When the idea for this special number of International Organization first took shape, the theme was a rather general one, “asymmetric international relations.” I had hoped to encourage contributions from the areas of small state and client state behavior, dominance and dependence, imperialism, and great power—small power behavior. While all of these phenomena are tied together by a shared asymmetric property, this is a “bland common denominator” on which to launch a collection of articles. As the enterprise evolved, we decided to develop a clearer focus on dependence and dependency. It became clear that there were two different sets of theoretical concerns before us which were sometimes labeled identically and often treated indiscriminately for analytical purposes. We drew the distinction between dependence as external reliance on other actors and dependency as the process of incorporation of less developed countries (LDCs) into the global capitalist system and the “structural distortions” resulting therefrom. There are similarities between these two approaches. Both have a predominant focus on relational inequalities among actors and both are equally interested in the vulnerabilities of members of the global system resulting from these unequal relations. However, there are important differences too. In addition to basic theoretical differences, there are equally fundamental gaps in the supportive methodologies. The dependence orientation seeks to probe and explore the symmetries and asymmetries among nation-states. This approach most often proceeds from a liberal paradigm which focuses on individual actors and their goals and which sees power in decisional terms. The individual actors are usually internally unified states which confront the external environment as homogeneous units. With the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis, analysis of dependent relations can be carried out on any combination of states, from dyads up to larger groupings. The fact that dependence is a term which can be meaningfully discussed at the dyadic level allows one the luxury of dealing with large numbers of observations. Thus, dependence theory is easily linked to statistical modes of analysis.

Although there is already a huge literature on dependence in international relations, many fundamental conceptual issues remain unresolved. Is the pattern of dependence of advanced industrial states on one another different in kind or only in degree from the dependence of peripheral capitalist societies on other members of the global system? What are the essential components of dependence that one must identify before constructing an adequate measure of it? What is the relationship between dependence and power? Since the answer to the first question is that the two patterns of dependence differ in kind, the first order of business is to provide the grounds for this distinction. Dependence is the pattern of external reliance of well-integrated nation-states on one another while dependency, which is closer to the dependencia tradition, involves a more complex set of relations centering on the incorporation of less developed, less homogeneous societies into the global division of labor. The conceptual components of dependence are the size of one's reliance on another, the importance attached to the goods involved, and the availability of these goods (or substitutes) from different sources. The components of dependency are the magnitude of foreign supply of important factors of production (technology, capital), limited developmental choices, and domestic “distortion” measures. Finally, the concept of dependence is most easily integrated into bargaining analyses while dependency is more fruitfully applied to analyses of the structure of relations among societies.

One of the intellectual precursors of contemporary dependency theory is Albert O. Hirschman's National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945) which examined the political potential inherent in the foreign trade sector. By focusing on the asymmetries in economic relations among countries, and on the possible manipulation of these asymmetries, Hirschman described the structural bases of power and influence in the international system. Like modern dependency theory, so does National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade suffer from a conceptual shortcoming: neither one takes up the issue of the countervailing, dialectical forces generated by these asymmetrical structural relations. A preponderance of objective capabilities may be countered by an asymmetry of opposing desires, as when the “weaker” nation desires its freedom from domination more than the “stronger” nation is bent on dominating it. Another dialectical force may be found in the imbalance between the attentions of any two countries with the stronger country's global involvement diluting its attention while the weaker country is able to concentrate its diplomatic skill on only one or a few salient partners. Thus, calculations based solely on economic power, i.e., on the ability to inflict punishment through economic means, are bound to be inadequate guides to the understanding of evolving relations.

The concept of dependence is used in several different scholarly traditions to refer to aspects of relational asymmetry in international and transnational relations. In three such traditions, dependence refers to three quite different kinds of concepts with the result that possibilities are restricted for fruitful dialogue about dependence across these scholarly traditions of dependencia theory, systematic empiricism, and formal, analytical theory. To aggravate this problem of multiple “languages,” there are two basic conceptual notions generally associated with the term dependence. These two meanings have clearly distinct implications for the nature of a theory of dependence, the character of entities dependent on one another, and the assessment or measurement of dependence. Thus, if the “language” gap is to be bridged and fruitful dialogue is to occur among different scholarly traditions, attention must be directed to the basic conceptual meaning of dependence in each tradition. Dialogue between systematic empiricism and dependencia theory is possible if empiricists recognize the fundamentally historical and historicist character of the particular substance of dependencia theory. These principles are exemplified here.

Three assertions about relations between multinational corporations and host countries in the Third World frequently appear in the dependencia literature: 1) that the host countries receive too few benefits; 2) that foreign investment causes distortions in the local economies; and 3) that foreign investment distorts host countries' political processes. These propositions can be reformulated as testable hypotheses, to which non-dependency studies of oligopolistic competition, bureaucratic politics, and transnational relations are relevant. Identifying critical areas of disagreement between dependency and nondependency approaches may help scholars to design their research in such a way as to enrich the dialogue between dependentistas and non-dependentistas.

In the metalworking and chemical industries of Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, the ownership structure of firms, their product sector, and propensity to obtain technology through licensing are closely associated. Foreign firms cluster in industrial sectors with complex and volatile technologies, in which their technological advantages permit the exaction of monopoly rents. Ownership structure and product sector, as well as firm size, are related to the firm's decision to obtain technology by licensing rather than by generating it autonomously or obtaining it through other means. Ownership structure, product sector, and licensing appear to interact with choice of machinery imports and research and development activities in such a way as to produce a “technological dependence syndrome” in which opportunities for “learning by doing” are consistently missed.

Bargaining relationships in formal international conferences and negotiations may involve structural asymmetries. A comprehensive analysis of these asymmetries in bargaining may be found in a synthesis of literature from formal game theory, structural-manipulative approaches to bargaining, social psychology, and the study of political influence. Propositions based on this literature focus on two factors which are likely to contribute to asymmetrical outcomes in negotiations: unequal costs to the negotiators from the failure to agree, and unequal resources available to employ in bargaining or influence attempts. An analysis of bargaining in the section of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) dealing with the issues of European security gave qualified support to these propositions. Influence over the final text in the CSCE agreement is related to a rough index of losses which would have resulted for individual nations from the failure to reach agreement in the CSCE. In addition, influence over the final text is related to each nation's resources, especially military resources. More significantly, the two superpowers exerted considerable asymmetrical influence over what was not included in the CSCE agreement, thus exercising a substantial veto. Thus, the asymmetrical outcomes within the CSCE negotiations were reflective of both differences in “threat potential,” that is, in the losses which actors would receive if no agreement had ensued, as well as differences in resources.

Current attempts to understand and remedy the underdevelopment and peripheral international roles of Third World states derive from three competing paradigms: conventional social science, Marxism, and dependency theory. Each paradigm claims to explain past history and to make relevant policy recommendations for Third World leaders. Yet, none of these approaches has so far been formulated as complex, well specified, causal models. One can build theory relevant to data by specifying competing three-variable models relating economic dependency to economic performance and development potential. An empirical evaluation can then be made of the dependency theory proposition that economic dependency inhibits positive economic performance (growth and development). Partial correlation and regression analyses of economic data from thirty tropical African states in the middle and late 1960s provide little support for two dependency-based models and evidence in favor of conventional and Marxist models. These findings have implications for theory, further research, and policy.

The relationship between foreign control and national development is a central concern of the Latin American “dependency school” of analysis, which focuses on the impact of investment by multinational corporations (MNCs) in the Third World. In the MNC-dominated steroid hormone industry in Mexico, foreign control has led to two major consequences which characterize it as “dependent”: first, there has been an unequal distribution of benefits from its growth, favoring the central capitalist economies and the MNCs more than Mexico; and secondly, at the level of domestic policy formulation, there has been a restriction of choice among local development options, since these conflicted with “global” priorities implied by the dependent situation. As an alternative to MNCs, national firms in Mexico would very likely have performed better in terms of Mexican national welfare (defined as local industry growth) and global consumer welfare (defined as identical products at lower prices). The attempt made by the Mexican State during the last two years of the Echeverria administration (1975–1976) to increase its autonomy vis-à-vis the MNCs by restructuring the industry with a new state-owned firm met with only limited success. Reasons for this include Mexico's declining prominence in the world industry due to the availability of substitutes for its raw material, and the ability of the MNCs to build a strong defense using local political allies. Yet despite the difficulties, Third World countries will need to develop strong states which can deal effectively with multinational corporations if they are to successfully establish their own development priorities.

Despite the efforts of the editor to cast the theoretical net as widely as possible—to include an eclectic mix of structural and behavioral dimensions of the concept of dependence—the bulk of the writings in this volume respond in some fashion to what I have elsewhere called “the dependency way of framing the question of development and underdevelopment.” It could hardly be otherwise, for the majority of authors represented here have had their primary research experience in or on Latin America. And it is out of the Latin American developmental experience—and its multiple failures and frustrations—that the main body of dependency ideas has grown.