¹ See, eg, De Waal, MJ and Schoeman-Malan, MC, The Law of Succession (Juta Law, Lansdowne 2003) 84–101.Google Scholar

² Some reference will be made to other Commonwealth jurisdictions, namely Australia, Botswana, Canada, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. South African private international law is built upon Roman-Dutch foundations with significant influence of English law. See Forsyth, CF, Private International Law. The Modern Roman-Dutch Law including the Jurisdiction of the High Courts (Juta Law Lansdowne 2003) 16–17Google Scholar and Schoeman, E ‘South Africa’ in Verschraegen, B (ed), Private International Law in Blanpain, R (gen ed), International Encyclopedia of Laws (loose-leaf, Kluwer Law International The Hague 2001) para 1–3.Google Scholar

³ The convention was concluded on 5 Oct 1961 and entered into force on 5 Jan 1964. South Africa acceded to the convention on 5 Oct 1970. Reservations were made in terms of a 9,10, and 12 of the convention. Section 3bis was added to the Wills Act 7 of 1953 by s 2 of the Wills Amendment Act 41 of 1965 and entered into force on 4 Dec 1970. See <http://www.hcch.net> for the text of the convention.

⁴ See s 3bis (1)(a).

⁵ See s 3bis (1)(b). The lex situs is not the only legal system that applies in respect of immovable property: see Tomlinson v Zwirchmayer 1998 2 SA 840 (T) 847–50.Google Scholar The lex situs is not applicable to movables and the law of the place of death is in neither case (movables or immovables) an applicable legal system. South African law will only be applicable if it is one of the listed legal systems. But see below on the potential applicability of the lex fori in respect of s 2(3) and 2A of the Wills Act 7 of 1953.

⁶ Ex Parte Jones: In re Jones v Jones 1984 4 SA 725 (W)Google Scholar; Chinatex Oriental Trading Co v Erskine 1998 4 SA 1087 (C) 1093HGoogle Scholar; Edwards, AB and Kahn, E, ‘Conflict of laws’ in (2003) 2(2) The Law of South Africa, para 284Google Scholar; Forsyth, CF (n 2) 10–11 and 125–7Google Scholar; Kahn, E, ‘Jurisdiction and conflict of laws in the South African law of husband and wife’ in Hahlo, HR, The South African Law of Husband and Wife (Juta Law Cape Town 1975) 529, 580Google Scholar; Kahn ‘Conflict of laws’ in Corbett, MM, Hofmeyr, GYS and Kahn, EThe Law of Succession in South Africa (Juta Law Lansdowne 2001) 579599; Schoeman (n 2) para 28.Google Scholar

⁷ See Forsyth, (n 2) 11Google Scholar; Schoeman (n 2) para 26.

⁸ Section 3bis (1)(e). The ship or aeroplane need not be in motion for the extra systems to be applicable. The locus actus includes the territorial waters of and the air space above a country. See Kahn, (n 6: 2001) 624.Google Scholar Also see Collins, L (gen ed) Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws vol 2 (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell London 2006) 1244Google Scholar and McClean, D and Beevers, KMorris: The Conflict of Laws (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell London 2005) 452Google Scholar in respect of s 2(1)(a) of the Wills Act, 1963 (UK).

⁹ Cf Art 2 of the convention and s 2(1)(c) of the Wills Act 1963 (UK).

¹⁰ See Neels, Jan L, ‘Private international law of succession in South Africa’ (2005) Yearbook of Private International Law 183, 194–6.Google Scholar The article is also published in (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg/Journal of South African Law [TSAR] 705.

¹¹ Symeonides, SC, ‘Private international law at the end of the 20^th century: progress or regress?’ in Symeonides, (ed), Private International Law at the End of the 20^th Century: Progress or Regress? (Kluwer Law International The Hague 2000) 3, 49–50.Google Scholar ‘The policy of favor testamenti is an old policy of the substantive law of succession. This policy has also been projected to the multistate level by choice-of-law rules which, through a list of alternative references to several laws, are designed to preserve the validity of the testament whenever possible by authorizing the court to apply whichever one of the listed laws would uphold the testament’ (Symeonides op cit 49).

¹² Forsyth, (n 2) 368.Google Scholar Also see Steyn, LC, Die Uitleg van Wette (Juta Cape Town 1981) 115–16, 120–1Google Scholar referring to Digesta 1.3.19: ‘In ambigua voce legis ea potius accipienda est significatio, quae vitio caret’ (translation by Steyn op cit 119: ‘[B]y ‘n dubbelsinnige wetsbepaling moet ons daardie betekenis verkies wat ‘n gebrek in die wet sou vermy’). The oversight by parliament may be partially remedied by this interpretation, although the prerequisite of formal validity of will 1 in terms of s 3bis (1)(a)-(c) remains. See, however, Steyn, op cit 126 and 154.Google Scholar

¹³ See Neels, (n 10: 2005) 192–4.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See the previous four paragraphs.

¹⁵ Art 2 of the convention.

¹⁶ Section 3bis (1)(c). See for the position in English law, eg Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 8) 1270–1Google Scholar and Miller, G, International Aspects of Succession (Ashgate Dartmouth Aldershot 2000) 214.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Waal, De and Schoeman-Malan, (n 1) 95–6.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Section 2(3) was inserted into the Wills Act 7 of 1953 by the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of 1992. It led to a spate of litigation, of which three cases up till date reached the Supreme Court of Appeal: Bekker v Naude 2003 5 SA 173 (SCA)Google Scholar; Van Wetten v Bosch 2004 1 SA 348 (SCA)Google Scholar; De Reszke v Maras 2006 2 SA 277 (SCA).Google Scholar

¹⁹ The South African Law Commission (now the South African Law Reform Commission) overlooks this fact when stating that there is no need for the doctrine of renvoi in South African private international law in respect of the formal validity of wills due to the existence of s 2(3): South African Law Commission Verslag oor Hersiening van die Erfreg Project 22 (1991) 54.Google Scholar

²⁰ Cf the obiter dicta in Ex Parte Senekal 1989 1 SA 38 (T) 39–40Google Scholar in respect of an application in terms of s 21(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 and the commentary by Forsyth (n 2) 282. Also see Forsyth, (n 2) 14–15Google Scholar on direct applicability of statutes by implication. See, further, the reference in s 2(3) to the formalities in s 2(1) and the opening phrase of s 2(1): ‘Subject to the provisions of section 3bis.…’; Neels, JL, ‘Die gedeeltelike uitsluiting van renvoi in resente wetgewing’ (1992) TSAR 739742.Google Scholar

²¹ See on the conflict between reasonableness and fairness, on the one hand, and legal determinability, on the other, in private international law: Neels, , ‘Die voorlopige regsoordeel in die internasionale privaatreg’ (1994) Stellenbosch Law Review 288Google Scholar; Neels, JL, ‘Substantiewe geregtigheid, herverdeling en die begunstigingsbeginsel in die internasionale familiereg’ (2001) TSAR 692Google Scholar; Neuhaus, PH, ‘Legal certainty versus equity in the conflict of laws’ in Fentiman, R (ed), Conflict of Laws (Dartmouth Aldershot 1996) 529Google Scholar; Reese, WLM, ‘The ever changing rules of choice of law’ in De Conflictu Legum. Opstellen aangeboden aan Roeland Duco Kollewijn en Johannes Offerhaus ter gelegenheid van hun zeventigste verjaardag (AW Sijthoff Leiden 1962) 389Google Scholar; Roodt, C, ‘The integration of substantive law interests and material justice in South African choice of law’ (2003) The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 1Google Scholar; Symeonides, (n 11) 3–79.Google Scholar See on finding the optimum between reasonableness and fairness, on the one hand and legal determinability on the other, in the law in general: Neels, , ‘Regsekerheid en die korrigerende werking van redelikheid en billikheid’ (1998) TSAR 702Google Scholar; (1999) TSAR 256 and 477.Google Scholar

²² See Neels (n 20).

²³ By s 6 of the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of 1992 (also see a 1 of the convention). Section 1 of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 defines ‘internal law’ as the ‘law of a state or territory, excluding the rules of the international private law of that state or territory’. The definition was inserted by s 2(c) of the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of 1992.

²⁴ In s 4 of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992.

²⁵ Forsyth, (n 2) 381–2Google Scholar; Kahn, (n 6: 2001) 632–4Google Scholar; Neels, (n 10: 2005) 199, 201Google Scholar; cf Schoeman (n 2) para 237 and Kiggundu, J, Private International Law in Botswana. Cases and Materials (1995) 279.Google Scholar In the context of movables, Tan, Yock Lin, Conflicts Issues in Family and Succession Law (Butterworths Asia Singapore 1993)Google Scholar argues in favour of the alternative application of both the lex domicilii of the testator at the time of revocation and the lex ultimi domicilii (613). In the absence of an express or a tacit intention of the testator, the interpretation of a will (including a revocatory clause) must take place in terms of the lex domicilii of the testator at the time of execution. See Neels, (n 10: 2005) 198.Google Scholar If English law is the applicable legal system in this regard and ‘one will deals only with property in… [country A] and is made in foreign form, and the other deals only with property in … [country B], the later will does not necessarily revoke the earlier one even if it contains a revocation clause’ (Morris (n 8) 456).Google Scholar On the capacity to revoke, see Neels, (n 10: 2005) 187.Google Scholar Proving the animus revocandi (the intention to revoke) is a matter of evidence, governed by the lex fori (Miller, (n 16) 189–90).Google Scholar

²⁶ See Forsyth, (n 2) 381–2Google Scholar; Kahn, (n 6: 2001) 632–4.Google Scholar The proposed rule in the text seems to govern both the inherent validity and effect and the formal validity of the revocation. The term ‘formal validity’ is here employed to indicate the various recognised forms of revocation.

²⁷ See Agbede, IO, ‘Nigeria’ in Verschraegen, B (ed), Private International Law in Blanpain, R (gen ed), International Encyclopedia of Laws (loose-leaf, Kluwer Law International The Hague 2004) para 196 (revocation may also be governed by customary or Islamic law: see para 197)Google Scholar; Collier, JG, Conflict of Laws (CUP Cambridge 2001) 274.CrossRefGoogle ScholarMiller, (n 16) 191–2Google Scholar; Morris (n 8) 467Google Scholar; North, PM and Fawcett, JJ, Cheshire and North's Private International Law (Butterworths London 1999) 997–8 and 1007Google Scholar; Nygh, PE, Conflict of Laws in Australia (Butterworths Sydney 1991) 528–3Google Scholar; O'Brien, JSmith's Conflict of Laws (Cavendish London 99) 588, 592Google Scholar; Walker, J, Castel and Walker: Canadian Conflict of Laws vol 2 (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Markham 2005) para 27.4.h.Google Scholar Cf Clarkson, CMV and Hill, J, The Conflict of Laws (OUP Oxford 2006) 448–9 and 451–2.Google Scholar Some Commonwealth authors do not (seem to) make a distinction between movables and immovables in this regard and support the lex domicilii of the testator at the time of revocation in all cases: see Anton, AE and Beaumont, PR, Private International Law. A Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law (W Green Edinburgh 1990) 6945Google Scholar; Briggs, A, The Conflict of Laws (OUP Oxford 2002) 221Google Scholar; Diwan, P and Diwan, A, Private International Law. Indian and English (OUP Oxford 1998) 501Google Scholar; Hickling, RI and Wu, Min Aun, Conflict of Laws in Malaysia (Butterworths Asia Malaysia 1995) 203Google Scholar; Kiggundu, (n 25) 279.Google Scholar Also see Crawford, EB and Carruthers, JM, International Private Law in Scotland (Thomson W Green Edinburgh 2006) 566.Google Scholar However, in the summary on p 576 they state that the lex situs governs in respect of immovables. Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 8) 1263–4Google Scholar favour the lex domicilii of the testator at the time of the revocation in respect of both movables and immovables. In the absence of authority, they however concede that the lex situs may apply in respect of immovables (1263 n 80).

²⁸ See the text at n 18ff.

²⁹ See the text at n 25.

³⁰ Moreover in the absence of the availability of the doctrine of renvoi, at least in the case of movables: see Neels, (n 20) 741.Google Scholar

³¹ ie alternatively to the lex domicilii of the testator at the time of the alleged revocation and the lex situs respectively.

³² See, eg, Cheshire and North (n 27) 998Google Scholar; Collins, L (gen ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws vol 1 (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell London 2006)49Google Scholar; Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 8) 1264Google Scholar; Schoeman, MC, ‘Outomatiese verval van ‘n testament weens veranderende omstandighede’ (part 2) (1991) De June 268, 268–73.Google Scholar

³³ See Nygh, (n 27) 530.Google Scholar

³⁴ Unless the will was made in contemplation of marriage. See the sources in nn 32–3.

³⁵ Only in respect of the minority of the population that are neither Hindu nor Muslim: see Diwan, and Diwan, (n 27) 501.Google Scholar

³⁶ Only in West Malaysia and not in respect of Muslims: see Hickling, and Wu, (n 27) 203.Google Scholar

³⁷ Only in certain provinces: see Rafferty, N (ed), Private International Law in Common Law Canada. Cases, Text, and Materials (Edmond Montgomery Toronto 2003) 839.Google Scholar

³⁸ 1955 2 SA 573 (T).Google Scholar See the discussion by Kahn, (n 6: 2001) 593–5.Google ScholarAlso see Re Martin [1900] P 211Google Scholar; Davies v Davies (1915) 24 DLR 737 (Alberta SC)Google Scholar; Re Micallef's Estate [1977] 2 NSWLR 929Google Scholar; Re the Estate of Covone (1989) 36 ETR 114.Google Scholar

³⁹ Frankel's Estate v The Master 1950 1 SA 220 (A)Google Scholar; Sperling v Sperling 1975 3 SA 707 (A).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It also does not provide for same-sex marriages: see Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 1 All SA 273 (SCA) para 124–5Google Scholar; Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) para 29 n 24 (also see para 70 n 80).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Schoeman, E, ‘The connecting factor for proprietary consequences of marriage’ (2001) TSAR 72Google Scholar; id, ‘The South African conflict rule for proprietary consequences of marriage: learning from the German experience’ (2004) TSAR 115Google Scholar; id, ‘The South African conflict rule for proprietary consequences of marriages: the need for reform’ (2004) Praxis des Internationalen Privatund Verfahrensrechts 65.Google ScholarSee Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 8) 1280–8.Google Scholar

⁴² 2005 1 All SA 273 (SCA) para 124–5.Google Scholar

⁴³ The Constitutional Court confirmed the extension of the definition of marriage to include same-sex relationships: Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC).Google Scholar Today the position in this regard is regulated by the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006.

⁴⁴ Stoll, H and Visser, PJ, ‘Aspects of the reform of German (and South African) private international family law’ (1989) De Jure 330.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Stoll, and Visser, (n 44) 335.Google Scholar The authors refer to a decision of the German Constitutional Court: BVerfGE 31 58 = (1971) NJW 1509. For the position in German law today, see arts 14–15 of the Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche, inter alia referring to a choice of law by the parties, the law of common nationality, the law of common habitual residence and the law of closest connection.

⁴⁶ Nationality or citizenship already plays a role in South African private international law in the context of the formal validity of wills (see s 3bis (1)(a)(iii) and 3bis (4)(a) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953), the recognition and enforcement of foreign divorce orders (see s 13(1)(c) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979), an application in terms of s 21(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 (see Ex Parte Senekal 1989 1 SA 38 (T) 39–40)Google Scholar and determining the proper law of a contract (Forsyth, (n 2) 309 and 313Google Scholar; Fredericks, EA and Neels, JL, ‘The proper law of a documentary letter of credit (part 1)’ (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 63, 68).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See the discussion in Kahn, (n 6: 2001) 593–5Google Scholar, who—however—supports the principle deduced from Pitluk v Gavendo 1955 2 SA 573 (T).Google Scholar To the same effect are Forsyth, (n 2) 381–2Google Scholar and Schoeman (n 2) para 238. Also see Cheshire and North (n 27) 998–9 and 1007–8Google Scholar; Crawford, and Carruthers, (n 27) 567Google Scholar; Hickling, and Wu, (n 27) 203Google Scholar; Miller, (n 16) 193, 195, and 197Google Scholar; Nygh, (n 27) 530. Cf Castel and Walker (n 27) para 27.4.i.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Also see Tan, (n 25) 29–34Google Scholar, referring to Singaporean case law reported in the Malayan Law Journal. Cf Clarkson, and Hill, (n 27) 449Google Scholar; Miller, (n 16) 196–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 32) 49–50.Google Scholar Cf Clarkson, and Hill, (n 27) 449.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Anton, and Beaumont, (n 27) 694–5Google Scholar; Briggs, (n 27) 221Google Scholar; Clarkson, and Hill, (n 27) 449Google Scholar; Collier, (n 27) 274 n 49Google Scholar; Diwan, and Diwan, (n 27) 494–5 501Google Scholar; Hickling, and Wu, (n 27) 203Google Scholar; Miller, (n 16) 193–5Google Scholar; Morris (n 8) 457–8Google Scholar; O'Brien, (n 27) 588–9.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Crawford, and Carruthers, (n 27) 567Google Scholar; Hiram, H, The Scots Law of Succession (Butterworths Lexis Nexis Edinburgh 2002) 162–3.Google Scholar Cf the position in KwaZulu-Natal if the will was executed before 1 January 1954; and also the position in Roman—Dutch law: Schoeman, MC ‘Outomatiese verval van ‘n testament weens veranderende omstandighede (part 1)’ (1991) De Jure 44, 45–7.Google Scholar

⁵² Also see Agbede (n 27) para 196 and Castel and Walker (n 27) para 27.4.i. Cf Dicey, Morris and Collins (n 32) 49Google Scholar; Kahn, (n 6: 2001) 634.Google Scholar

⁵³ Section 2B of the Wills Act 7 of 1953. Similar rules apply in the United Kingdom, in certain Australian states and in Ontario (Canada): see Miller, (n 16) 197Google Scholar; Nygh, (n 27) 530–1Google Scholar; Rafferty, (n 37) 839.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Also see Canada Trust Co v Sachs (1990) ETR 226.Google ScholarCf Castel and Walker (n 27) para 27.4.i; Kahn, (n 6: 2001) 634Google Scholar; Nygh, (n 27) 531. But Miller (n 16) proposes the lex domicilii of the testator at divorce to govern revocation by divorce in respect of both movables and immovables.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See, in general, Martinek, MG, ‘Look back before you leap? Fateful tendencies of materialization and of parallelism in modern private international law theory’ (2007) TSAR 277 (based on a paper delivered at the private international law seminar at the University of South Africa on 29 March 2006).Google Scholar