goal. During the period of the interim arrangements, the Gaza Strip (excluding Israeli settlements and military installations) and the “Jericho Area” are to be administered by a “Palestinian Authority” (PA), a body established under the Cairo Agreement, which is distinct from the PLO.

The Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, signed on May 4, 1994, seeks to implement the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangements signed in Washington on September 13, 1993 and, in particular, to put into effect its Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Gaza and the Jericho Area. The primary purpose of the Agreement is then to transfer territory from Israel to the Palestinian Authority. Article V of the Agreement defines this territory as covering the Gaza Strip and Jericho, excluding the Settlements and the Israeli military installation area. The transfer of territory is naturally accompanied by a transfer of legal and political control from the Military Government to the Palestinian Authority. But the Agreement does not simply assign to the Palestinian Authority all legislative, executive and judicial functions within the territory transferred to its control.

The economic provisions of the agreement between Israel and the PLO are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on April 29th 1994. Concluding nearly six months of negotiations, the Protocol spells out the arrangements regulating economic relations between the Palestinian Authority, established under the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP), and Israel. Its eleven articles deal with the foreign trade, monetary and fiscal regimes of the areas under this jurisdiction, and with the movement of labour and goods between them and Israel. The Protocol also treats some more specific matters, such as the licensing of tour operators, access to tourist sites and compulsory motor vehicle insurance.

Environmental resources and hazards do not recognize political boundaries. The basic fact that the people of Israel and of the new Palestinian entity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip share several important natural resources compels the parties to co-operate in the protection of these resources. Neither party is solely able to manage these essential resources (e.g., water) and any attempt to act unilaterally in this sphere might harm the interests of both parties. A quick reading of the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (“the Cairo Agreement”) shows that the parties were indeed aware of this, and the agreement includes numerous environmental provisions in various sections.

It is generally thought that Jerusalem is the most difficult problem that the peace-makers have to deal with. The centrality of the issue of Jerusalem derives neither from security considerations nor from economic interests, but from emotional and religious sensitivities. The complexity of the issue is the result of three factors: the city is holy for adherents of Christianity, Islam and Judaism, namely, it is sacred for many millions of people, most of whom do not live in the city; it is the subject of conflicting national claims of two peoples — Israelis and Palestinian Arabs; and its population is very heterogeneous. A solution to the conflicts about Jerusalem is a sine qua non for the achievement of a viable and durable peace in the area.