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Rethinking direct participation in hostilities and continuous combat function in light of targeting members of terrorist non-State armed groups

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2022

Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi
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Abstract

Endless armed conflicts against terrorist groups put civilian populations at risk. Since France has been involved in the Sahel from 2013 onwards, transnational non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) of extended geographical and temporal scope against groups designated as terrorists are not a US exception anymore. NIACs against terrorist groups, conducted not only by the United States but also by France, persist and have been reconfigured around threat anticipation. How can anticipatory warfare be best constrained? This article argues that it can be best done through more constraining rules regulating target selection in NIACs and, in particular, by redefining the notion of continuous combat function (CCF). Many elements explored in this article indicate that the United States and France select targets that they pre-designate as terrorists, before these targets are engaged in hostilities. Instead of responding to the observed participation of these individuals in hostilities, strikes are based on contextual and behavioural elements ahead or outside of such moments. This paper argues that when war consists of threat anticipation, it becomes very extensive and particularly risky for civilians. Furthermore, recent State practice in the counterterrorism context reveals the pitfalls of the notions of direct participation in hostilities and CCF as defined in the 2009 International Committee of the Red Cross Interpretive Guidance. Outside this context, the interpretations proposed in the Interpretive Guidance might seem sufficient to constrain target selection processes and to protect civilian populations. However, when applied to armed conflicts that are driven by threat anticipation, the pitfalls of these interpretations emerge. I formulate a critique of these interpretations as being partly responsible for anticipatory warfare and propose an alternative theory for the CCF test.

Keywords

direct participation in hostilitiescontinuous combat functioninternational humanitarian lawjus in bellocounterterrorismterrorismtargetingdrones
Type
Selected Articles
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 105 , Issue 923: Organized Crime , August 2023 , pp. 1028 - 1046
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC.

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References

1 Nicolas Barotte, “Général Lecointre: ‘Nous allons vers une réorganisation de l'ordre du monde’”, Figaro, 21 May 2021, available at: www.lefigaro.fr/international/general-lecointre-nous-allons-vers-une-reorganisation-de-l-ordre-du-monde-20210521 (all internet references were accessed in August 2022).

2 For the past twenty years, the United States has used force against members of transnational terrorist groups in, among other places, Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, Iraq and Syria. See, for instance, reports by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “US Strikes in Yemen, 2002 to Present”, available at: www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/charts?show_casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_strikes=1&location=yemen&from=2002-1-1&to=now; “CIA and US Military Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to Present – Chart: Pakistan: CIA Drone Strikes, 2004 to Present”, available at: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NAfjFonM-Tn7fziqiv33HlGt09wgLZDSCP-BQaux51w/edit#gid=477128060; “US Strikes in Somalia, 2007 to Present”, available at: www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/charts?show_casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_strikes=1&location=somalia&from=2007-1-1&to=now; “Afghanistan: US Air and Drone Strikes, 2015 to Present”, available at: www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/charts?show_casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_strikes=1&location=afghanistan&from=2015-1-1&to=now.

3 French Ministry of Armed Forces, Opération Barkhane, available at: www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/operation-barkhane.

4 These interventions amount to NIACs only when the requirement of intensity is met, and the group is sufficiently organized.

5 Harold Hongju Koh, “How to End the Forever War?”, Oxford Union, Oxford, 7 May 2013, Speech published by Just Security, available at: www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Koh-Oxford-How-to-End-the-Forever-War.pdf. Derejko, Nathan, “A Forever War? Rethinking the Temporal Scope of Non-International Armed Conflict”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2020Google Scholar, available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kraa018. Edward Wong, “Americans Demand a Rethinking of the ‘Forever War’”, New York Times, 3 February 2020, available at: www.nytimes.com/2020/02/02/us/politics/trump-forever-war.html.

6 Ruth Maclean and Finbarr O'Reilly, “Crisis in the Sahel Becoming France's Forever War”, New York Times, 29 March 2020, available at: www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/world/africa/france-sahel-west-africa-.html. “France's Forever War in the Sahel”, The Economist, 17 February 2021, available at: www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/02/17/frances-forever-war-in-the-sahel. Benjamin Haddad, “France's Forever War”, Foreign Policy, 17 November 2015, available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/17/france-syria-isis-hollande-assad/. “Au Mali, la France piégée dans une guerre sans fin”, Der Spiegel, Courrier International, 13 June 2021, available at: www.courrierinternational.com/article/enquete-au-mali-la-france-piegee-dans-une-guerre-sans-fin.

7 N. Barotte, above note 1.

8 “Macron: Barkhane Mission Ending, French Presence to Stay in Sahel”, Al Jazeera, 10 June 2021, available at: www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/10/sahel-macron-announces-end-operation-barkhane-it-exists. “Fin de l'opération Barkhane au Mali : la France acte son retrait pour mieux rester au Sahel”, France24, 17 February 2022, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=RRO_aFMx6ho.

9 “The President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron took part in the G5 Sahel Summit by videoconference. At the end, he held a joint press conference with the President of the Republic of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum.” “Press Conference Following the G5 Sahel Summit”, Elysée, 9 July 2021, available at: www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2021/07/09/conference-de-presse-a-lissue-du-sommet-du-g5-sahel.

10 Statute reference is: Loi n° 2018-607 du 13 juillet 2018 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2019 à 2025 et portant diverses dispositions intéressant la défense (Law on military programming), available at: www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2018/7/13/ARMX1800503L/jo/texte.

11 Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi, “Le Silence des Agneaux: France's War Against ‘Jihadist Groups’ and Associated Legal Rationale”, ICCT Journal, 15 May 2020, available at: https://icct.nl/publication/le-silence-des-agneaux-frances-war-against-jihadist-groups-and-associated-legal-rationale/. Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi, “Will the War on Terror Ever End?”, La Revue des droits de l'Homme, Actualités Droits-Libertés, March 2019. Dustin A. Lewis, Gabriella Blum and Naz K. Modirzadeh, “Indefinite War. Unsettled International Law on The End of Armed Conflict”, Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, Legal Briefing, February 2017, available at: https://pilac.law.harvard.edu/indefinite-war/.

12 M. Drevet, L. Mieusset, R. Mignot-Mahdavi, C. Pinel and A. Yehiel, “Testimony of a French Drone Operator: Anticipatory Strikes in the Sahel”, European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD), 16 February 2022, available at: www.efadrones.org/testimony-of-a-french-drone-operator-anticipatory-strikes-in-the-sahel/. Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi, “Frappe de Bounti : la France conduit-elle des « frappes signatures » au Sahel ?”, La Revue des droits de l'homme, Actualités Droits-Libertés, 19 April 2021, available at: http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/11718.

13 Law on military programming, above note 10. See also France's latest Strategic Review: Defence and National Security Strategic Review, 2017, available at: www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/politique-defense/actualisation-strategique-revue-strategique-2017#title-3227. Annexed Report to the Law on Military Programming (NB: it also has legislative value), Rapport annexé (appears at the end of the legislation), available at: www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000037192797&dateTexte=20181122.

14 For estimates of the civilian harm caused by the United States, see, for instance, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “CIA and US Military Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to Present – Chart: Civilians Killed”, available at: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NAfjFonM-Tn7fziqiv33HlGt09wgLZDSCP-BQaux51w/edit#gid=1976356146. Open Society Foundations, “After the Dead Are Counted: U.S. and Pakistani Responsibilities to Victims of Drone Strikes”, November 2014, available at: www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/after-dead-are-counted-us-and-pakistani-responsibilities-victims-drone-strikes. Amnesty International, “‘Will I be Next?’: US Drone Strikes in Pakistan”, Amnesty International Publications, London, 2013, available at: www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/12000/asa330132013en.pdf. International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, September 2012, available at: www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf. And for France, see Roche Fabrice Sossiehi, “Six villageois du nord du Mali ont été tués par une frappe attribuée à la force Barkhane”, NorAfrik.com, 28 March 2021, available at: www.norafrik.com/politique/8540.html. “UN Investigation Concludes French Military Airstrike Killed Mali Civilians”, United Nations News, 30 March 2021, available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1088722.

15 Although discussions on Samuel Moyn's Humane have mainly focused on the book's argument that drone wars are stabilized through law and are endless because they appear to be more humane, the book also importantly describes the blurring boundary between war and peace. This is explained as an outcome of war's “conver[sion] into policing in the spirit of humane control”. See Moyn, Samuel, Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2021, p. 323Google Scholar.

16 Melzer, Nils, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, May 2009Google Scholar (ICRC Interpretive Guidance), available at: www.refworld.org/docid/4a670dec2.html. Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi, “Drones Programs, the Individualization of War and the Ad Bellum Principle of Proportionality”, in Claus Kress and Robert Lawless (eds), Necessity and Proportionality in International Peace and Security Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020. Nehal Bhuta and Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi, “Dangerous Proportions: Means and Ends in Non-Finite War”, in Nehal Bhuta, Florian Hoffmann, Sarah Knuckey, Frédéric Mégret and Margaret Satterthwaite (eds), The Struggle for Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Philip Alston, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021.

17 R. Mignot-Mahdavi, “Le Silence des Agneaux”, above note 11.

18 Even if they do not argue in favour of the same interpretation of CCF from a normative standpoint, the following authors all consider that the predominant interpretation of CCF is constraining. Some praise this interpretation of CCF: Hofmann, Laura, “Strengthening the Principle of Distinction? A Critical Appraisal of the ICRC's Continuous Combat Function”, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2015CrossRefGoogle Scholar; others criticize this version of CCF for being too constraining: Watkin, Kenneth, “Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Interpretive Guidance”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010, p. 692Google Scholar; van der Toorn, Damien, “‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’: A Legal and Practical Road Test of the International Committee of the Red Cross's Guidance through Afghanistan”, Australian International Law Journal, Vol. 17, 2010, p. 20Google Scholar.

19 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978), Art. 51; Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978), Art. 13(3).

20 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1.

21 Among other relevant sources, see International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber I), 5 December 2003, §§ 45 and 78; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 29 July 2004, § 110; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case No. 11.137, Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7, 18 November 1997, § 178; Israeli Supreme Court, Targeted Killings case. Boothby, Bill, “‘And for Such Time as’: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2009Google Scholar. Dinstein, Yoram, “Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in International Armed Conflicts”, International Law Studies, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2008Google Scholar, available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol84/iss1/11. Schmitt, Michael N., “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2009Google Scholar.

22 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, pp. 16–17. Dapo Akande analyses the threshold of harm definition as going beyond the ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol I which had defined direct participation in his view “overly narrowly” as causing actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces (he refers to Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary to the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, para. 1944). Akande recalls that in the Targeted Killings decision, the Israeli Supreme Court criticized the Commentary approach for excluding acts intended to cause damage to civilians and agrees that opening up the scope of the notion to acts that are hostile to civilians just makes sense. See Akande, Dapo, “Clearing the Fog of War? The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2010CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 This choice is grounded on the fact that common Article 3 reads as follows: “1. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.” By including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms in the category of persons taking no active part in the hostilities, it seems reasonable to say that, conversely, members of armed forces who have not laid down their arms or are not hors de combat can functionally be considered to be included in the category of persons taking direct part in hostilities under the law of NIACs.

24 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, p. 34.

25 Ibid.

26 See, for example, D. Akande, above note 22.

27 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, p. 27.

28 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, p. 34.

29 See, for example, D. Akande, above note 22; L. Hofmann, above note 18; Henry, Sabrina, “Exploring the ‘Continuous Combat Function’ Concept in Armed Conflicts: Time for an Extended Application?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 100, No. 907–909, 2018CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, p. 34.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, p. 34 (emphasis added).

34 Jakob Kellenberger, “Foreword”, in ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16. Dr Jakob Kellenberger was President of the ICRC at the time and until 2012.

35 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, p. 10.

36 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, p. 34.

37 Gaggioli, Gloria, “Targeting Individuals Belonging to an Armed Group”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 51, 2018Google Scholar.

38 As a side note, it should be underlined that this limitation only sounds reasonable as CCF is either a version of or an alternative to (depending on one's point of view as mentioned above) punctual DPH which itself is limited to direct participation in NIACs. The limitation is also only fair when considering that the creation of CCF (and the extension of target options it comes with) was not accompanied by the creation of a fully fledged membership status and combatant privilege.

39 See, for instance, G. Gaggioli, above note 37.

40 Ibid., pp. 911–12.

41 Ibid., p. 911.

42 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, p. 28.

43 D. Akande, above note 22, p. 189.

44 Ibid.

45 Cora Currier and Justin Elliott, “Drone Warfare ‘Signature Strikes’”, Global Research, 27 February 2013, available at: www.globalresearch.ca/drone-warfare-signature-strikes/5324491.

46 Azmat Khan and Anand Gopal, “The Uncounted”, New York Times, 16 November 2017, available at: www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/16/magazine/uncounted-civilian-casualties-iraq-airstrikes.html?_r=0.

47 Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, “Pentagon Denies Striking Mosque in Syria, Says it Killed al Qaeda Militants”, Reuters, 17 March 2017, available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa-idUSKBN16O26S.

48 Forensic Architecture, “Al-Jinah Mosque – Forensic Architecture”, YouTube, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOyihqEOfYA.

49 Ibid. See also Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “U.S. Finds that March Airstrike that Struck Building Described as Mosque was Legal”, The Washington Post, 7 June 2017, available at: www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/06/07/u-s-finds-that-march-airstrike-that-struck-building-described-as-mosque-was-legal-and-resulted-in-one-civilian-casualty/.

50 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/55, 8 August 2017, p. 13.

51 For NIACs, see Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 CCW Convention as amended on 3 May 1996) (entered into force 3 December 1998), Art. 3(10); and Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 26 March 1999 (entered into force 9 March 2004), Art. 7. For IACs, see Additional Protocol I, Art. 57(1).

52 The White House, “Executive Order—United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force”, 1 July 2016, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures. For an analysis, see Ryan Goodman, “Why the Laws of War Apply to Drone Strikes Outside ‘Areas of Active Hostilities’ (A Memo to the Human Rights Community)”, Just Security, 4 October 2017, available at: www.justsecurity.org/45613/laws-war-apply-drone-strikes-areas-active-hostilities-a-memo-human-rights-community/. For a demonstration that the interpretation is solid, although still subject to discussion, see Lubell, Noam and Derejko, Nathan, “A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqs096: “IHL is not in and of itself pre-determined as applying to a limited geographical scope, and its applicability is designed to follow the prevailing hostilities wherever they may spread, rather than vice versa.”

53 Airwars, “Pakistan: Reported US Strikes 2011”, available at: https://airwars.org/wp-content/themes/airwars-new/archives/bij-drone-war/drone-war/data/obama-2011-pakistan-strikes.html.

54 Salman Masood and Pir Zubair Shah, “C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan”, New York Times, 17 March 2011, available at: www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html.

55 Tom Wright and Rehmat Mehsud, “Pakistan Slams U.S. Drone Strike”, Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2011.

56 Forensic Architecture, “Drone Strikes on a Jirga in Datta Khel”, 25 October 2013, available at: https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/drone-strikes-on-a-jirga-in-datta-khel.

57 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, 11 March 2014, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/59, available at: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, 11 March 2014, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/59, available at: www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_25_59.pdf.

58 See also International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), above note 14.

59 Scott Shane, “Contrasting Reports of Drone Strikes”, New York Times, 11 August 2011, available at: www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12droneside.html?ref=asia&mtrref=undefined&gwh=AA5BB874ECB05EFD4B4F0EFBA50C0835&gwt=pay.

60 Rémi Carayol, “Sahel : les frappes de l'armee française dans le collimateur”, Médiapart, 28 June 2021, available at: www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/280621/sahel-les-frappes-de-l-armee-francaise-dans-le-collimateur.

61 “Mali: le doute subsiste après une intervention de l'armée française”, TV5Monde, 6 January 2021, available at: https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/mali-le-doute-subsiste-apres-une-intervention-de-l-armee-francaise-390514.

62 ASAF, “Press Release – Operation Barkhane: Strike Against a Gathering of Members of an Armed Terrorist Group in the Douentza Region. Press Release of the Armed Forces Staff. Paris, 7 January 2021”, 12 January 2021, available at: www.asafrance.fr/item/communique-de-presse-operation-barkhane-frappe-contre-un-rassemblement-de-membres-d-un-groupe-arme-terroriste-dans-la-region-de-douentza.html.

63 MINUSMA, “Rapport sur l'incident de Bounty du 3 janvier 2021 (Report on the Bounty Incident of 3 January 2021)”, March 2021, available at: https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/rapport_final_bounty_bounty9.pdf.

64 ASAF, “Press Release, 7 January 2021”, above note 62.

65 ASAF, “Press Release from the Ministry of the Armed Forces: Reaction to the MINUSMA Report on the January Strikes in Mali”, 30 March 2021, available at: www.asafrance.fr/item/communique-de-presse-du-ministere-des-armees-reaction-au-rapport-de-la-minusma-sur-les-frappes-de-janvier-au-mali.html.

66 ASAF, “Press Release, 7 January 2021”, above note 62.

67 MINUSMA, above note 63.

68 R. Mignot-Mahdavi, above note 12.

69 It should be noted that the mere carrying of weapons does not suffice to establish DPH as, in order to reach the threshold of harm required to qualify as DPH, the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict. See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, above note 16, pp. 47–50.