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II. Free Movement of Goods

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Karl Newman  and
Stephen Weatherill
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Extract

1. From “Sunday trading” to Keck and Mithouard

These Current Developments surveys have consistently been driven to consideration of the Court's attempts to fix the outer limits of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, beyond which national authorities remain exclusively competent to regulate their markets without fear of legal challenge based on Community rules governing the free movement of goods. The high-water mark of judicial interventionism came in the so-called “Sunday trading” cases where the United Kingdom was required to justify against standards recognised by Community law rules governing shop opening hours despite the fact that such rules, although inhibitive of commercial freedom, posed no demonstrable obstacle to the construction of an integrated marketing strategy for the whole territory of the Community.1 In Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard2 the Court sought to curtail the reach of Article 30. A French rule prohibiting resale at a loss was held unaffected by Article 30. The Court overruled previous decisions, probably including the pair dealing with Sunday trading, although the Court was not explicit. Its intention to refocus the law of the free movement of goods on measures hostile to market integration, rather than those merely oppressive of commercial freedom, was reflected in the formula:

Type
Current Developments: European Community Law
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , July 1997 , pp. 704 - 712
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1997

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References

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