1 “Así fue la brutal cacería para asesinar al H2”, Diario Debate, 10 January 2017, available at: www.debate.com.mx/mexico/Asi-fue-la-brutal-caceria-para-asesinar-al-H2-VIDEO-20170210-0087.html (all internet references were accessed in August 2022). The Beltrán Leyva Cartel started as an armed branch for the protection of the Sinaloa Cartel against the armed wing of the enemy Gulf Cartel (Los Zetas). Since the capture of founding member Arturo Beltrán Leyva in 2009, the cartel has been broken up into different cells distributed along the south and northwest of Mexico. See Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, “Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO)”, available at: www.wilsoncenter.org/beltran-leyva-organization-blo.

2 “Desde hace más de 2 meses, la Marina cazaba a ‘El H2’ en Nayarit”, Diario Milenio Digital, 10 February 2017, available at: www.milenio.com/policia/2-meses-marina-cazaba-h2-nayarit.

3 “El Chapo: Mexican Police Capture then Release Drug Boss's Son after Battle with Cartel”, The Guardian, 18 October 2019, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/17/el-chapo-violence-breaks-out-in-mexican-city-amid-rumours-of-sons-arrest; Andréa Schmidt, “Episode 20: ‘The Siege of Culiacán’”, New York Times, 15 November 2019, available at: www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/the-weekly/el-chapo-guzman-son.html.

4 Fisher Linthicum, “This Was the Moment Mexican Forces Captured the Son of ‘El Chapo.’ Soon After, They Freed Him”, Los Angeles Times, 30 October 2019, available at: www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-10-29/video-shows-mexican-soldier-begging-son-of-el-chapo-to-order-his-cartel-fighters-to-stand-down; Ioan Grillo, “How Mexico's Drug Cartels Are Profiting from the Pandemic”, New York Times, 7 July 2020, available at: www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/opinion/sunday/mexico-drug-cartels-coronavirus.html.

5 According to RULAC, “[t]he Government of Mexico is involved in a non-international armed conflict against at least the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación”. See Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Geneva Academy), “Non-International Armed Conflicts in Mexico”, RULAC, available at: www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflict-in-mexico#collapse4accord. See also Bellal, Annyssa (ed.), The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2018, Geneva Academy, Geneva, 2019, p. 27Google Scholar; Bellal, Annyssa (ed.), The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2017, Geneva Academy, Geneva, 2018, pp. 83–91Google Scholar.

6 Including other cartels as well. See Comision Mexicana de Defensa y Promocion de los Derechos Humanos (CMDPDH), The Situation of Drug-Related Violence in Mexico from 2006–2017: A Non-International Armed Conflict?, Leiden IHL Clinic Report Series No. 28, The Hague, 2018, p. 207.

7 Anastasia Voronkova, Is Mexico Really in a State of conflict?, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 12 May 2017, available at: www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2017/05/mexico-state-conflict.

8 ICTY, The Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70; ICTY, The Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 11 November 1999, para. 562. See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment (Trial Chamber I), 2 September 1998, para. 620; Jean Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol. 4: Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 1958 (ICRC Commentary on GC IV), pp. 35–36, 49–50; ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2016 (ICRC Commentary on GC I), Art. 3, para. 425.

9 Bianchi, Andrea and Naqvi, Yasmin, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism, Hart, Oxford, 2011, p. 102Google Scholar.

10 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978), Art. 1.1; Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978).

11 Angélica Ospina-Escobar, “Territorios bajo control del crimen: El impacto de la guerra contra las drogas más allá de los homicidios”, Nexos, 23 November 2017, available at: https://economia.nexos.com.mx/?p=699.

12 On a similar methodology to this article, it has been argued elsewhere that IHL is applicable to criminal drug gangs in El Salvador. See Lima, Ximena Galvez, “Inked or Not: Maras and Their Participation in El Salvador's Recent Armed Conflict”, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2019CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also the situation of Brazil in A. Bellal (ed.), The War Report: 2018, above note 5, pp. 73–82; and the situation of El Salvador in A. Bellal (ed.), The War Report: 2017, above note 5, pp. 64–70. See also Robert Muggah, “Rethinking the Intensity and Organization of Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean”, World Peace Foundation, 16 February 2012, available at: https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/02/16/part-i-rethinking-the-intensity-and-organization-of-violence-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.

13 For the purposes of this article, see the definition of criminal organizations in United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, UNGA Res. 55/25, 15 November 2000, Art. 2(a).

14 Gallahue, Patrick, “Mexico's ‘War on Drugs’ – Real or Rhetorical Armed Conflict?”, Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2011, p. 34Google Scholar.

15 US Department of Justice, “Drug Trafficking Organizations”, in National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, National Drug Intelligence Center, February 2010, available at: www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/dtos.htm.

16 Ibid.

17 Ricart, Carlos Perez, “La temprana (y permanente) militarización de la seguridad publica en México: Un estudio histórico”, Contextualizaciones Latinoamericanas, Vol. 10, No. 19, 2018, p. 11Google Scholar; Froylan Enciso, “Los fracasos del chantaje: Régimen de prohibición de drogas y narcotráfico”, in Mónica Serrano and Arturo Alvarado Mendoza (coords), Los grandes problemas de México: Seguridad nacional y seguridad interior, Colegio de México, Mexico City, 2010, p. 99.

18 Kristina Davis, “A Short History of Mexican Drug Cartels”, San Diego Union-Tribune, 21 October 2016, available at: www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/border-baja-california/sd-me-prop64-sidebar-20161017-story.html; Noel Alvarado, “Pelean las plazas a muerte seis cárteles mexicanos”, La Prensa, 7 July 2020, available at: www.la-prensa.com.mx/policiaca/pelean-las-plazas-a-muerte-seis-carteles-mexicanos-5460859.html.

19 See, for example, US Drug Enforcement Administration, National Drug Threat Assessment, December 2019, pp. 99–100.

20 See Vité, Sylvain, “Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 873, 2009, p. 78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; International Law Association (ILA), Committee on the Use of Force, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law, The Hague, 2010, p. 3.

21 See, for example, “Mexican President Sticks to No-War Approach and Refuses to Use Force on Drug Cartels Despite Fighters Showcasing Their Weapons in Viral Videos as Murders Hit New High of 17,439 for the First Half of 2020”, Daily Mail, 20 July 2020, available at: www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8542137/Mexican-president-sticks-no-war-approach-shocking-cartel-video.html.

22 “Il y a des situations de chevauchement entre DH [droits humains] et DIH [droit international humanitaire] quant au champ d'application ratione situationis puisque les DH s'appliquent aujourd'hui en période de conflit armé et que le DIH s'applique également dans des situations de conflit purement interne. Rappelons cependant l’évidence: le DIH ne peut pas s'appliquer en temps de paix ou de troubles intérieurs (à moins que les Etats en conviennent par accords spéciaux). Par contre, il est censé s'appliquer automatiquement en période de conflit armé, et les Etats ne peuvent pas déroger à ces règles. Les DH, quant à eux, s'appliquent en tout temps à moins que les Etats décident d'y déroger dans la stricte mesure où la situation l'exige pour faire face à un conflit armé ou à tout autre état d'urgence menaçant la vie de la nation. Cette différence est essentielle; elle est consubstantielle à la nature du DIH conçu pour les conflits armés, contrairement aux DH qui ont une portée plus générale.” Gloria Gaggioli, “L'influence mutuelle entre les droits de l'homme et le droit international humanitaire à la lumière du droit à la vie”, doctoral thesis, No. D. 833, Université de Genève, Geneva, 2011, p. 148.

23 Most countries in Central America and the Caribbean showed significant increases in homicide rates in the last three decades. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Victims of Intentional Homicide, 1990-2018”, available at: https://dataunodc.un.org/data/homicide/Homicide%20victims%20worldwide; Steven Malby, “Homicide”, in Stefan Harrendorf, Markku Heiskanen and Steven Malby (eds), International Statistics on Crime and Justice, UNODC, 2010, pp. 16–17.

24 See the situation of Brazil in A. Bellal (ed.), The War Report: 2018, above note 5, pp. 73–82; and the situation of El Salvador in A. Bellal (ed.), The War Report: 2017, above note 5, pp. 64–70.

25 Jennifer Hazen, What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2013, pp. 2, 36, 171.

26 Gloria Gaggioli, The Use of Force in Armed Conflict: Interplay Between the Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement Hostilities Paradigms, ICRC Expert Meeting Report, Geneva, 2013, p. 32.

27 “Consecuencias de violencia en México, equiparables a países en guerra: Cruz Roja”, Aristegui Noticias, 21 October, 2017, available at: https://aristeguinoticias.com/2110/mexico/consecuencias-de-violencia-en-mexico-equiparables-a-paises-en-guerra-cruz-roja/.

28 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84, Judgment (Trial Chamber I), 3 April 2008, para. 60; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 10 July 2008, para. 195. See also ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Trial Chamber I), 14 March 2012, para. 537; ICC, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016, paras 134–136; ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 8, Art. 3, para. 425.

29 Tillman Rodenhäuser, Organizing Rebellion: Non-State Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, p. 63.

30 Ibid., p. 64; ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, No. ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Pre-Trial Chamber II), 31 March 2010, para. 102; ICC, Lubanga, above note 28, para. 536; ICC, Bemba, above note 28, para. 134.

31 ICTY, Haradinaj, above note 28, para. 60. UN, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Geneva, 25 January 2005, para. 131.

32 Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 68.

33 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction (Trial Chamber), 12 November 2002, para. 87.

34 A. Bianchi and Y. Naqvi, above note 9, p. 129.

35 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 2009, p. 32.

36 Marcos Palacios and Mónica Serrano, “Colombia y México: Las violencias del narcotráfico”, in M. Serrano and A. Alvarado Mendoza (coords), above note 17, p. 134.

37 CMDPDH, above note 6, p. 206.

38 Council on Foreign Relations, “Mexico's Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels”, 26 February 2021, available at: www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-drug-war#chapter-title-0-1.

39 For the theoretical discussions on this, see T. Rodenhäuser, above note 29, pp. 80–85.

40 Laura Calderon, Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David A. Shirk, Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico: Analysis through 2018, Justice in Mexico Project, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA, 2019, p. 4.

41 ILA, above note 20, p. 3.

42 In regards to Los Zetas’ “franchising model”, Tom Wainwright notes: “[I]t comes with all the same advantages and disadvantages [of franchising]. One of the big advantages is that it has allowed the Zetas to grow much more quickly. One of the disadvantages though, and this is something you often see in the legitimate franchising business, is that the franchisees often start to quarrel among each other, and the trouble is that the interest of these franchisees, the local criminals, aren't very well-aligned with the interests of the main company.” “‘Narconomics’: How The Drug Cartels Operate Like Wal-Mart and McDonald's”, NPR, 15 February 2016, available at: https://tinyurl.com/38k2mw8h.

43 ILA, above note 20, p. 28.

44 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Isak Musliu and Haradin Bala, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 30 November 2005, para. 170.

45 S. Vité, above note 20, p. 78.

46 “With respect to the beginning of the applicability of common Article 3, no specific provision is necessary: common Article 3 becomes applicable as soon as a non-international armed conflict comes into existence.” ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 8, para. 484. See also Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019, p. 461.

47 Javier Dondé Matute, “¿Por qué considero que no hay crímenes de guerra en México?”, in México y la Corte Penal Internacional, Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, Mexico City, 2014, p. 157.

48 Ibid.

49 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, above note 13, Art. 2(a); Sanchez, Andrea Nill, “Mexico's Drug ‘War’: Drawing a Line between Rhetoric and Reality”, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2013, p. 504Google Scholar.

50 “Major Mexican drug cartels, such as the Sinaloa or Zetas, ally themselves with local providers of violence and protection according to transnational trafficking needs”: Ivan Briscoe, Non-Conventional Armed Violence and Non-State Actors: Challenges for Mediation and Humanitarian Action, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, May 2013, p. 3; Juliana Fregoso, “Tercerización narco: Los grupos sin fama que hacen el trabajo sucio para los grandes cárteles mexicanos”, Infobae, 11 June 2017, available at: www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2017/06/11/tercerizacion-narco-los-grupos-sin-fama-que-hacen-el-trabajo-sucio-para-los-grandes-carteles-mexicanos/

51 Wilson Center, above note 1.

52 C. Duncan, “Mexican Drug Cartel Shows Off Uniformed Troops with Military Weapons and Armoured Vehicles in Video”, The Independent, 18 July 2020, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/mexico-drug-cartel-video-jalisco-new-generation-weapons-military-cjng-a9626246.html

53 Victoria Dittmar, “Why the Jalisco Cartel Does Not Dominate Mexico's Criminal Landscape”, InSight Crime, 11 June 2020, available at: www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/jalisco-cartel-dominate-mexico/.

54 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. 2, Section B, Federal Political Department, Berne, 1949, p. 10.

55 Ibid., pp. 10–15, 121, 325 –339; ICRC Commentary on GC IV, above note 8, p. 32; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Slodoban Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on the Motion for Judgement of Acquittal (Trial Chamber), 16 June 2004, para. 26.

56 T. Rodenhäuser, above note 29, p. 38.

57 S. Sivakumaran, above note 32, p. 161.

58 ICTY, Haradinaj, above note 28, para. 49.

59 Ibid.

60 ICTY, Boškoski, above note 28, para. 177.

61 ICC, Lubanga, above note 28, para. 538.

62 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 33rd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 2019, p. 50.

63 Ibid., fn. 67.

64 International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, with Commentaries”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, Part 2, 2011, Art. 2(b).

65 ICRC, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, Opinion Paper, March 2008, p. 5, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-article-170308.htm.

66 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 17 December 2004, para. 341.

67 Lindsay Moir, “The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict”, in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 412.

68 L. Calderon et al., above note 40, p. 3.

69 Ibid., p. 4.

70 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide: Executive Summary, 2019, p. 20.

71 Carlos Pérez Ricart, “La Kingpin Strategy: ¿Qué es y cómo llegó a México?”, Naxos, 21 October 2019, available at: https://seguridad.nexos.com.mx/?p=1646.

72 Bergman, Marcelo, “La violencia en México: Algunas aproximaciones académicas”, Desacatos: Revista de Ciencias Sociales, No. 40, 2013, p. 68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 Ibid., pp. 70–72; Jaime Arredondo Sánchez Lira, Zulia Orozco, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David A. Shirk, The Resurgence of Violent Crime in Tijuana, Justice in Mexico Policy Brief, February 2018, p. 7.

74 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 2015, p. 17.

75 Ibid., p. 18.

76 Hazen, Jennifer, “Understanding Gangs as Armed Groups”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 878, 2010, p. 372CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also M. Palacios and M. Serrano, above note 36, p. 110: “[I]n Mexico a great part of the problem of the knowledge of the phenomenon of violence originates from the indeterminacy of the agents of homicide and kidnapping: which are related to the conflict with the guerrillas, which with drug-trafficking and which ones are related to other types and forms of criminality, either organized or spontaneous.”

77 M. Bergman, above note 72, p. 67.

78 CMDPDH, above note 6, p. 209.

79 “The historical analysis provided allows us to make three tentative conclusions: 1) throughout the history of Mexico the military have had a predominant position in public security operations; 2) the police have not been able to function without a strong military dimension; 3) never in the history of this country has it been possible to make a clear delimitation between police and military work.” C. Perez Ricart, above note 17, p. 12.

80 S. Sivakumaran, above note 32, p. 169.

81 Instituto Belisario Domínguez, Temas estratégicos, No. 85, Senado de la República, Mexico, 2020; Will Grant, “Mexico Crime: Could This Become the Bloodiest Year on Record?”, BBC News, 12 July 2020, available at: www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-53332756.

82 Alberto Nájar, “Violencia en México: El récord de homicidios en 2019 durante el primer año de gobierno de AMLO”, BBC News, 21 January 2020.

83 “The Zetas are not like any other large criminal organization in Mexico. They are enforcers first, businessmen second. … They are less interested in controlling the distribution chains and more interested in controlling the territory in which the business is done.” Steven Dudley, “The Zetas and the Battle for Monterrey”, InSight Crime, 2012, p. 11, available at: www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/zetas_monterrey.pdf; June Beitell, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, R41576, US Congressional Research Service, 28 July 2020, pp. 22–23.

84 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment, 2012, p. 23.

85 A parallelism can be established in relation to the strategy of terrorist organizations: see A. Bianchi and Y. Naqvi, above note 9, p. 109.

86 George Grayson and Samuel Logan, The Executioner's Men: Los Zetas, Rogue Soldiers, Criminal Entrepreneurs, and the Shadow State They Created, Transaction, New Brunswick, NJ, 2012, pp. 90, 94.

87 Statistics can be found on the UNODC data portal, available at: https://dataunodc.un.org/.

88 Secretaria de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana, Informe de Incidencia Delictiva Fuero Común, Mexico, 20 January 2022; Causa en Común, “Registro de policías asesinados 2021”, available at: http://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/.

89 Arturo Angel, “Pese a Guardia Nacional crece la violencia: Van más de 32 mil homicidios desde su despliegue”, Animal Político, 30 June 2020, available at: www.animalpolitico.com/2020/06/guardia-nacional-violencia-homicidios-despliegue-amlo/.

90 J. Arredondo Sánchez Lira et al., above note 73, p. 4.

91 Ibid., p. 5.

92 V. Dittmar, above note 53.

93 “Still, it is also notable that the character of the violence in 2015–17 differs significantly from the highly visible, high impact violence that characterized the city's previous public security crisis in 2008–10. In the earlier period of violence, there was a far greater frequency of high profile violence – running gun battles in the streets, mass casualty incidents, bodies hanging from bridges, gangland-style executions …. Violence in 2015–17 has tended to be geographically concentrated in the city's poor and marginalized areas, with a lesser impact on the daily life of wealthy and middle class residents. … [R]ather than a few large, powerful criminal organizations whose differences can be settled by a surreptitious “pax mafiosa,” authorities are now confronting many micro-level criminal organizations battling over neighborhoods and street-corners. In this sense, the surge in small-scale, lower profile homicides represents a very different problem than the spectacular violence that authorities confronted in the past.” Ibid., p. 6.

94 See Carlos Villalta and Robert Muggah, “What Explains Criminal Violence in Mexico City? A Test of Two Theories of Crime”, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2016. See also Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo, “Panorama del homicidio en México: Esquema del análisis territorial 1990–2007”, in M. Serrano and A. Alvarado Mendoza (coords), above note 17, p. 327.

95 See above section “Organized for Commerce?”.

96 See below section “The Question of the Nexus”.

97 “Drug-trafficking is a social, cultural, economic and health phenomenon; insecurity is just one of its expressions.” José Luis Pardo Veiras, “México cumple una década de duelo por el fracaso de la Guerra contra el Narco”, New York Times, Spanish ed., 7 October 2016, available at: www.nytimes.com/es/2016/09/07/espanol/opinion/mexico-cumple-una-decada-de-duelo-por-el-fracaso-de-la-guerra-contra-el-narco.html.

98 A. Bellal (ed.), The War Report: 2017, above note 5, p. 25.

99 ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 8, Art. 3, para. 434.

100 IACHR, Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case No. 11.137, Report No. 55/97, 18 November 1997, paras 154–156. “Protracted armed conflict” indicates “the need for the armed groups in question to have the ability to plan and carry out military operations for a prolonged period of time”: ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Pre-Trial Chamber I), 29 January 2007, para. 243. See also The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, 4 March 2009, para. 60.

101 The definition was not relevant to the case, but the interpretation can be made from the negative reference. See Court of Justice of the European Union, Aboubacar Diakité v. Commissaire Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides, Case No. C-285/12, Judgment (Fourth Chamber), 30 January 2014, para. 35.

102 ICTY, Limaj, above note 44, para. 172.

103 A. Bellal (ed.), The War Report: 2017, above note 5, p. 26.

104 “Seven Killed in Mexico after Gunmen Down Helicopter in Series of Attacks”, The Guardian, 2 May 2015, available at: www.theguardian.com/weather/2015/may/02/seven-killed-in-mexico-after-gunmen-down-helicopter-in-series-of-attacks; “Jalisco New Generation Cartel Ambushes Mexico City Police Chief in Brazen Attack with Military-Grade Weapons”, La Politica Online, 2 July 2020, available at: www.lapoliticaonline.es/nota/84977-jalisco-new-generation-cartel-ambushes-mexico-city-police-chief-in-brazen-attack-with-military-grade-weapons/.

105 Adry Torres, “More than 60 People Are Murdered in Mexico's Most Dangerous State Following the Arrest of Fuel Theft Cartel Leader El Marro”, The Daily Mail, 10 August 2020, available at: www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8612143/More-60-people-murdered-Mexicos-dangerous-state-arrest-cartel-boss-El-Marro.html.

106 A. Nill Sanchez, above note 49, p. 503.

107 “We have to ask whether a clear-cut distinction between the security forces of the state and criminal organizations does not obscure the fact that what happens in multiple regions of the country, as shown by the Ayotzinapa case, is a phenomenon of macrocriminality that implies mixed criminal structures in which it is hard to draw the line between state and non–state agents”: CMDPDH, above note 6, p. 146. See also Jo Tuckman, “Mexico Ayotzinapa Massacre: New Theory Suggests Illicit Cargo Motivated Attack”, The Guardian, 23 October 2015, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/mexico-bush-ambush-43-missing-students-new-report.

108 See the analysis of the Haradinaj and Tadić cases in A. Nill Sanchez, above note 49, p. 482.

109 ICTY, Limaj, above note 44, para. 84. See also ICTY, Boškoski, above note 28, para. 175; ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 6 December 1999, para. 92.

110 According to data provided by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), available at: www.internal-displacement.org/countries/mexico. See also IDMC, New Humanitarian Frontiers: Addressing Criminal Violence in Mexico and Central America, 2015; A. Nill Sanchez, above note 49, p. 483.

111 M. Sassòli, above note 46, p. 201.

112 ICTY, The Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 16 November 1998, para. 445; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 31 March 2003, para. 225.

113 ICTY, Boškoski, above note 28, para. 69.

114 Dinstein, Yoram, Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

115 Ibid., pp. 12, 14; ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-12, Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 1 May 1999, para. 600.

116 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dragolljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 12 June 2002, para. 58.

117 Katherine Fortin, The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, p. 51.

118 G. Gaggioli, above note 26, p. 32.

119 ICRC, Violence and the Use of Force, Geneva, 2015, p. 16.

120 Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 88–89.

121 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 1990 (BPUFF), Principle 5; UN General Assembly, Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, UNGA Res. 34/169, 17 January 1979 (CCLEO), Art. 3 (strictly necessary and to the extent required).

122 “Law enforcement officials may resort to the use of force only when all other means of achieving a legitimate objective have failed (necessity) and the use of force can be justified (proportionality) in terms of the importance of the legitimate objective (legality) to be achieved”: ICRC, above note 119, p. 43. See also BPUFF, above note 121, Principle 9.

123 BPUFF, above note 121, Principle 3.

124 Stuart Casey-Maslen, Use of Force in Law Enforcement and the Right to Life: The Role of the Human Rights Council, Academic In-Brief No. 6, Geneva Academy, 2016, pp. 11–13; Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/36, 1 April 2014, para. 70.

125 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 (entered into force 23 March 1976), Art. 6.

126 CCLEO, above note 121, Art. 1.

127 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, para. 4477. These same definitions are applicable to CA3: see ICRC Commentary on GC I, above note 8, para. 386. See also ICRC, above note 119, p. 19.

128 ICRC, above note 74, p. 36.

129 David Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Special Report No. 60, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2011, p. 10.

130 Salazar, Víctor Manuel Saavedra and Navarro, Joel Romo, “Seguridad pública en México: Del cuestionamiento teórico-legal, a la realidad empírica del papel militar en responsabilidades civiles”, Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2019Google Scholar.

131 Congreso General de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Ley de Seguridad Interior, 21 December 2017.

132 David Agren, “López Obrador accused of Militarizing Mexico with New Security Decree”, The Guardian, 11 May 2020, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/11/mexico-lopez-obrador-armed-forces-decree; ACUERDO por el que se dispone de la Fuerza Armada permanente para llevar a cabo tareas de seguridad pública de manera extraordinaria, regulada, fiscalizada, subordinada y complementaria, Presidential Decree, 11 May 2020.

133 Amnesty International, Mexico: When Words are Not Enough, 2019, pp. 10–12; Human Rights Watch, “Latin America, It's Time to End Police Abuse”, 18 November 2020, available at: www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/18/latin-america-its-time-end-police-abuse.

134 Human Rights Watch, “Mexico: Overhaul Police Forces”, 24 July 2020, available at: www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/24/mexico-overhaul-police-forces.

135 Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Pronunciamiento, Mexico, 11 May 2020.

136 A. Bianchi and Y. Naqvi, above note 9, p. 128.

137 “In situations falling short of armed conflict, the State has the right to use force to uphold law and order, including lethal force”: ICTY, Boškoski, above note 28, para. 178.

138 Carlos Montemayor, “Los movimientos guerrilleros y los servicios de inteligencia (notas reiteradas y nuevas conclusiones)”, in M. Serrano and A. Alvarado Mendoza (coords), above note 17, pp. 42, 45–47.

139 ICRC, above note 74, p. 10.

140 IACHR, The Human Rights Situation in Mexico, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 44/15, 31 December 2015, pp. 31–39; Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, Informe de Actividades 2019, Mexico, 2020, p. 157.

141 While Sassòli uses this argument to defend the applicability of IHL, the same argument could be made regarding IHRL applicability. See Marco Sassòli, “L'administration d'un territoire par un groupe armé peut-elle être régie par le droit?”, in Michel Hottelier, Maya Hertig Randall and Alexandre Flückinger (eds), Études en l'honneur du Professeur Thierry Tanquerel, Schulthess Éditions Romandes, Zürich, 2019, p. 268.

142 Marco Sassòli, “The Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Current and Inherent Challenges”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 10, 2007, p. 51.

143 Ibid.

144 ICTY, Limaj, above note 44, para. 89. See also ICC, Lubanga, above note 28, para. 537; L. Moir, above note 67, p. 408.

145 Konstantinos Mastorodimos, Armed Non-State Actors in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Ashgate, Farnham, 2016, p. 18.