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Implementation of the Canadian Contingency Plan for a Case of Suspected Viral Hemorrhagic Fever

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2015

Mark Loeb*
Affiliation:
Hamilton Regional Laboratory Program and the Departments of Pathology and Molecular Medicine and Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Douglas MacPherson
Affiliation:
Office for Public Health Security, Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Health Canada, Ottawa, and the Faculty of Health Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Michele Barton
Affiliation:
Hamilton Health Sciences, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
Jan Olde
Affiliation:
Hamilton Health Sciences, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
*
Henderson General Hospital, Hamilton, Ontario, CanadaL8V 1C3

Abstract

Objective:

To describe the implementation of the Canadian contingency plan for viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) in response to a suspected case.

Setting:

A 300-bed, tertiary-care, university-affiliated hospital.

Participants:

A 32-year-old Congolese woman admitted to the hospital with suspected VHF in February 2001. Contact evaluation included hospital healthcare workers and laboratory staff.

Intervention:

Enhanced isolation precautions were implemented in the patient care setting to prevent nosocomial transmission. Contact tracing and evaluation of close and high-risk contacts with symptoms was conducted. Laboratory precautions included barrier precautions and diversion of specimens. Communication occurred to both hospital employees and the media.

Results:

Three high-risk contacts, 13 close contacts, and 60 casual contacts were identified. Two close contacts became symptomatic and required evaluation. Challenging process issues included tracing of laboratory specimens, decontamination of laboratory equipment, and internal and external communication. After 5 days, a transmissible VHF of public health consequence was ruled out in the index case.

Conclusion:

Contingency plans for VHF can be implemented in an efficient and feasible manner. Contact tracing, laboratory issues, internal communication, and media interest can be anticipated to be the key challenges.

Type
Original Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America 2003

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