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EVOLVING INTERPRETATION OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES: ’ACTS CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS’ IN THE REFUGEE CONVENTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 March 2015

David McKeever
Affiliation:
Associate Legal Officer, International Court of Justice, LL.M (Cantab), M.St (Oxon), davidmckeever80@hotmail.com.
Corresponding

Abstract

The 1951 Refugee Convention does not apply to a person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that ‘he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ (Article 1(F)(c)). To date, this exclusion clause has generally been interpreted by courts, commentators and UNHCR in a static manner which fails to take into account developments in international law and practice. This paper considers the ‘evolutive approach’ to treaty interpretation, generally, and applies this approach, alongside standard rules of treaty interpretation, to Article 1(F)(c). This paper challenges a number of assertions commonly made regarding this clause, and concludes that it should be interpreted to the effect that conduct amounting to serious or sustained human rights violations, such that would constitute ‘persecution’ for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention, meets the standard for exclusion under Article 1(F)(c).

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2015 

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References

1 This provides that the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’.

2 Arato, J, ‘Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences’ (2010) 9 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 443, 449CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘Arato’).

3 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1999, para 74.

4 Aust, A, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, CUP 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar 243 (‘Aust’). A frequently cited example is that of the UN Security Council relating to art 27(3) of the UN Charter (see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971 (‘Namibia’) para 22).

5 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1964) vol I, 34, para 10.

6 Arato (n 2) 445–6; G Letsas, ‘Intentionalism and the Interpretation of the ECHR’ in M Fitzmaurice, O Elias and P Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On, (2010) 257, 257, 270 (‘Letsas’).

7 W Kalin, ‘Implementing Treaties in Domestic Law: From ‘‘Pacta Sunt Servanda’’ to Anything Goes?’ in V Gowland-Debbas (ed), Multilateral Treaty-Making (2002) 111, 115; Secretary of State for the Home Department v K [2006] UKHL 46 (UK) (‘SSHD v K’) paras 84–86, per Baroness Hale.

8 Bernhardt, R, ‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1999) 42 GYIL 11, 14–15Google Scholar (‘Bernhardt’); McLachlan, C, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 279, 290CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘McLachlan’).

9 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, 182–183, paras 41–42; see also Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran (1987-II) 15 Iran-USCTR 189, 222, para 112; McLachlan (n 8) 293–4.

10 International Law Commission, ‘Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ in Report of the International Law Commission, 58th Session (2006) UN Doc GAOR A/61/10, 400, 415 (references omitted).

11 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978 (‘Aegean Sea’) 32, para 77.

12 McLachlan (n 8) 318.

13 Aegean Sea (n 11) 34, para 80; 37, para 90.

14 Gabčíkova-Nagyamaros Project, Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, 67–68, para 112.

15 WTO, United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Report of the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R; (1999) 38 ILM 118, para 130.

16 Namibia (n 4) para 53. See also Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, (‘Navigational and Related Rights’) 242, para 64, also paras 70, 89.

17 Ocalan v Turkey, ECtHR, A No 46221/99, Judgment, 12 March 2003, paras 189–198.

18 Consider eg arts 8(1), 15 and 58 of the ECHR. While the Human Rights Committee's General Comment 29 (on the derogation clause of the ICCPR, art 4) appears to call for a more expansive approach to identifying non-derogable rights, it primarily emphasizes the need for proportionality when States purport to derogate from obligations under the Covenant. Insofar as the Committee argues that certain rights not expressly included in art 4 of the Covenant are, nevertheless, non-derogable, its reasoning is unconvincing. For example, it associates restrictions on freedom of movement (contrary to art 12 ICCPR) with deportation or forcible transfer as a crime against humanity. But the latter is an international crime with specific elements not included in art 12 of the Covenant, and to assert any link or equivalence between these distinct international rules is to also ignore the fact that art 12(3) allows for restrictions on the exercise of that right even in the absence of any ‘public emergency’ (UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001, at paras 1, 8, 13).

19 Navigational and Related Rights (n 16), Déclaration de M. le Juge ad hoc Guillaume 297, para 15.

20 For example, the words ‘events occurring before 1 January 1951’ in art 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention could hardly be subject to an evolving interpretation, hence the need to adopt, in 1967, a Protocol to the Convention which removed this temporal limitation.

21 Before the ECJ, see Commission v United Kingdom, 100 ILR at 114.

22 Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department, DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 54, Judgment of 21 November 2012 (‘Al-Sirri’) at para 1.

23 ibid, para 16, per Lady Hale and Lord Dyson (for the Court).

ibid

24 Art 35 of the Convention.

25 See McAdam, J, ‘Interpretation of the 1951 Convention’ in Zimmermann, A (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 75, 79, 97 and 110–12Google Scholar (‘McAdam’); Al-Sirri (n 22) para 36. Domestic courts frequently derive assistance from UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Doc HCR/IP/4/ENG/REV.1, January 1992 (‘UNHCR RSD Handbook); Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, at 214 per Keith J.

26 Established in 1958, EXCOM functions as a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly. At time of writing, 94 States are members of the EXCOM <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c89.html>. The criteria for membership are: membership of the UN or its specialized agencies, demonstrated interest in refugee matters, and wide geographical representation. It is not required that a State be party to the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol.

27 McKeever, D: ‘The Human Rights Act and Anti-terrorism in the UK: One Great Leap Forward by Parliament, but Are the Courts Able to Slow the Steady Retreat That Has Followed?’ (2010) 1 PL 110, 113–16Google Scholar (‘McKeever 2010’).

28 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 September 2003, Doc HCR/GIP/03/05 (‘UNHCR 2003 Exclusion Guidelines’) paras 25–29.

29 A Zimmerman and P Wennholz, ‘Article 1F 1951 Convention’ in Zimmermann (n 25) 579, 602–7 (‘Zimmerman and Wennholz’); Goodwin-Gill, G and McAdam, J, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2007)Google Scholar (‘Goodwin-Gill and McAdam’) 190–7; Gilbert, G, ‘Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses’ in Feller, E, Turk, V and Nicholson, F, Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR's Global Consultations on International Protection (CUP 2003)Google Scholar 425, 439–44 (‘Gilbert’); Nyinah, M Kingsley, ‘Exclusion under Article 1F: Some Reflections on Context, Principles and Practice’ (2000) 12 IJRL Special Supplementary Issue 295, 310–13Google Scholar (‘Kingsley Nyinah’).

30 Al-Sirri (n 22) and Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D (Joined Cases (C-57/09 and C-101/09, Grand Chamber Judgment of 9 November 2010 (‘Deutschland v B and D’).

31 The author's own experience includes carrying out RSD for UNHCR in Sudan in 2003–04.

32 Witnesses may still be in the country of origin and inaccessible to decision-makers in the forum State. On the other hand, where witnesses are in the forum State, and in particular living in the same refugee community/camp as the applicant, the risks of witness evidence being distorted by intimidation and/or score-settling are obvious (O'Neill, W, Rutinwa, B and Verdirame, G, ‘The Great Lakes: A Survey of the Application of the Exclusion Clauses in the Central African Republic, Kenya and Tanzania’ (2000) 12 IJRL Special Supplementary Issue 135, 138–9Google Scholar (‘O'Neill et al.’).

33 Added to this is the operational reality that interpreters are often, by necessity, drawn from the refugee community in the forum State—the fact that an interpreter belongs to a particular ethnic/political group can affect perceptions of his/her neutrality in the eyes of the applicant.

34 UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) para 44; UNHCR, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, September 2003 (‘UNHCR Exclusion Background Note’) paras 96–97; also UNHCR, Guidelines on the Application in Mass Influx Situations of the Exclusion Clauses of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, February 2006. For a detailed account of the problems arising in such a context, see O'Neill et al. (n 32) 135–70.

35 UNHCR 2003 Exclusion Guidelines (n 28) para 32; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 101; Gilbert (n 29) 465.

36 Letsas (n 6) 257.

37 Tyrer v United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, Series A, No 26, para 31.

38 Soering v UK, Appl No 14038/88, ECHR (Series A) No 161 (1989); Matthews v United Kingdom, 1999, para 39; Dudgeon v UK, Judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A, No 45, 23.

39 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom, 1999, paras 51–52.

40 Bernhardt (n 8) 12.

41 See eg the 1999 Advisory Opinion in The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, OC-16/99, Opinion of 1 October 1999, para 114.

42 Sepet and Bulbul v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 15, at para 6, per Lord Bingham; also R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, ex parte Roma Rights Centre [2004] UKHL 5 (‘Roma Rights Centre’) at para 43, per Lord Steyn; UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) paras 59–60.

43 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (‘EU Qualification Directive’) art 10(1)(a); A Zimmermann and C Mahler, ‘Article 1A, para 2’ in Zimmermann (n 25) 281, 375–9 (‘Zimmermann and Mahler’). See also UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) para 68; for a similar recommendation regarding ‘nationality’, see ibid, para 74.

44 SSHD v K (n 7) at paras 84–86, per Baroness Hale. Also Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another, ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 at 657, per Lord Hope; EU Qualification Directive (n 43) arts 9(2)(f).

45 A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1997] HCA 4; (1997) 190 CLR 225 (‘A v Minister for Immigration’) at 293–294. See also EU Qualification Directive (n 43) art 10(1)(d).

46 UNHCR 2003 Exclusion Guidelines (n 28) paras 10–13; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 25; Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 595, 596; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 29) 166; Gilbert (n 29) 433–9.

47 Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, at paras 128–137; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 30.

48 UNHCR 2003 Exclusion Guidelines (n 28) para 13; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 33. On the relevance of the ICC Statute for interpreting ‘crimes against humanity’ under art 1(F)(A) see Attorney-General v Tamil X [2010] NZSC 107, at para 47, per McGrath J; B v Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Anor [2011] IEHC 198, at para 28.

49 Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 609–10. It is therefore inherently contradictory to argue, as Kwakwa does, that ‘Article 1(F) should be interpreted as restrictively as possible, but in a manner that reflects the current state of international law’ (Kwakwa, E, ‘Article 1(F)(c): Acts Contrary to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ (2000) 12 IJRL Special Supplementary Issue 79, 86Google Scholar (‘Kwakwa’).

50 UNHCR Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention: Issues in the context of the preliminary ruling references to the Court of Justice of the European Communities from the German Federal Administrative Court regarding the interpretation of Articles 12(2)(b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive, July 2009 (‘UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference’) 20; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34), paras 38 (on ‘serious’) and 42 (on ‘non-political’).

51 Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 602.

52 Gilbert (n 29) 450–4.

53 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004 136, paras 27–28; Kadelbach, S, ‘Interpretation of the Charter’ in Simma, B and Wessendorf, N (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2012)Google Scholar 71, 74, 79–80 (‘Kadelbach’); A McNair, ‘The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties’ (1930) 11 BYIL, 100, 116–17.

54 The Statute of the Office of UNHCR was annexed to General Assembly resolution 428 (V), adopted on 14 December 1950. The Office was established as of 1 January 1951.

55 de Visscher, C, Problèmes d'interprétation judiciaire en droit international public (Pedone 1963) 87–8Google Scholar; H Waldock, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur’, 1964 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, 60 (‘Waldock’).

56 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 SCR 982 at paras 128–129 (‘Pushpanathan’).

57 This section summarizes some of the more notable trends and reported cases. For more detailed accounts see: Grahl-Madsen, A, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol 1: Refugee Character (Sijthoff 1966) 286–9Google Scholar (‘Grahl-Madsen); Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 29) 186–9; Kwakwa (n 49) 87–90; Hathaway, JC and Foster, M, The Law of Refugee Status (2nd edn, CUP 2014) 587–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘Hathaway and Foster’). For regional or country-specific reviews, see UNHCR, Asylum in the European Union: A Study of the Implementation of the Qualification Directive (2007) 101–4 (‘UNHCR Asylum in the EU’); Sloan, J, ‘The Application of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention in Canada and the United States’ (2000) 12 IJRL Special Supplementary Issue 222–48Google Scholar (‘Sloan’); Kapferer, S, ‘Exclusion Clauses in Europe: A Comparative Overview of State Practice in France, Belgium and the United Kingdom’ (2000) 12 IJRL Special Supplementary Issue 195221Google Scholar (‘Kapferer’); Michel, N, ‘France: Purposes and Principles of the United Nations: The Way in Which France Applies Article 1F(c)’ in van Krieken, PJ (ed), Refugee Law in Context: The Exclusion Clause (TMC Asser Press 1999) 294–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘Michel’).

58 EU Qualification Directive (n 43).

59 ibid Recital, para 22

ibid

60 Decision in Case 5845 III/61 of 27 June 1962, discussed in Grahl-Madsen (n 57) 287–8.

61 See Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 29) 186–7.

62 UNHCR Asylum in the EU (n 57) 102–4.

63 This was the subject of the UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference (n 50).

64 Deutschland v B and D (n 30).

65 Milosek and Kamykowski, discussed in Grahl-Madsen (n 57) 286–7.

66 Commission des recours des réfugiés (CRR) No 502.265, 18 July 1986 (confirmed by the Conseil d'Etat 31 July 1992); see discussion in Kapferer (n 57) 205; see also Traoré (Commission des recours des réfugiés, No 237/574, 16 June 1993), Zende (Commission des recours des réfugiés, No 253.901, 26 October 1994) and Sultani (Commission des recours des réfugiés, No 251.561, 4 February 1994).

67 Kapferer (n 57) 206–7. Kapferer was critical of this ‘expansive use’ of art 1F(c) (ibid 221); Michel (n 57) 296–7.

68 Michel (n 57) 296.

69 Kapferer (n 57) 198–9 and decisions cited therein.

70 XXX v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, CCE, N. 24.173 (4 March 2009), discussed in UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference (n 50) 29; on earlier Belgian jurisprudence, see UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 48.

71 Al-Sirri (n 22) 63–8; similarly, B v Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Anor [2011] IEHC 198, at paras 55–56.

72 The Court left open the possibility that, on the facts, an act of terrorism in one country could have the international repercussions required (Al-Sirri (n 22) paras 38–39).

73 ibid para 13

ibid

74 ibid para 14, also para 66.

ibid

75 Between 1992 and 1999, of ‘over 200’ exclusion assessments carried out, 190 were on the basis of sub-para (a) only (G Van Kessel, ‘Canada's Approach Towards Exclusion Ground 1F’ in van Krieken (n 57) 287, 290 (Van Kessel).

76 Sloan (n 57) 245–6; Kwakwa describes this practice as ‘far-fetched’, and ‘clearly erroneous and overly broad’ (n 49) at 87 and 89.

77 Discussed in Kwakwa (n 76) 87–89; also Van Kessel (n 75) 291–2.

78 Pushpanathan (n 56) paras 15–21.

79 By four votes to two (Cory and Major JJ agreed that art 1F(c) is triggered by serious human rights violations, but dissented on the basis that, in view of its effects and responses of the international community, drug trafficking should also engage this provision).

80 Pushpanathan (n 56) para 75.

81 The United States is a party to the 1967 Protocol but not the 1951 Convention, though art 1(F) applies equally under both instruments (see art 1(2) of the Protocol).

82 US Act section 208(b)(2)(C); discussed in Sloan (n 57) 224–5.

83 Sloan (n 57) 245.

84 This function is carried out under the UNHCR Statute, rather than the Convention. Persons so recognized are usually referred to as ‘mandate refugees’ (UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) paras 13–19). The definitions for both inclusion and exclusion in the Statute differ slightly from those in the 1951 Convention, though in practice the Convention formulations take precedence (UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 20).

85 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2011: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions 37–41. In 2012, UNHCR ‘conducted RSD in more than 60 countries and registered 110,400 new RSD applications, confirming UNHCR as the second largest RSD body in the world’ <https://public.msrp.unhcr.org/psc/RAHRPRDX/EMPLOYEE/HR/c/HRS_HRAM.HRS_CE.GBL>.

86 UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) paras 162–163.

87 UNHCR 2003 Exclusion Guidelines (n 28) para 17 (emphasis added).

88 UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) paras 47–49).

89 UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference (n 50) 14, 26–7.

90 ibid 28.

ibid

91 ibid 14–15.

ibid

92 ibid 28–9.

ibid

93 He suggested that a person who has carried out policies incompatible with the principle of ‘equal rights of men and women’, as found in the Preamble and art 1(3) of the Charter, should not automatically be labelled as guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN (Grahl-Madsen (n 57) 283–6).

94 Hathaway, J, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths 1991)Google Scholar 191 (‘Hathaway’).

95 While arguments for the exclusion under this provision ‘of those who breach human rights standards or fail to support other goals of the world community’ were more compelling than some other positions advanced, nevertheless ‘the range, detail, and relative obscurity of such standards would work a real hardship in the case of the average citizen, who generally looks only to domestic law to understand her duties’ (ibid 228).

96 ibid 227–9.

ibid

97 Hathaway and Foster (n 57) 589.

98 ibid 592, 596.

ibid

99 ibid 593.

ibid

100 ibid 596–7.

ibid

101 Kwakwa (n 49) 83.

102 He characterizes as ‘obviously an erroneous interpretation of Article 1F(c)’ the French decisions discussed above, and concludes that art 1F(c) has been ‘misused and abused’ (ibid 86, 89–90)

103 ibid 91.

ibid

104 Gilbert (n 29) 457.

105 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 29) 189–90.

106 Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 596.

107 ibid 603.

ibid

108 ibid 604.

ibid

109 ibid 609–10.

ibid

110 UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) para 149.

111 UNHCR 2003 Exclusion Guidelines (n 28) para 2; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 4.

112 Kwakwa (n 49) 80, 82; Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 605; Gilbert (n 29) 428.

113 McKeever 2010 (n 27) 122–6.

114 On the interaction of refugee law and other human rights protection within the EU legal order, see Deutschland v B and D (n 30) paras 113–121.

115 Kingsley Nyinah (n 29) 300–1; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) paras 21–22.

116 In Belgium, France and the UK, forced removal of excluded asylum-seekers is ‘very rare’ (Kapferer (n 57) 218). Regarding Rwandan refugees in the 1990s, see O'Neill et al. (n 32) 169.

117 UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) paras 163, 179.

118 UNHCR 2003 Exclusion Guidelines (n 28) para 17; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 46; UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference (n 50) 13–14. See also, to similar effect, Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 607, 610.

119 Gilbert (n 29) 449; Grahl-Madsen (n 57) 294–7.

120 UNHCR 2003 Exclusion Guidelines (n 28) para 155; Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 597–602; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 29) 178.

121 Grahl-Madsen (n 57) 292–4.

122 Hathaway (n 94) 222–3; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) paras 72–75.

123 The drafters of CSR51 intentionally left the meaning of ‘persecution’ undefined (Hathaway (n 94) 102); UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) para 51.

124 Bernhardt (n 8) 12.

125 McLachlan, C, Shore, L and Weiniger, M, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (OUP 2007) 226–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

126 A v Minister for Immigration (n 45) 240 (Dawson J), 255–256 (McHugh J) and 275 (Gummow J); McAdam (n 25) 86–7; on ‘deliberate imprecision’ in the UN Charter, see J Crawford, ‘Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law (2006) 319 Recueil des Cours 365–6 (Crawford); on the ‘impossibility of attaining absolute certainty in the framing of laws’, see Michaud v France, ECtHR, A No 12323/11, Judgment of 6 December 2012, para 96.

127 Regarding the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard, see Mondev International Ltd v USA (2003) 42 ILM 85, discussion in McLachlan (n 8) 298–9.

128 UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference (n 50) 7, 10; UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 4.

129 Gilbert (n 29) 428, 445, 456–7; Kingsley Nyinah (n 29) 299.

130 It is certainly appropriate for inclusion (under art 1A(2)) to be carried out before exclusion under art 1(F), but in cases where the inclusion assessment raises concerns about possible excludability, a final decision on status will not be taken until an exclusion assessment has been carried out: the individual will not have been recognized as a refugee prior to the exclusion assessment. Art 1(F) thus does not remove a status previously conferred, it precludes conferral of that status in the first place (Pushpanathan (n 56) at paras 7, 58).

131 ‘The benefit of [art 33(1)—non refoulement] may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.’ The contrast between 1(F) and 33(2) is in fact drawn in the very same 2009 UNHCR Note (UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference (n 50) 8, also 33; also Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 589–90, 609; Hathaway (n 94) 225–6.

132 Art 1 CRC provides that ‘For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.’

133 The exclusion clauses are included in art 1 ‘definition of a refugee’, part of Chapter I (General Provisions), while the various rights which accrue from refugee status are detailed in Chapters II–IV.

134 Bernhardt (n 8); for earlier discussions, see Lauterpacht, H, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’ (1949) 26 BYBIL 48Google Scholar.

135 Navigational and Related Rights (n 16) 24–25, para 48.

136 ibid 24, para 47.

ibid

137 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, 24; see also Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v Iran), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1952, 93 at 105; Namibia (n 4) 35, para 66; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf; ICJ Reports 1978, 22, para 52. See also Waldock (n 59) 60–61.

138 Hathaway (n 94) 229.

139 UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) para 162.

140 K Keith, ‘Interpreting Treaties, Statutes and Contracts’ (May 2009) New Zealand Centre for Public Law, Occasional Paper No 19, 55; Sinclair, I, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 1984)Google Scholar 116 (‘Sinclair’).

141 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, 8; SSHD v K (n 7), para 10, per Lord Bingham. Indeed, in 1951 one of the drafters described it as ‘essential that the text [of the Convention] should be as clear as possible, since in its interpretation of any convention the International Court of Justice could only take into account its actual text, nor what had been said during the preparatory work without finding expression in the text’ (Conference of Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR. 19 (1951) (‘Plenipotentiaries 19’) 13).

142 cf UNHCR 2003 Exclusion Guidelines (n 28) para 163.

143 Kwakwa (n 49) 84.

144 Al-Sirri (n 22) paras 15–16, 75.

145 Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 603.

146 Charter, arts 24(2), 14 and 52(1), respectively. See A Paulus, ‘Article 2’ in B Simma, D-E Khan, G Nolte and A Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Third Edition, Vol 1, 121, 128–9. On the binding nature of arts 1–2, A Randelzhofer, ‘Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ in R Wolfrum (ed), United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, Vol 2 (1995) 994, 996–7 .

147 Arts 14, 24(2), 52, 76, 104 and 105.

148 Arts 11, 12, 13, 24(1), 33–39, 42, 43, 48, 51, 55, 73, 84 and 99; R Wolfrum, ‘Article 1’ in B Simma et al. (n 146) 107, 108–9 (‘Wolfrum’).

149 Art 4(1), International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005; art 19(1), International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1998. It is noted that these are not merely hortatory references included in the respective preambles.

150 McKeever, D, ‘The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Law on the Use of Force: Missed Opportunities or Unrealistic Expectations?’ (2009) 78 Nordic Journal of International Law 361, 378–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar (‘McKeever 2009’).

151 In 1995, the ICJ described as ‘irreproachable’ the assertion ‘that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character’ (East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1995, at 102, para 29—emphasis added); Bedjaoui, M, ‘Article 1: commentaire générale’ in Cot, J-P, Pellet, A and Forteau, M (eds), La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article (3rd edn, Economica 2005)Google Scholar 313, 316–17 (‘Bedjaoui’).

152 ‘[C]ertains buts ou principes recèlent parfois, comme c'est le cas en ce paragraphe 2 [de l'article 1], une dynamique propre qui en permet une récupération et une utilisation extensive et inattendue’ (ibid 317); Pushpanathan (n 56) para 62.

153 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, 4, at 8–9; Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962 (‘Certain Expenses’) 151, at 157, 165.

154 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, 174, at 180 (emphasis added).

155 Certain Expenses (n 153) 151, at 168.

156 Kadelbach (n 53) 93–95; B Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interests in International Law’ (1994) 250 Recueil des Cours 264–8; Tomuschat, C, ‘Obligations arising for States without or against Their Will’ (1993) 241 Recueil des Cours 336–7Google Scholar (‘Tomuschat’).

157 SC res 733, 23 January 1992; SC res 751, 24 April 1992, SC res 767, 24 July 1992, and SC res 794, 3 December 1992; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 29) 194.

158 See eg SC res 929, 22 June 1994.

159 UNSC res 688, 5 April 1991 (Iraq); UNSC res 814, 26 March 1993 (Somalia); UNSC res 1556, 30 July 2004 (Darfur).

160 SC resolutions 216, 12 November 1965 and 217, 20 November 1965, relating to Southern Rhodesia; Tomuschat (n 156) 337–8.

161 SC res 940, 31 July 1994.

162 SC res 1373 (2001); res 1624 (2005); res 1377 (2001).

163 GA res 49/60 (1994); res 51/210 (1996); res 60/158 (2006); res 60/288 (2006).

164 See overview in Crawford (n 127) 381–2.

165 On early UN peacekeeping operations and the purposes of the UN, see Certain Expenses (n 153) 151, 171–2 and 175–7. As of March 2015, there are 16 UN peacekeeping missions operating. Actions against ISAF, a UN-mandated peacekeeping force which ceased operations in late 2014, have been held to constitute acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN under art 1F(c) (see section IV.A above).

166 SC res 687 (1991), 3 April 1991 (Iraq–Kuwait border).

167 UNSC res 827, 25 May 1993 (Yugoslavia) and res 955, 8 November 1994 (Rwanda).

168 See eg SC res 864, 15 September 1993; SC res 1267 (1999), 15 Oct 1999 and SC res 1333 (2000), 19 Dec 2000.

169 SC res 731 (1992), 21 January 1992 and 748 (1992), 31 March 1992 regarding the Lockerbie bombing; SC res 1638 (2005), 11 November 2005, regarding Charles Taylor.

170 UNSC res 692, 20 May 1991 (regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait).

171 See discussion in McKeever 2009 (n 151) 394–6.

172 SC res 217 (1965) on Southern Rhodesia; SC res 276 (1970) on South West Africa; SC res 1975 (2011), 30 March 2011 on Côte d'Ivoire.

173 SC res 1564 (2004), 18 September 2004, para 12.

174 SC res 1592 (2005), 31 March 2005 (Darfur).

175 Riedel, E and Arend, J-M., ‘Article 55(c)’ in Simma, B, Khan, D-E, Nolte, G and Paulus, A (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2012) vol 2, 15651602Google Scholar (‘Riedel and Arend’).

176 Charter, second preambular para. The EU Qualification Directive identifies the preamble of the Charter, along with arts 1 and 2, as the source for identifying the purposes and principles of the UN (see above).

177 O de Frouville, ‘Article 1, paragraphe 3’ in Cot, Pellet and Forteau (n 151) 357, 360. This position ignores, for example, the 1926 Slavery Convention (later supplemented in the 1950s), the Minorities Treaties associated with the League of Nations Covenant and the various labour rights conventions adopted by the International Labour Organization (I Brownlie, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations: General Course on Public International Law (1995) 255 Recueil des Cours 78–9 (‘Brownlie’).

178 Brownlie (n 177) 79.

179 Riedel and Arend (n 175) 1579–1602.

180 In 1951 the Council of Europe had 14 Member States; it currently has 47.

181 Brownlie (n 177) 79; Crawford, J, ‘The Charter of the United Nations as a Constitution’ in Fox, H (ed), The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (BIICL 1997) 316, 11Google Scholar; Riedel and Arend (n 175) 1576.

182 Wolfrum (n 148) 115; Ruda, JM, The Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter: A Legislative History of the Preamble, Article 1 and Article 2 (Editorial Estudios Internacionales 1983) 154–61Google Scholar.

183 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, 42, para 91.

184 Apartheid ‘constitute[s] a denial of fundamental human rights [and] is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter’ (Namibia (n 4), para 131); SC res 554, 17 August 1984.

185 GA resolutions 47/133, 18 December 1992 (art 1(1)), and 3452 (XXX), 9 December 1975 (art 2) respectively.

186 GA res 2200 (XXI), 16 December 1966 (on the ICCPR and ICESCR); GA res 34/180, 18 December 1979 (CEDAW); GA res 36/55.

187 SC res 554, 17 August 1984, GA res 265 (III), 14 May 1949 and GA res 616 A (VII), 5 December 1952 (on racial discrimination in South Africa); GA res 56 (I), 11 December 1946 (the political rights of women); GA res 3452 (XXX), 9 December 1974 (Torture); GA res 44/69, 8 December 1989 (apartheid).

188 1948 UDHR (preambular para 6); 1965 ICERD (preambular para 1); 1966 ICCPR and ICESCR (preambular paras 1, 4); 1979 CEDAW (preambular paras 1, 3); 1984 Convention against Torture (preambular paras 1, 3); 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (preambular paras 1–3).

189 GA res 44/73, 8 December 1989 (on CEDAW).

190 GA res 60/1, 12 September 2005, paras 2, 4, 9; Kadelbach (n 53) 92; Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, Report of the Secretary-General, 14 July 1997, UN Doc A/51/950, paras 78–79.

191 Kadelbach (n 53) 86, 88.

192 Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 603.

193 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 29) 189.

194 On non-State agents of persecution, see EU Qualification Directive, art 6(C); Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689; UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) para 65; Hathaway (n 94) 125–33; Zimmermann and Mahler (n 43) 362–9.

195 The first convictions secured by the ICTY and ICTR (Duško Tadić and Jean-Paul Akayesu, respectively) were of individuals far removed from high public office. The same is true of the ICC (Thomas Lubanga Dyilo).

196 Pushpanathan (n 56) at paras 68, 131–134.

197 Kwakwa (n 49) 82 (emphasis in original). UNHCR's position is that ‘the exclusion clauses can only be of an exceptional character and require a restrictive application and interpretation, with utmost caution, in the light of the overriding humanitarian character of the 1951 Convention’ (UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference (n 50) 19).

198 Arato (n 2) 475.

199 McAdam notes that it is possible to discern ‘various, and possibly conflicting, objects and purposes from the Preamble to the 1951 Convention’ (n 25) 91.

200 A treaty's object and purpose can be ‘elusive’, but ‘fortunately, the role it plays in interpreting treaties is less than the search for the ordinary meaning of the words in their context’. (Aust (n 4) 235).

201 On preambles and interpreting a treaty's object and purpose, generally: G Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951–54: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’, (1957) 33 BYBIL 203, 228; Beagle Channel Arbitration, Argentina v Chile, 52 ILR 93. With respect to the 1951 Convention, see Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another, ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629, 639 (Steyn); R Allweldt, ‘Preamble to the 1951 Convention’ in Zimmermann (n 25) 225, 227–8 (‘Allweldt’) .

202 The 1951 Convention contains a much longer list of refugee rights than the earlier instruments: property rights under arts 13–14 and access to employment in arts 17–19 were new, while other guarantees such as those relating to education were strengthened (Allweldt (n 201) 236).

203 At the time of its adoption the Convention ‘was seen as an instrument of burden sharing’ (T Einarsen, ‘Drafting History of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol’ in Zimmermann (n 25) 37, 40 (‘Einarsen’).

204 By contrast, the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization stipulated that this was to be a non-permanent organization (18 UNTS 3). It was in fact liquidated in February 1952.

205 C Skran, ‘Historical Development of International Refugee Law’ in Zimmermann (n 25) 3, 6 (‘Skran’); on the interwar instruments generally, see Grahl-Madsen (n 57) 122–40; also N Robinson, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Its History, Significance and Contents (1952) 1–3. Robinson, who had participated in the drafting, stressed that the scope of rights guaranteed in the Convention was broader than in any of the previous agreements (ibid 6).

206 A v Minister for Immigration (n 45) at 247–248, per Dawson J.

207 Skran (n 205) 7–10; Einarsen (n 203) 43–4; Grahl–Madsen (n 57) 109.

208 In a resolution of December 1926, the Council of the League of Nations asked High Commissioner Nansen to expand the scope of these arrangements, to new groups of refugees who ‘as a consequence of the war and of events directly connected with the war, are living under analogous conditions’ (League of Nations Official Journal, February 1927, 155).

209 Skran (n 205) 14.

210 ibid 18.

ibid

211 Art 1 defined as ‘refugee coming from Germany’ ‘any person who was settled in that country, who does not possess any nationality other than German nationality, and in respect of whom it is established in law or in fact he or she does not enjoy the protection of the Government of the Reich’ (ibid 27).

212 This covered ‘persons possessing or having possessed German nationality and not possessing any other nationality [as well as stateless persons not covered by previous conventions] who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the protection of the German Government’ (art 1(a)–(b)), but stipulated that ‘persons who leave Germany for reasons of purely personal convenience are not included in this definition’. (ibid 30).

213 18 UNTS 3. The Constitution was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 62 (I) of 15 December 1946.

214 IRO Constitution, Annex I, Part I, Section A(1)–(4).

215 ibid Section A(2).

ibid

216 ibid Section A(4).

ibid

217 In this respect, the 1951 Convention adopts a more restrictive definition than that provided in art 1(2) of the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

218 Namely, persons considered refugees prior to the war ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion’ (Annex I, Part I, Section A (1)(c)—as discussed above, the pre-war instruments had not in fact required a ‘convention ground’. Above and beyond definition as a ‘refugee’, the IRO Constitution also defined who from this category would become ‘the concern of the Organisation’ (ibid Section C (1)(a)(i))—here one ‘valid objection’ for a refugee not wishing to return was ‘persecution, or fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality or political opinions’).

219 Art 1(A)(1). See Grahl-Madsen (n 57) 108–46. The status of these persons, usually referred to as ‘statutory refugees’ would, however, be subject to application of the exclusion clauses in art 1F (UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) para 33).

220 These limited refugee status to those displaced ‘as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951’, and in Europe (UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) paras 7, 108).

221 At time of writing, Turkey retains the geographic limitation under art 1(B) of the 1951 Convention. Turkey provides non-European refugees with ‘temporary asylum seeker status’, leaving it up to UNHCR to find permanent solutions for these individuals (see <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html>). The practical consequences of this position remain significant (McKeever, D, ‘The Social Contract and Refugee Protection: A Comparative Study of Turkey and Germany in the 1990s’ in Bolesta, A (ed), Forced Migration and the Contemporary World: Challenges to the International System (Libra 2003) 146, 156–60Google Scholar.

222 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons – Memorandum by the Secretary General, 3 January 1950, UN Doc E/AC.32/2 (‘Secretary-General Memorandum’), comments on draft Article 1; Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Doc E/AC.32/SR.3 (1950) 9 (US); ECOSOC, UN ECOSOCOR, 11th Session, SR 406 (1950), para 55 (France); Plenipotentiaries 19 (n 137) 11 (France); ibid 15–16; see also 21st Meeting, UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR.21 (1951) (‘Plenipotentiaries 21’) 4 (Italy); Plenipotentiaries 19, 21–22 (US); ibid 25; see also Plenipotentiaries 21, 13 (Colombia and Venezuela); Plenipotentiaries 19, 13–14 (Sweden); Plenipotentiaries 21, 6 and Conference of Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR. 24 (1951) (‘Plenipotentiaries 24’) 18 (Yugoslavia).

223 Kingsley Nyinah (n 29) 296–8.

224 Attorney-General v Refugee Council of New Zealand, Inc. [2003] 2 NZLR 577 at paras 100, 111 per McGrath J. EXCOM conclusions have been frequently invoked in UK courts (Roma Rights Centre (n 42) at para 24); SSHD v K (n 7) at para 84.

225 Conclusion No, 12 (XXIX) (all reproduced in UNHCR, A Thematic Complication of Executive Committee Conclusions (6th edn, Division of International Protection Services 2011).

226 Conclusion No 17 (XXXI).

227 Conclusion No 100 (LV).

228 Conclusion No 82 (XLVIII).

229 Conclusion No 94 (LIII) (emphasis added).

230 Conclusions No 102 and 103 (LVI).

231 The Convention was ‘a compromise between competing interests … between the need to ensure humane treatment of the victims of oppression on the one hand and the wish of sovereign states to maintain control over those seeking entry to their territory on the other’ (Roma Rights Centre (n 42) at para 15, per Lord Bingham).

232 VCLT art 31(1) and (2).

233 See eg Attorney-General v Zaoui and Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security [2006] 1 NZLR 289 at paras 25–30.

234 ‘This Convention shall not apply’ (sub-paras (D), (E), (F)) or ‘shall cease to apply’ (sub-para (C)). The same phrasing was used in the Statue of UNHCR (see arts 6(A) on cessation and 7 on exclusion).

235 SSHD v K (n 7) at para 86, per Baroness Hale. Similarly, reference has been had to art 1 of the ICERD when interpreting ‘race’ for the purposes of art 1A(2) (Zimmermann and Mahler (n 43) 376).

236 R. v Special Adjudicator, ex parte Hoxha [2005] UKHL 19, at para 38, per Baroness Hale.

237 T v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] AC 742, at 786, per Lords Mustill, Slynn and Lloyd.

238 Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689, at 743.

239 H Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Bk II, ch 21 (‘On the Sharing of Punishments’) in Neff, S (ed), Hugo Grotius On the Law of War and Peace (CUP 2012) 294CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

240 An international relief agency, founded in 1943. It provided assistance in particular to displaced persons seeking to return home after the war. From 1947 its functions were transferred to a number of UN agencies including the IRO and the World Health Organization.

241 UNRAA, Resolution 71.

242 Annex I, Pt I, Section A and C, respectively.

243 IRO Constitution, Annex I, Pt I, Section C (1)(A)(i).

244 IRO Constitution, Annex I, Pt II.

245 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art 1(5).

246 See also, mutatis mutandis, art 5(1) ICESCR.

247 ECHR, art 17.

248 Grahl-Madsen (n 57) 283.

249 Kwakwa (n 49) 82.

250 Al-Sirri (n 22) para 12.

251 Kwakwa (n 49) 82 and 84; Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 605.

252 UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference (n 50) 13.

253 Aust (n 4) 244–7; Sinclair (n 140) 116.

254 There are other problems in placing too much emphasis on the travaux here. Much of the record relating to the 1951 Convention comprises minutes of meetings—ie not verbatim, but rather summary records (McAdam (n 25) 99–100). Art 1F(c) had initially been drafted by a working group of the Ad Hoc Committee, but no record of that group's deliberations had been kept, and the paragraph had not been discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee itself when the group's report had been adopted. (ECOSOC, Social Committee: Summary Record of the Hundred and Sixtieth Meeting, 2 August 1950, UN Doc E/AC.7/SR.160 (‘ECOSOC 160’) 17). Also, only 26 of the (145) States currently party to the 1951 Convention actually participated in the drafting process (Goodwin-Gill 2010 (n 6) 209).

255 Summarized in Einarsen (n 203) 49–68; also McAdam (n 25) 99–103.

256 Res 116 (VI)(D), 2 March 1948.

257 The memorandum referred to art 14 UDHR under draft art 3 (Admission), and the comments on that draft article reproduced the limitation to the right of asylum embodied in art 14(2) UDHR (Secretary-General Memorandum (n 222), draft art 3 and comment).

258 Constituted under ECOSOC Resolution 248 (IX) B of 8 August 1949.

259 This provided for exclusion of an individual who ‘has committed a crime specified in Article VI of the London Charter of the [IMT] or any other act contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ (Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, UN Docs E/1618 and E/AC.32/5 (1950) 13).

260 ECOSOC 160 (n 254) and ECOSOC Social Committee: Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, 22 August 1950, UN Doc E/AC.7/SR.166 (‘ECOSOC 166’).

261 ECOSOC 160 (n 254) 15.

262 ibid 19.

ibid

263 ibid 15, 18.

ibid

264 ibid 16.

ibid

265 ibid 15–16.

ibid

266 ibid 17.

ibid

267 ibid 20.

ibid

268 ECOSOC 166 (n 260) 6.

269 ibid 8.

ibid

270 ibid 9. ECOSOC adopted (by a vote of 7–0–8) a text providing that ‘no contracting State shall be obliged, under the provisions of this Convention, to grant refugee status to any person whom it has serious reasons to consider as falling under [art 14(2) UDHR]’ (ibid 11).

ibid

271 Plenipotentiaries 24 (n 222) 4–5.

272 ibid 5–6, 13.

ibid

273 Conference of Plenipotentiaries, UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR. 29 (1951) (‘Plenipotentiaries 29’) 11–12.

274 ibid 17.

ibid

275 Plenipotentiaries 24 (n 222) 18; Plenipotentiaries 29 (n 273) 16.

276 Plenipotentiaries 29 (n 273) 20.

277 ibid 27. At second reading, the text of art 1(F) was adopted by 18 votes to 1, with 1 abstention (A/CONF.2/SR. 34 (1951) 13).

ibid

278 Kwakwa (n 49) 91

279 UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 46.

280 Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 605. In fact, this interpretation would impose a particular mode of (criminal) responsibility—beyond simple commission—which cannot be read in to the text of the Convention.

281 Hathaway based his model on the International Bill of Rights, distinguishing between a) non-derogable rights (freedom from torture, slavery etc), b) rights which are derogable in certain circumstances only (freedom from arrest and detention, right to privacy and family life), c) rights in respect of which States are to take steps towards progressive realization (primarily economic, social and cultural rights), and d) those rights listed in UDHR but not included in either of the 1966 Covenants. Whether a violation of a given right would amount to ‘persecution’ under art 1A(2) would depend on its categorization and the circumstances of its violation (discriminatory, etc) (Hathaway (n 94) 108–12).

282 EU Qualification Directive (n 43), art 9(1)(b); UNHCR RSD Handbook (n 25) para 53.

283 In Pushpanathan, the Court held that the purpose of art 1F(c) was to exclude ‘those individuals responsible for serious, sustained or systemic violations of fundamental human rights which amount to persecution in a non-war setting’ (Pushpanathan (n 56) at para 64—emphasis added). On this point, the Court was unanimous; see para 126 for the concurring view of Cory and Major JJ. cf UNHCR 2009 Statement on ECJ Reference (n 50) 27.

284 Zimmermann and Wennholz (n 29) 609). With respect, those authors do not fully apply this logic in their interpretation of art 1F(c) (609–10).

285 Pushpanathan (n 56) at para 63, also at para 74.

286 The purpose of art 1F(c) is: ‘to exclude those individuals responsible for serious, sustained or systematic violations of fundamental human rights which amount to persecution in a non-war setting’ (Pushpanathan (n 56) at para 64—emphasis added), and the Court repeatedly emphasized the need to determine whether the conduct amounted to persecution (ibid, at paras 65, 70, 71, 74, 75).

287 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (n 29) 188, 190.

288 ECOSOC 166 (n 260) 9; Kingsley Nyinah (n 29) 296–7.

289 A detailed consideration of the type of conduct which could fall within (c), so interpreted, is beyond the scope of this paper. The examples given here are illustrative only.

290 Grahl-Madsen suggested that denial of the right to vote could trigger exclusion under art 1F(c) – see section IV.C above.

291 Hathaway (n 94) 109–10.

292 UNHCR has stated, without explanation, that art 1F(c) should not be applied in respect of smuggling or trafficking of migrants (UNHCR Exclusion Background Note (n 34) para 48).

293 ICC Statute, art 8(2)(B)(xvi) for international armed conflict, and art 8(2)(E)(vii) for non-international armed conflicts. These provisions also characterize as a war crime the use of such persons to actively participate in hostilities.

294 The fluid nature of many conflicts, particularly non-international (as defined in art 8(2)(D) ICC Statute), may make it difficult for the decision-maker to determine whether that element of the actus reus for ‘war crimes’ under art 1F(a) was satisfied at the material time.

295 In respect of actual participation in hostilities, the CRC obligation is even softer: ‘States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities’ (art 38(2)).

296 McKeever 2010 (n 27) 116–17.

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