While the rules of the jus in bello are generally operative in cyberspace, it appears to be problematic to apply the fundamental principle of distinction because of the systemic interconnection of military and civilian infrastructure in the cyber realm. In this regard, the application of the accepted legal definition of military objectives will make various components of the civilian cyber infrastructure a legitimate military objective. In order to avoid serious repercussions for the civilian population that might follow from this inherent interconnectedness, different concepts are analysed that could provide potential solutions for a clearer separation of legitimate military targets and protected civilian installations and networks. The approaches discussed range from the exemption of central cyber infrastructure components that serve important civilian functions, to the creation of ‘digital safe havens’ and possible precautionary obligations regarding the segregation of military and civilian networks. As a solution, the authors propose a dynamic interpretation of the wording ‘damage to civilian objects’ within the principle of proportionality of Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, an interpretation that would comprise the degradation of the functionality of systems that serve important civilian functions.

In the summer of 2010, the US Army began the field-testing of a new weapon, the XM25 ‘Individual Semi-Automatic Airburst System’, which fires ‘airburst’ anti-personnel rounds that can be programmed to detonate at a certain distance. While the XM25 has been heralded as a ‘game changer’ for modern warfare, the question nonetheless remains to what extent it is compatible with the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Against this background, this article aims to examine the legality of the XM25, in particular having regard to the customary prohibition on certain explosive projectiles and the general prohibition on causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.

The dramatic increase over the past decade in the quantity and sophistication of communications satellites in the earth's orbit raises new legal questions regarding the hostile disruption of satellite transmissions. As dependence on satellite communications in the military, governmental, economic and civilian spheres escalates globally, both states and non-state entities have become increasingly vulnerable to the consequences of disrupted transmissions, whether accidental or intentional. The implications of this new phenomenon for international humanitarian law (IHL) are better understood in the context of a preliminary analysis of the principles and norms underlying three regimes which now converge around satellite activities ad bellum. These are the substantive law regarding freedom of transborder communication, including relevant jus cogens prohibitions; international telecommunications regulation; and space law. The present analysis focuses on (a) the development of a taxonomy of the types of hostile disruption of satellite transmissions, (b) an examination of the three present normative regimes which govern international satellite transmissions in peacetime, and (c) the relevance of these three regimes for the development of applicable IHL. Overall, the article addresses the legal and policy aspects of an improved international response to the growing phenomenon of transmission disruption on the part of state and non-state entities both in peacetime and during war. Greater clarity regarding the applicable legal norms will enable both state and non-state actors to utilise satellite systems with increased certainty, reliability and effectiveness.

The advent of modern technology such as drones provides states with unique capabilities to acquire, with ease, high-quality information regarding acts performed by armed forces and agencies, such as (but not only) targeted killings. In some cases, this information can shed light on the facts of the case, when alleged violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law have occurred and thus investigation is called for. However, although calls for disclosure are increasing, states are reluctant to disclose information relating to such activities. This article discusses potential sources for obligations of disclosure, whether to civil society or to certain international bodies such as the International Criminal Court. In essence, the article posits that disclosure obligations can derive from the principle of transparency, as it applies, inter alia, to investigations, augmented by an emerging positive right to receive information. These obligations must be balanced, in turn, with considerations of national security. The article suggests that this balance, across a wide spectrum of international contexts, should be conducted in light of standards of necessity, proportionality and specificity. Accordingly, blanket non-disclosure may constitute a violation of international law or result in factual inferences to the detriment of states or individuals.

This article will examine the opportunities and limitations of using social media in the execution of legal duties relating to the monitoring and enforcement of IHL. The article will first provide an overview of social media. Next, it will briefly summarise the normative framework of IHL as well as the legal duties of the primary actors and promoters of IHL (for example, states, the UN, NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross and courts) to monitor and enforce these rules. The article will then address specific legal obligations relating to IHL monitoring and enforcement and the impact of social media on meeting these requirements.

Throughout, the article will use case studies from several conflict zones, including Sudan, Uganda, Mexico, Somalia, Gaza and Libya. The article will conclude that social media can play a critical role in promoting IHL education, and monitoring for potential violations. The benefits of this technology, however, are less clear for carrying out legal obligations related to the enforcement of IHL, such as fact-finding, arrest and prosecution. It is essential, therefore, that clear guidelines for utilising this quickly evolving technology, particularly in official fact-finding and judicial frameworks, be established.

Lionel Leonard Cohen – The Rt Hon Lord Cohen of Walmer in the County of Kent – was a distinguished British lawyer. In 1951, he was appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. Given the fact that he was a committed Jew, this was a remarkable achievement in its time. He chaired the Committee which produced the 1945 Cohen Report, whose recommendations were adopted and in due course enacted in the Companies Act 1948.