Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-m8qmq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T02:06:35.923Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

What is a Stereotype? What is Stereotyping?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Abstract

If someone says, “Asians are good at math” or “women are empathetic,” I might interject, “you're stereotyping” in order to convey my disapproval of their utterance. But why is stereotyping wrong? Before we can answer this question, we must better understand what stereotypes are and what stereotyping is. In this essay, I develop what I call the descriptive view of stereotypes and stereotyping. This view is assumed in much of the psychological and philosophical literature on implicit bias and stereotyping, yet it has not been sufficiently defended. The main objection to the descriptive view is that it fails to include the common‐sense idea that stereotyping is always objectionable. I argue that this is actually a benefit of the view. In the essay's final part, I put forward two hypotheses that would validate the claim that stereotyping is always morally or epistemically wrong. If these hypotheses are false—which is very likely—we have little reason to build moral or epistemic defect into the very idea of a stereotype. Moreover, we must abandon the seemingly attractive claim that judging individuals based on group membership is intrinsically wrong.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by Hypatia, Inc.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Allport, Gordon. 1935. Attitudes. In Handbook of social psychology, ed. Murchison, C. Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press.Google Scholar
Allport, Gordon. 1954/1972. The nature of prejudice. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2010. The imperative of integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blum, Lawrence. 2004. Stereotypes and stereotyping: A moral analysis. Philosophical Papers 33 (3): 251–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, Rupert. 2010. Prejudice: Its social psychology. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.Google Scholar
Choudhry, Sujit. 2000. Distribution vs. recognition: The case of anti–discrimination law. George Mason Law Review 9 (1): 145–78.Google Scholar
Cohen, Ariel. 1999. Think generic: The meaning and use of generic sentences. Stanford: Stanford University Center for the Study of Language and Information.Google Scholar
Devine, Patricia. 1989. Stereotypes and prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56 (1): 518.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellison, Ralph. 1952/1995. Invisible man. New York: Vintage International.Google Scholar
Fiske, Susan, and Taylor, Shelley. 1991. Social cognition, 2nd edition. New York: McGraw Hill Inc.Google Scholar
Fodor, Jerry. 2010. LOT 2: The Language of thought revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gendler, Tamar. 2008. Alief in action and reaction. Mind and Language 23 (5): 552–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haslanger, Sally. 2012. Resisting reality: Social construction and social critique. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leslie, Sarah‐Jane. 2007. Generics and the structure of the mind. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 375403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leslie, Sarah‐Jane. Forthcoming. Real men: polysemy or implicature? Analytic Philosophy, Special Issue on Slurs.Google Scholar
Lippman, Walter. 1922. Public opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company.Google Scholar
Kundra, Ziva, and Sinclair, Lisa. 1999. Motivated reasoning with stereotypes: Activation, application, and inhibition. Psychological Inquiry 10 (1): 1222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Madva, Alex. Forthcoming. Virtue, social knowledge, and implicit bias. In Implicit bias and philosophy, ed. Saul, Jennifer and Brownstein, Michael. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Mandelbaum, Eric. Unpublished ms. Attitude, inference, and association: On the propositional structure of implicit bias. http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~mandelbaum/ (accessed April 20, 2015).Google Scholar
Moreau, Sophie. 2004. The wrongs of unequal treatment. University of Toronto Law Journal 54 (3): 291326.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pelletier, Jeffrey, and Asher, Nicholas. 1997. Generics and defaults. In Handbook of logic and language, ed. van Benthem, J. and Ter Meulen, A. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 288. 1989.Google Scholar
Rosch, Eleanor. 1978. Principles of categorization. In Cognition and categorization, ed. Rosch, Eleanor and Lloyd, Barbara. Hillside, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2010. Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4): 531–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shakur, Assata. 1987. Assata: An autobiography. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books and Zed Books.Google Scholar
Smith, Edward E., and Medin, Douglas L. 1981. Categories and concepts. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Eliot, and DeCoster, Jamie. 2000. Dual process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4 (2): 108–31.Google Scholar
Smith, Eliot, and Zarate, M. A. 1990. Exemplar and prototype use in social categorization. Social Cognition 8 (3): 243–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, Michael. 2004. Apprehending human form. In Modern Moral Philosophy: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, ed. O'Hear, Anthony. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Valian, Virginia. 1998. Why so slow: The advancement of women. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Weitz, Rose, and Gordon, Leonard. 1993. Images of black women among Anglo college students. Sex Roles 28 (1–2): 1934.CrossRefGoogle Scholar