¹ I want to express my sincere gratitude to Terrence Tilley for the guidance, patience, and theological wisdom he extended to me through all drafts of this paper.

² For examples of scholarship focusing primarily on Dupuis' religious pluralism see the following: Cavadini, John, “Two Recent Christian Theologies of Religious Pluralism,” Horizons 31 (Spring 2004): 187–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar; In Many and Diverse Ways, ed. Kendall, Daniel and O'Collins, Gerald (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2003)Google Scholar; Hall, Gerard, “Jacques Dupuis’ Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism,” Pacifica 15 (Fall 2002): 37–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heller, Christian, “Auf dem Weg zu einer christlichen Theologie des religiösen Pluralismus: die religionstheologischen Positionen Jacques Dupuis' und John Hicks im Vergleich,” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 125:2–3 (2003): 167–85Google Scholar; O'Collins, Gerald, “Jacques Dupuis's Contributions to Interreligious Dialogue,” Theological Studies 64:2 (2003): 388–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yong, Amos, “The Turn to Pneumatology in Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism: Conduit or Detour?” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 35 (1998): 437–54.Google Scholar

³ Dupuis, Jacques, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997), 388.Google Scholar

⁴ Macquarrie, John, “Pluralism in Christology,” in Radical Pluralism and Truth, ed. Jeanrond, Werner and Rike, Jennifer (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 183.Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., 178.

⁶ Ibid., 186.

⁷ I use the language of salvific “practice” here to point out humanity's active investment and involvement in salvation. This idea is meant to be distinct from a Pelagian doctrine of free will and salvation. In a classic text on early Christian doctrines, J.N.D. Kelly summarizes the claims of Pelagianism: it has an “excessively rosy view of human nature and [an] insufficient acknowledgement of man's dependence on God” (Early Christian Doctrines [New York: Harper Collins, 1976], 357). Dupuis does indeed have a very rich understanding of humanity's significance in the salvation schema. However, humanity's significance in the process of salvation must be understood always and only in relation to divine significance in that schema. I label humanity's role in salvation as a “practice” in order to restrict the sense that humanity's role in bringing about salvation is an ontological one, but at the same time upholds that humanity's practice is an utterly graced one.

⁸ This proposal for a theological approach is indebted to and inspired by the work of Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and David Tracy. Fiorenza's work, in particular, provides the basis for my own model. Drawing significantly on the political philosophy of John Rawls, he proposes a model for reconstructive hermeneutics termed a “broad reflective equilibrium”: “[This] method presupposes a diversity of judgments, principles, and theories, each entailing different kinds of justification that come together to support or criticize, to reinforce or revise” (Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church [New York: Crossword, 1984], 301). The broad reflective equilibrium model is invaluable because it outlines with precision the various resources that we draw upon when we interpret any text or material. Most significantly for my own thinking, Fiorenza points out that we employ “background theories” and “retroductive warrants” in the interpretative task. These will be discussed in greater detail (in notes) in the following pages.

⁹ Henceforth, for the sake of brevity, I will refer to “symbols” as shorthand for Christian symbols, narratives, and doctrines.

¹⁰ Philosophically, I am invoking a claim of Emanuel Levinas' here. Levinas writes that for Western philosophy, “knowledge is esteemed as the very business of the human where nothing remains absolutely other” (Basic Philosophical Writings [Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996], 153). He resists the idea that all knowing must be a total assimilation of difference to ourselves. Although I propose a correlational method for theology, I believe it is imperative that we leave open the possibility that our present experiences (including the symbolic order and fixed concepts that underlie them) indeed can be disturbed and disrupted by difference (ibid., 71), in this case by the difference of past traditional symbols, narratives, and doctrines. Levinas explains that it is our tendency to know by inviting objects into our “horizon of knowledge” only on the condition that these objects eventually “renounce” their difference (ibid., 12). I want to suggest that we can invite Christian symbols, narratives, and doctrines into our horizon of knowledge/experience while allowing them to maintain their integrity as different and perhaps disruptive.

¹¹ Fiorenza states that we are in a situation of philosophical, religious, and theological pluralism. There is no single “given” basis or common presupposition from which to proceed. As other religions “increasingly make their imprint on Christian theology,” our theological presuppositions cannot hold the same status and authority they once did. Furthermore, “No single philosophy or philosophical view exists [as a] standard or cultural medium for theological reflection” (“Systematic Theology: Task and Methods” in Systematic Theology, ed. Fiorenza, Francis Schüssler and Galvin, John P., 2 vols. [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1991]: 67Google Scholar).

¹² These can be identified, in Fiorenza's broad reflective equilibrium, as background theories, those with which we interpret data. He points out that we look for a “coherence” between our theories and data, and sometimes we must revise our theories in order to attain that coherence (Foundational Theology, 310).

¹³ David Tracy notes that “We need interpretations that risk envisioning a Christian future” (“Theological Method,” in Christian Theology: An Introduction to its Traditions and Tasks, ed. Hodgson, Peter and King, Robert [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985], 35Google Scholar).

¹⁴ Fiorenza terms this a “retroductive warrant.” Drawing on the work of the American philosopher Charles Peirce, he discusses retroductive warrants as the criteria by which we make decisions which cannot be attributed to either inductive or deductive reasoning; “a theory is more warranted to the degree that it can guide praxis.” Our retroductive warrants, then, take into consideration not only logical criteria but also practical criteria of how particular decisions will “structure praxis and guide forms of life” (Foundational Theology, 307). Although Tracy does not discuss this in exactly the same way as Fiorenza does, he does suggest that theologians must pay attention to the “history of effects” of various theologies (“Theological Method,” 48). “History of effects” is an idea Tracy draws from Hans-Georg Gadamer (see Hans-Georg Gadamer, , Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., trans. rev. Weinsheimer, Joel and Marshall, Donald G. [New York: Crossroad, 1988], 267–74Google Scholar). Tracy employs this concept to point out how one's history and context shapes one's reading of texts (The Analogical Method: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism [New York: Crossroad, 1987], 103). Applying this idea to theological method, Tracy would agree that we ought to consider the “history of effects” that our theologies will have (that is, how history and context will continually influence the interpretation of theology) and grant that consideration some influence in our theological moves.

¹⁵ Pierre Bourdieu develops the concept of a “space of possibilities” in order to evaluate the process of production of cultural works (art, music, literature). Bourdieu's theory rejects an overly deterministic model (i.e., the theology I construct is solely the result of my context) of cultural production and at the same time rejects a romantic one (i.e., I construct theology independently of my context). He points out that while we necessarily work within a particular horizon of possibilities that constrains what we write or produce (i.e., we are deeply embedded in contexts that will shape our productions), we are able to bring about genuinely new creations that cannot be reduced to the explanation that they are the result of our context. See Bourdieu, Pierre, “Principles for a Sociology of Cultural Works,” in The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, ed. Randall, John, trans. Verlie, Claud Du (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Dupuis, Jacques, Who Do You Say I Am? (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1994), 75.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., 65. While it is outside the scope of this essay to offer justification or warrant here, I wish at least to acknowledge the supercessionist tinge that this view has. The view that Christ is prefigured in the Hebrew Scriptures is perhaps the result of Dupuis' confessional biases.

¹⁸ Ibid., 21.

¹⁹ Ibid., 107.

²⁰ Ibid., 168.

²¹ The larger assumption grounding my claim here is that theology is first and foremost an endeavor oriented toward communication rather than representation. On this point, I have been influenced by Terrence Tilley. Tilley argues that an assumption that “language essentially functions to signify what we mean” is confused. Rather, he states, “language fundamentally is a communication medium.” To communicate effectively, one must consider the audience being addressed and “[their] ability to understand what is communicated.” This view presupposes that because theologians seek to communicate theological ideas effectively, those theological ideas will be shaped, at least in part, according to the context of the audience (Tilley, Terrence, Religious Diversity and the American Experience: A Theological Approach [New York: Continuum, 2007], 32–34Google Scholar).

²² This is not to suggest that we assimilate all theological concepts to the philosophy of the day, but rather is to point out that our theological concepts are always a part of our larger conceptual frameworks.

²³ Dupuis, , Who Do You Say I Am?, 81.Google Scholar

²⁴ Dupuis gives the example of the various ways in which St. Cyprian's third-century dictum extra ecclesiam nulla salus (“outside of the Church there is no salvation”) has been employed for rather questionable purposes (Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 127). See n. 14 for discussion of “history of effects.”

²⁵ Phan, Peter, “Jacques Dupuis and Asian Theologies of Religious Pluralism” in In Many and Diverse Ways, 73.Google Scholar

²⁶ Terrence Merrigan, “Jacques Dupuis and the Redefinition of Inclusivism,” in ibid., 63.

²⁷ Luigi Sartori, “‘Subsistit in’: Criterion of ‘Truth and History’ in Interreligious Dialogue” in ibid., 96–7. Just as Karl Rahner is said to have the non-believer always in mind when he wrote his theology, one could say that Jacques Dupuis always kept the global and plenary subject in mind when he wrote his theology.

²⁸ Claude Geffré, “From the Theology of Religious Pluralism to an Interreligious Theology” in ibid., 48.

²⁹ I refer to these assertions as a group, yet I am excluding the first point from that group. As I want to make clear in my discussion of it, the first point is in fact foundational for the other five and cannot be evaluated in the same terms as the others. In points two through six I will point to the aspect of humanity and draw out the implicit background theories.

³⁰ Dupuis, , Who Do You Say I Am?, 41.Google Scholar

³¹ Ibid., 141.

³² Ibid., 96.

³³ Dupuis, Jacques, “Trinitarian Christology as a Model for Theology of Religious Pluralism” in The Myriad Christ, ed. Merrigan, Terrence and Haers, Jacques (Sterling, VA: Leuven University Press, 2000), 90.Google Scholar

³⁴ Dupuis, Jacques, “Universality of the Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ” in The Convergence of Theology, ed. Kendall, Daniel and Davis, Stephen T. (New York: Paulist, 2001), 322Google Scholar; Dupuis, , “Trinitarian Christology as a Model for Theology of Religious Pluralism,” 89.Google Scholar

³⁵ Dupuis, , Who Do You Say I Am?, 107.Google Scholar

³⁶ Dupuis, , “Trinitarian Christology as a Model for Theology of Religious Pluralism,” 93.Google Scholar

³⁷ Dupuis, , Who Do You Say I Am?, 42.Google Scholar

³⁸ Ibid., 43.

³⁹ Ibid., 49.

⁴⁰ Dupuis, , “Trinitarian Christology as a Model for Theology of Religious Pluralism,” 96.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Dupuis, , Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 270.Google Scholar

⁴² Dupuis, , Who Do You Say I Am?, 56.Google Scholar

⁴³ Dupuis poses the question sharply: “Is it possible to make the salvation of all depend on the particular, historical Jesus of Nazareth, about whom often they [non-Christian people] have not heard or whom otherwise they have not been in a position to recognize? More radically, what authority as a ‘norm of faith’ does the New Testament witness still retain, once it is confronted with our present experience of dialogue?” (Dupuis, , Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 191Google Scholar).

⁴⁴ Ibid., 305.

⁴⁵ Dupuis, , “Universality of the Word and the Particularity of Jesus Christ,” 323.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Tilley, Terrence, “Christian Orthodoxy and Religious Pluralism,” Modern Theology 22 (2006): 56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁷ Ibid., 60.

⁴⁸ Dupuis, , “Universality of the Word and the Particularity of Jesus Christ,” 327.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Again it should be emphasized that the role humanity plays in bringing about God's kingdom or salvation is functional insofar as it is a practice and is ontological insofar as it is graced by the very incarnation of the Word.

⁵⁰ Dupuis, , Who Do You Say I Am?, 141.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Dupuis, , “Universality of the World and the Particularity of Jesus Christ,” 332.Google Scholar

⁵³ Dupuis argues that the Word made flesh should be thought of in terms of quality and not quantity. Any revelation in history is necessarily relativized and inabsolute, precisely because it comes in history, happening in a particular time and place. Manifestation in human form must be, by definition, limited manifestation (Dupuis, , Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 252Google Scholar).

⁵⁴ Who Do You Say I Am?, 116.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 114.

⁵⁶ Geffré, 49.

⁵⁷ Merrigan, 61.

⁵⁸ Dulles, Avery Cardinal, “World Religions and New Millennium: A Catholic Perspective” in In Many and Diverse Ways, 12.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Merrigan, 67.

⁶⁰ Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Notification on the book “Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism” by Fr. Jacques Dupuis, S.J., (24 January 2001), preface, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20010124_dupuis_en.html.Google Scholar

⁶¹ König, Franz Cardinal, “Let the Spirit Breath” in In Many and Diverse Ways, 14–17.Google Scholar

⁶² Peter Phan, Review of Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism by Dupuis, Jacques S.J., Dialogue & Alliance 14 (Spring-Summer 2000): 122.Google Scholar

⁶³ Terrence Nichols, Review of Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, by Dupuis, Jacques S.J., Cross Currents 49 (1999): 411.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Notification, II.3.

⁶⁵ Notification, V.8.

⁶⁶ George Lindbeck, Review of Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism by Dupuis, Jacques S.J., International Bulletin of Missionary Research 22 (1998): 34.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ O'Collins, Gerald, “Jacques Dupuis: His Person and His Work” in In Many and Diverse Ways, 24.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Sartori, 86.

⁶⁹ Haight, Roger, “Jesus Christ and Religious Pluralism” in Thinking of Christ, ed. Wiley, Tatha (New York: Continuum, 2003), 94.Google Scholar