1 “MSF pulls out of Afghanistan”, Médecins Sans Frontières, 28 July 2004, available at: <http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=8851DF09-F62D-47D4-A8D3EB1E876A1E0D> (last visited on 28 July 2004).

2 Humanitarian security: “A matter of acceptance, perception, behaviour…”, address given by the ICRC's Director of Operations to the High-level Humanitarian Forum, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 31 March 2004.

3 Studer, Meinrad, “The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 83, No. 842, 2001, pp. 367–392Google Scholar. The ICRC has adopted the term civil-military relations to describe the specific relationship between humanitarian actors and multinational military missions in time of armed conflict. This was a deliberate choice in order to differentiate between the ICRC's term and the military terms of “civil-military coordination” (CIMIC-NATO) and “civil affairs” (CA - U.S. Armed Forces) which refer to military doctrine and practice.

4 The 1990s cemented the fundamental issues of cooperation between the ICRC and multinational military missions in situations of armed conflict. The core issues of this relationship include:

• access to victims;

• visits to those detained by multinational military forces;

• exchange of information (security, general situation);

• ICRC mandate to conduct training of armed forces and disseminate international humanitarian law; and

• ICRC support and assistance for treatment of the sick and wounded.

5 “Colin Powell's call for non-governmental organizations to act as ‘a force multiplier for us (…) an important part of our combat team’ in Iraq shows the dangers.” Martin Woolacott, “Humanitarians must avoid becoming tools of power”, The Guardian, 2 April 2004.

6 The author, who assumes full responsibility for the content of this article, has taken certain liberties in considering the ICRC's guidelines, previously limited to considerations of how the ICRC relates to multinational military missions in armed conflict, and projects these issues onto a broader horizon of interlinked issues and concerns for humanitarian action over the coming decade.

7 Studer, op. cit. (note 1), pp. 387–390.

8 A cross-section of views on civil-military relations include the following: Sarah E. Archer, “Civilian and military cooperation in complex humanitarian operations”. Combined Arms Center Military Review, March-April 2003, available online at: http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/English/MarApro3/indxmao3.htm> (advocates improved synergy, cooperation and coordination between the military and humanitarian organizations in achieving common end states); “Armed forces as humanitarian aid workers? Scope and limits of co-operation between aid organizations and armed forces in humanitarian aid”. Verband Entwicklungspolitik Deutcher Nichtregierungs-Organisationen e. V., May 2003, available online at: <http://venro.org/publikationen/archiv/Position%20Paper%20Armed%20Forces%20and%20Humanitarian%20A.PDF> (last visited on 10 March 2004) (comprehensive overview of the civil-military relationship, focusing on the trend towards militarization of humanitarian assistance); Jane Barry and Anna Jefferys, “A bridge too far: Aid agencies and the military in humanitarian response”, Humanitarian Practice Network, 6 May 2004, available online at: <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2398> (15 June 2004) (clarifies the key issues of debate, and proposes greater dialogue on policy and practice); Eric James, “Two steps back: Relearning the humanitarian-military lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq”, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2003, available online at: <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a125.htm> (raises doubts about the cohesiveness of the relationship between humanitarian and military actors, and suggests that growing discord can be seen as having set the relationship “two steps back”); Damian Lily, “The peacebuilding dimension of civil-military relations in complex emergencies: A briefing paper”, International Alert, August 2002, (advocacy for enhancing cooperation between military and humanitarian actors); Pugh, Michael, “The challenge of civil-military relations in international peace operations”, Disasters, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2001, pp. 345–357CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed (highlights the integrative approach the military has adopted in attempts to institutionalize the civil-military relationship); Adam Siegel, “Civil-military marriage counseling: Can this union be saved?”, Special Warfare, December 2002, pp. 28–34, available online at: <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a140.pdf> (focuses on the military's perception of its civilian counterparts).

9 NATO and United States Armed Forces doctrines are chosen as examples, given their availability in the public realm, their relevance to the key contexts of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ICRC's practical field experience with these armed forces in time of armed conflict.

10 Article 69.2 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (“Additional Protocol I”).

11 Article 69.1 Additional Protocol I.

12 United States Agency for International Development, Disaster Assistance Response Teams:

“A DART is a rapid response management team composed of disaster relief specialists who conduct assessments, identify and prioritize needs, manage onsite relief activities, recommend response actions, and coordinate with affected country and other response organizations. The teams are typically deployed after devastating disasters of significant magnitude. DARTs have been deployed world-wide, including deployments to Iraq immediately following the aftermath of the recent conflict, to affected populations in Angola's 27-year civil war, and to provide humanitarian relief to communities affected by the drought through out Ethiopia”. “USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Deploys to Liberia”, 6 August 2003, <http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2003/pr030806.html>.

13 “AJP-9: NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), June 2003, <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AIP-9.pdf>, (last visited on 24 June 2004).

14 Joint Chiefs of Staff Library, 20 June 2004, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/> (last visited on 24 June 2004).

15 Examples of this include the SFOR and ISAF military missions, which control newspapers, radio and television stations. From these platforms, they are able to control the flow of “good news” to the local population, and can attempt to influence public opinion and behaviour in their favour and towards broader political objectives.

16 Afghanistan provides multiple examples: ISAF maintains 10 CIMIC teams, with a total budget of US$1.2 million. Each CIMIC team has its own district of responsibility in Kabul province; each finds small-scale, shortterm projects that it can finance – providing furniture to a school, rehabilitating a clinic, etc. The CIMIC approach as a whole attempts to coordinate the PRTs' projects with the IGO/NGO community and the national and local authorities.

17 USAID PowerPoint Presentation given for ICRC Kabul, April 2004. The presentation goes on to describe the specific tasks of PRTs in detail: “Relationship building; Monitoring and reporting; Security support for Bonn processes; Security briefs/information sharing; Mediation; Prioritization of reconstruction and development efforts; Implementation of assistance projects; Approximately US$125 million in 2004 project funding”. In addition to State donor financing, US$40 million is available to the military via Department of Defence programmes managed by USAF.

See also a further example from an article published during the 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul: “The idea with Afghanistan is that you learn from experience, things that have worked, the PRTs, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, are liked by many people,” said Mr Cagaptay. “They think it is a great idea. They think it is a successful marriage of civilian-military teams. It is also great for PR [public relations] because you can convince the people that you are working for them when you actually do projects on the ground and I think people would like to see this idea pursued further in Afghanistan and also elsewhere if NATO does get involved”. Meredith Buel, “Europe NATO summit expected to focus on Iraq, Afghanistan”, Voice of America News, 23 June 2004.

18 “Liberia: Key northern Liberian town faces relief crisis”, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 19 May 2003, available online at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/o/89a7aaif5fc3d78085256e9900705551?OpenDocument>.

19 The so-called Brahimi Report clearly advocates: “(…) flexibility for heads of. United Nations peace operations to fund ‘quick impact projects’ that make a real difference in the lives of people in the mission area…” Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 21 August 2000, UN Doc.A/55/305(2000).

20 A similar scenario occurred in Kunduz, Afghanistan, where PRT forces belonging to the UN mandated International Stability Force again chose to support a hospital that had been part of the ICRC's ongoing medical programmes. Again, the ICRC chose to withdraw in order to avoid duplication of efforts and to reduce the risk of a humanitarian organization (the ICRC) being confused with military forces. The ICRC had to resume its support when the next rotation of ISAF forces decided that the programme no longer fitted in with its objectives or financing.

21 Krulak, Charles C. (former Commander, United States Marine Corps), “Three block warfare: Fighting in urban areas”, Speech to the National Press Club, Washington, 10 October 1997Google Scholar.

22 “General plans changes in Afghan strategy”, Associated Press, 20 December 2003.

23 “Director for UN, Conflict and Humanitarian Division”, Homepage for DFID, the UK Department for International Development. 6 July 2004, <www.dfid.gov.uk/Recruitment/xfiles/jaextdirunchjobdescript.doc>. See also: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Public Service Agreement 2005–06 to 2007–08”, July 2004, available online at: <http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/issues/finance/psatechnotes_2005-2008.pdf>: “Target 2.1 (…) the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to work together (and if appropriate with other Government Departments) to improve the impact of Her Majesty's Government's (HMG) overall effort in areas suffering from violent conflict, or where there is tension which might lead to violent conflict. It also requires them as part of this work to seek improvements in the effectiveness of the efforts of the international community to prevent or end violent conflicts. This covers work in all the areas of activity to which HMG contributes at different parts of the conflict cycle. The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), which will be set up in 2004 to co-ordinate FCO/DFID/MOD post-conflict work aims to ensure better planning, implementation and management of the UK's contribution to post-conflict situations, primarily when UK forces are deployed. The PCRU will involve officials principally from the three departments, but will draw on other government departments as appropriate. It will gradually become operational and reach its full capacity in early 2006”. Simliar suggestions can be found in the aforementioned Brahimi Report: “The Panel recommends that Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) be created, with staff from throughout the United Nations system seconded to them, to plan new missions and help them reach full deployment, significantly enhancing the support that Headquarters provides to the field. There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment”. Brahimi, op.cit. (note 13), Executive summary.

24 “Our experience”, Global Risk Strategies, 30 June 2004, <http://www.globalrsl.com/>.

25 Hugo Slim, “A call to alms: Humanitarian action and the art of war”, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, February, 2004. <http://www.hdcentre.org/index.php?aid=85>. (last visited on 31 July 2004).

26 In Afghanistan an ICRC delegate was killed in April, 2003, forcing the ICRC to drastically reduce its presence and activities in the south of the country. Likewise, after the car bomb attack in October 2003 on its delegation in Baghdad, the ICRC was obliged to reduce its visibility, staff and programmes in a context in which it was unable to conduct all of its protection and assistance activities safely.

27 “The ICRC's starting point in defining its relationship with the military are the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent as well as the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law. These provide the general framework for the nature and scope of this relationship”. Studer, op. cit. (note 1), p. 386.

28 Concerning the activities of the ICRC's Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces, see: “Integration of law of armed conflict”, ICRC, Geneva, May 2003: “ICRC mandate: in 1977, the ICRC was mandated by the international community to support national programmes undertaken by States for the integration of international humanitarian law into the education, training, doctrine and operations of armed forces around the world.

Two-track approach: over time, the ICRC has developed two different, but complementary, approaches towards armed forces.

• Dissemination activities (PREDIS) aim at obtaining understanding by the parties for ICRC activities and guaranteeing access to the victims and security.

bull; Integration activities (PREIMP) aim at having armed forces adopt concrete mechanisms or measures to ensure respect for international humanitarian law principles, specially protected persons and objects as well as the necessary means to this end.

According to the prevailing security situation in the country and its operational needs, a delegation may give preference to one or the other or even to a combination thereof”.

The ICRC employs 27 delegates worldwide, supporting the training efforts of over 100 armed and security forces.

29 A typical presentation includes the following: (i) an introduction to the mandate of the ICRC to show its specific role linked to contexts of war and internal violence and based on the Geneva Conventions; (ii) a presentation of the structure of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to explain the different Red Cross/Red Crescent entities that might be present in a given context where a multinational military mission may be deployed; (iii) an explanation of the principles of neutrality and independence to lead into the presentation, and help explain to audiences the ICRC's advocacy for a distinction to be maintained between military, political and humanitarian action; (iv) an explanation of the modus operandi of the ICRC to stress that it is a predictable humanitarian organization that works in the same manner worldwide and a presentation of its core activities; (v) a closing explanation of the ICRC's position on civil-military relations and concerns with regard to the developments described in this article. A key message for armed forces is that for an organization such as the ICRC, which is active in zones of conflict worldwide, a relationship with armed forces is only natural.

30 As an example of such reactions: “The NGOs and international organizations and military, coalition, ISAF, seem to me all [to have] the same objective. Because we have the same objectives - whether we work together or not – we are going to be working for the same objective irregardless of what coordination happens between those groups (…) No one here wants to work in an insecure environment. No one here wants to see the Afghan population with the kind of economy that it has now. Everyone wants to see an increase in stability, an increase in prosperity, and just because we have the same objectives, we are going to be seen as marching together regardless of what the NGOs or the military want or don't want. Both parties are looking at doing the same thing for the same good reasons but they are not conflicting. They add to each other and they combine with each other, and that is good.” “Afghanistan: Interview with US-led coalition civil military coordination centre”, IRIN News, 9 April 2004, <http://www.IRINNew.org>.

31 See footnote 9 above.

32 As early as 2001 the issue of how the ICRC is perceived by others working in the same area in time of armed conflict was considered with regard to civil-military relations. The term “ecumenism” was used to describe the realities of the ICRC's pragmatic positioning vis-à-vis an evolving civil-military relationship: “Ecumenism – a policy we prefer – constitutes a sort of third way, frequently followed by the ICRC as a matter of course. It more clearly acknowledges the existence of a tendency towards closer cooperation between military and humanitarian action, in particular within the UN framework, which attempts to accommodate rather than thwart or ignore such cooperation and thus comes half way between ‘damage control’ and ‘constructive engagement’. The ICRC should be tolerant of other approaches and resist the temptation to believe that its humanitarian policy alone is correct. The differences in perception pose a conceptual challenge to the ICRC, namely to determine what is the essence of humanitarian action and what is merely a pragmatic choice depending on the context.” Studer, op. cit. (note 1), p. 386.

33 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 1986.

34 Agreement on the Organization of the International Activities of the Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 26 November 1997, published in IRRC, No. 322, March 1998, p. 159.