What we mean precisely by judicial reasoning is the reasoning of the judge as disclosed in the grounds of his judgment. The writings of jurists, the arguments of counsel, the indictment filed by the prosecuting officer—all provide grounds which may effect the judge's decision ; but it is the reasoned judgment alone which provides all the elements required to unfold the characteristic features of judicial reasoning.

The operative part of the judgment, the very ruling, is preceded by the grounds which constitute the reasoning on which the ruling is based. Judicial reasoning thus constitutes a model of practical reasoning, aimed at justifying a decision, a choice or a claim, and establishing that they are neither arbitrary nor unjust: the judicial ruling is justified if the conclusion following its reasons conforms to the law.

Assimilating judicial reasoning to a syllogism whose conclusion is true because it can be formally proved as deriving from true premises, would deny the very nature of practical reasoning and make it impersonal and devoid of its essential element of adjudication. The specific juridical nature of the judge's reasoning is not the formally correct deduction drawn from premises—in this respect legal deduction bears no distinctive features—but lies in the reasoning which serves to lay down those premises within the frame of an existing legal system.

Interest in the legal system of Israel is enhanced by the circumstances in which the new State came into being.

The circumstances of place are peculiar, in that the territory of Israel is situated at the cross-roads of two continents and at the very focus of movements of upheaval by which they are both so deeply stirred.

No less unusual are the circumstances of time. The proclamation of independence, for all its novelty, was not in the nature of a birth certificate, but rather of an official record of resurrection witnessed after a hiatus of close on two thousand years. No other people, so it seems, better demonstrates the adage that a nation's history is reflected in its institutions. Driven into exile and scattered to every corner of the earth for so many generations, it is now retrieving its identity in a supreme effort of reunion in its never-forgotten home-land. In the meantime, the fund of experience accumulated during the great dispersion has left its mark on the individuality of every immigrant, so that in many respects the mental attitude of the population is as variegated as the rainbow.

I have chosen this particular topic for discussion not so much because of its intrinsic interest, but rather because of the opportunity it gives us to see ancient Near Eastern sources in their interrelationship. Let me commence with some words of introduction concerning the sources which will be considered. These are altogether four: the Laws of Eshnunna (LE), the Code of Hammurabi (CH), the biblical Book of the Covenant, and finally the Talmud. Between them they extend over some 2,000 years or more; nevertheless, it is my submission that not only may they be compared with profit, but even that there are some actual links which connect them.

The city of Eshnunna is situated to the East of the Tigris, on the bank of its tributary, the Diyala. The kingdom occupied an important strategic position between Assyria (in the North), Babylon (in the West), Isin and Larsa (in the South), and Elam (in the East). Much of its history is as yet uncertain, and it is not my intention, nor am I competent, to trace the fluctuating fortunes of the kingdom, the victories and defeats of its rulers. Eshnunna finally fell victim to the expansionist policies pursued with success by Hammurabi of Babylon, during the fourth decade of his reign.

Lawyers in general, and international lawyers in particular, seem to suffer from what may be termed “the Latin formula syndrome”. In almost every branch of international law, one is faced with well-known epigrams of sententiousness drawn from the cornucopian source of ancient Latin phraseology. These venerable maxims, a legacy of the immense influence that Roman and Ecclesiastical law wielded on the fathers of modern international law, are in many respects very useful. In a few choice words, they epitomize fundamental ideas that may otherwise require verbose explanations, and they serve as a beacon for those groping their way in the legal dark. Unfortunately, however, laconic adages in general tend to be over-simplified, and, what is worse, as a result of constant and mechanical repetition, they are apt to lose their contact with reality and become petrified. If the law of nations is to be not merely “the law of notions”, but also the law of motion and animation, the epitaphs reflecting its major precepts must be reexamined every so often, else the mortmain of once flourishing but now barren concepts will keep it in a strangle-hold.

One of the more important of the Latin maxims that abound in international law is the general principle par in parem non habet imperium. This principle is commonly regarded as the starting-point for any venture into the field of State immunities, and it has even been said that

This question is closely connected with substantive law. It is interesting to note that whilst the Israel legislature has purported to revise only the procedure with respect to criminal insanity, the substantive issues were also attacked by the courts soon after the enactment of the procedural innovations in 1955, thus perhaps also reflecting the close interdependent relationship between the procedural and the substantive aspects of the problem. The setting up of a somewhat detailed procedural machinery has, curiously enough, led to far-reaching liberalization of the tests of irresponsibility by the Israel courts who, after a persistently strict adherence to the McNaghten Rules, are now willing to add the test of “irresistible impulse” by an ingenious interpretation of the Criminal Code Ordinance (the terms of which have not been changed in this respect since its enactment in 1936), straining the “natural” meaning of its provisions almost to breaking point.

The first attempt to achieve this far-reaching change of policy was made by Justice Agranat (as he then was) in the Mandelbrot Case but despite his scholarly and forceful opinion he was overruled by the majority of the court. The same issue, however, came up again in the Mizan Case, where a panel of five Justices (two dissenting) confirmed Justice Agranat's minority opinion in the MandelbrotCase, thus incorporating in substantive law the additional test of pressure of irresistible impulse derived from mental illness.