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United States: Statement of Interest to Set Aside Default Judgement against China Filed in the Jackson v. People's Republic of China Case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2017

Abstract

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Type
Judicial and Similar Proceedings
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1983

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Footnotes

*

[Reproduced from the text provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. The page numbers in the Table of Contents and Table of Authorities have been changed to reflect I.L.M. page numbers.

[The U.S. District Court's Decision of September 1, 1982,and the Chinese Aide Memoire of February 2, 1983, concerning the issues , appear respectively at 22 I.L.M.75(1983) and 22 I.L.M. 81(1983).]

References

*/ The United States files this Statement of Interest and appears pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 517, which authorizes the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United States in any pending suit.

2/ The absolute principle of immunity is adhered to by a number of foreign states. While the United States now adheres to the restrictive principle of immunity, the codification of that practice and the removal of the Executive's authority to recognize a foreign state's immunity in a particular case is relatively recent. Compare administrative practice begun in 1952 under the “Tate letter,” 26 Dept. State Bull. 984-985 (1952) with the codification of that practice in 1976 by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).

3/ Numerous articles by Chinese officials, jurists and scholars have severely criticized the decision and the United States government's failure to take what the PRC considers appropriate steps to deal with it (Robinson Declaration, Exhibits 2-5). These articles are generally considered as statements of official PRC Government positions (Robinson Declaration, ¶3(D)).

4/ We do not mean to suggest that other defenses raised by the 1"RC are not appropriate bases to set aside the default judgment, but only that based on the facts known to the United States, the statute of limitations defense appears dispositive.

5/ To the best of our knowledge there were defaults on interest payments for substantial periods between 1920 and 1951. Under Alabama law the statute of limitations begins to run as to each interest coupon from the date it matures or is payable. State exrel. Boswell v. Montgomery, supra, 350 So. 2d at 75. In fact, under Foreign Claims Settlement Commission decisions involving the 1911 Huguang Bonds, the default on the bonds is considered to have run from the time of the first default on interest payments. In re Carl Marks & Co., Decision No. CN-472 (entered as final decision March 11, 1971); In re Catherine E. Olive, Decision No. CN-2-058 (entered as final decision November 21, 1979). Generally holdings of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission are not reviewable in any court. See First National City Bank v. Gillilland, 257 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958); DeVegvar v. Gillilland, 228 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert, denied, 350 U.S. 994 (1956); see also, Z & F Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470, 489 (1941).

6/ In fact, the Republic of China controlled the Mainland until 1949, tnat is, for at least 38 of the 40 year life of the bonds, and presumably during that period had the benefit of the railroad built with the funds from the bonds.

7/ Although this standard provides an exceedingly narrow range of property that might be executed upon, it is consistent with Congress’ intent to codify in large part a foreign sovereign's traditional immunity from attachment in aid of execution, and from execution to satisfy a judgment, while carefully delineating limited exceptions to that immunity. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, (Cont'd.)

* supra, at 27, 1976 U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News at 6626. Congress established immunity from execution as the general rule under the FSIA (28 U.S.C. 1609), because “[s]uch attachments can * * * give rise to serious friction in United States’ foreign relations,” and because Congress recognized that although there is a trend toward limiting that immunity “the enforcement or [sic] judgments against foreign state property remains a somewhat controversial subject in international law.” Id.