Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
International civil aviation appears to be a pertinent yet largely overlooked issuearea to study in the light of recent discussions about the changing international system. In this article the evolution of the international aviation system from its inception early in this century is analyzed in terms of regime changes. Three different regime periods are delineated, and possible explanations of the observed regime changes are discussed. On the face of it, the development of international aviation seems to conform with the overall global trend toward complex interdependence. Yet it also raises a number of questions concerning interdependence that might be addressed in the study of other issue-areas. These concern the links between politico-economic issue-areas and military security, the degree of harmony or conflict associated with interdependence, and the role of states generally—and the United States in particular—under conditions of complex interdependence.
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