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Hanoch Dagan and the liberal concept of autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 June 2022

Gregory S. Alexander
Gregory S. Alexander*
Affiliation:
A. Robert Noll Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell University, USA
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: gsa9@cornell.edu
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Abstract

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Type
Review Symposium
Information
International Journal of Law in Context , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2022 , pp. 237 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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