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Pressure Groups, Tory Businessmen and the Aura of Political Corruption Before the First World War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Frans Coetzee
Affiliation:
Lake Forest College, Illinois

Extract

When Gladstone's Liberal government passed the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act in 1883, its supporters hoped that the future conduct of politics would be purer and more equitable. Not only would the grosser forms of corruption (such as bribery or intimidation) now be punished more severely, but the advantages previously enjoyed by wealthier candidates would now be minimized because the new law imposed strict limits on campaign spending which applied equally to all candidates for a particular constituency. But these noble goals, it soon appeared, were little closer to realization because the law contained a crucial loophole by failing to constrain the expenditure of the numerous pressure groups active in British politics. Because of this loophole, electoral corruption might continue to flourish, even if the perpetrator would no longer be the candidate's agent, but rather the pressure group treasurer. This view that the intent (if not the letter) of the law was being subverted was a common theme of Edwardian political journalism. As the Westminster Gazette observed, ‘when a by-election takes place each candidate has the assistance of a cloud of outside organizations which spend on the election a large sum of money which is not included in the official election expenses… clearly the result is to drive a coach-and-six through the Corrupt Practices Act.’ On the floor of the House of Commons similar arguments were aired. One Liberal MP contended that the statute ‘had been of great service in securing more honest representation than before, but no one who had followed political events closely could fail to see that its whole purpose was avoided, and that its terms were entirely circumvented, by the action which political organizations took on behalf of a candidate, which he was wholly unable to do for himself.’ Such assertions remained unsubstantiated, however, because infringements by pressure groups were rarely subjected to legal review in the election courts, being considered too difficult to define and expensive to prove.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

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References

1 Westminster Gazette, 20 Feb. 1908. On the Act itself see O'Leary, Cornelius, The elimination of corrupt practices in British elections, 1868–1911 (Oxford, 1962), pp. 159–78Google Scholar, Jelf, Ernest A., The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Acts, 1883 and 1895 (3rd edn, London, 1905)Google Scholar; Gwyn, W. B., Democracy and the cost of politics in Britain (London, 1962)Google Scholar.

2 Buckmaster, S. in Hansard, 4th series, CLXXXIV, 19 02 1908Google Scholar, col. 917.

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5 Cited in Taylor, H. A., Jix, Viscount Brentford (London, 1933), p. 89Google Scholar.

6 Conservative Agents' Journal (Oct. 1910), p. 105. The article was signed ‘M.N.S.’

7 Lawrence to A. J. Balfour, 13 June 1908, Balfour MSS, British Library, 49791, fos. 246–9.

8 Given the confines of space, I have chosen to omit consideration of the other organizations. There are additional reasons for doing so: the Budget Protest was linked to a temporary issue, the National Service League articulated an issue too explosive to be used as a touchstone of Unionist commitment, and the Union Defence League was virtually indistinguishable from the party itself. A critical reader might query the inclusion of the Navy Leaque, which continually claimed to ‘be absolutely distinct from partisan politics.’ From its inception, however, the leaque was overwhelmingly Unionist. This orientation, in addition to the inferences about its support from business and industry, suggests that its experience is highly relevant to the questions raised in this article.

9 Navy League executive committee minutes, Sea Cadet Association, 11 Dec. 1894.

10 Navy League minutes, 4, 28 Feb. 1895.

11 Navy League annual report (1896). Unless otherwise indicated, figures are drawn from the Navy League's annual reports for the corresponding years.

12 Other sources of income included advertisements in the monthly journal, occasional donations, and the sale of league buttons, badges, and maps.

13 SirHill, J. G., ‘An ideal sea training home’, in Burgoyne, Alan (ed.), The Navy League Annual, 1907–08 (1907), p. 181Google Scholar.

14 Navy League Journal (Sept. 1904).

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16 The Times, 18 Oct. 1904; The Navy (Apr. 1914).

17 The Navy (Aug. 1909), p. 229.

18 Ibid. (Mar. 1914); Hannon to R. Yerburgh (copy), 21 November 1916, Hannon MSS, House of Lords Record Office, 2/3.

19 The Nation, 17 Jan. 1914.

20 Ibid. 24 Jan. 1914. One might argue that any such contacts would not have crept into the written record. Yet the executive committee minutes were quite candid in regard to the league's financial problems and its occasional questionable electoral practices (such as the dispatch of hecklers to disrupt one of Charles Masterman's political meetings). The Navy League contacted various firms to determine shipbuilding capacity, but there is no evidence to suggest that these contacts subsequently sustained campaigns directed by the firms themselves. On this subject see also Marder, Arthur, The anatomy of British sea power (New York, 1940), p. 54Google Scholar; Trebilcock, Clive, ‘Legends of the British armaments industry, 1890–1914: a revision’, Journal of Contemporary History, V (1970), 319CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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22 The Times, 26 Nov. 1910; Weardale to Ridley, 30 Nov. 1910, Blagdon MSS, Northumberland Record Office, ZRI 25/99.

23 J. W. Carter to Lord Robert Cecil, 5 Mar. 1908. Cecil MSS, British Library, 51158, fos. 177–81.

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26 Blagdon MSS, ZRI 25/99. The occupational distribution of this list suggests a sociology of the tariff reform movement similar to that described in Sykes, Alan, Tariff reform in British politics, 1903–1913 (Oxford, 1979)Google Scholar and Marrison, A. J., Businessmen, industries and tariff reform in Great Britain, 1903–1930’, Business History, XXV (1983), 148–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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28 A list in the Monthly Notes on Tariff Reform (Nov. 1911) reveals that a mere two per cent of the donors were responsible for 52 per cent of league income in that year. Similarly, the six most generous subscribers to the Northern Tariff Reform Federation (of a total of 146 subscribers) provided half that organization's revenue. Blagdon MSS, ZRI 25/99.

29 Rempel, Richard, Unionist divided: Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain and the Unionist Free Traders (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 68Google Scholar.

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34 Ridley to Bonar Law, 27 Dec. 1910, Bonar Law MSS, House of Lords Record Office, 18/6/150. Ridley had also dispatched two agents on a private two-month foray to raise further contributions. Ridley to Maxse, 9 Dec. 1910, Maxse MSS, West Sussex Record Office, 462/781.

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36 T. W. A. Bagley to Bonar Law, 12 June 1912, Bonar Law MSS, 26/4/19.

37 Ridley to A. Chamberlain, 21 Jan. 1913, Austen Chamberlain MSS, Birmingham University Library, AC 9/5/73. A similar general pattern was characteristic of the Tariff Commission, an unofficial body convened by Joseph Chamberlain to diagnose the ills of British industry and recommend the appropriate protectionist cure. Its income dwindled from an initial peak of £10,364 in 1904 to £7,694 in 1908, and to barely £3,000 in 1912. Already by 1909 the Commission's treasurer was warning that ‘the interest of old supporters seems to be flagging somewhat.… our resources will be at an end shortly, if I cannot obtained further support’. W. Burbridge to J. Dennis, 25 Nov. 1909, Tariff Commission papers, TC 6/1/3.

38 The Times, 25 Nov. 1910. Weardale was president of the National Reform Union.

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40 Bagley to Ridley, 23 Nov. 1910, Blagdon MSS, ZRI 25/99.

41 Bagley to Ridley, 26 Nov. 1910, Blagdon MSS, ZRI 25/99.

42 Weardale to Ridley, 30 Nov. 1910, Blagdon MSS, ZRI 25/99.

43 Monthly Notes on Tariff Reform (Nov. 1911); Bagley to Bonar Law, 9 Oct. 1911, Bonar Law MSS, 18/7/196. The differences hardly seem that substantial, which may indicate the growing desperation of the tariff reformers.

44 Monthly Notes (Nov. 1911).

45 Ibid. (Dec. 1905, Dec. 1906).

46 Ibid. (June 1905, Sept. 1907). Unpaid subscriptions were a persistent problem; in Sussex, for example, nearly half the amount pledged in 1907 to the Sussex County Tariff Reform, Association went unpaid. Monthly Notes (May 1907); circular by Lord Leconfield of 6 Mar. 1905, Petworth Archives, West Sussex Record Office, 5476.

47 Aitken to Edward Goulding (copy), 21 Nov. 1910, Beaverbrook MSS, House of Lords Record Office, BBK C/317.

48 A. Stringer to Aitken, 5 Jan. 1912, Beaverbrook MSS, BBK B/76.

49 Stringer to Aitken, 25 Apr., 2 May 1912, Beaverbrook MS, BBK B/76.

50 Sandars to Balfour, 22 Jan. 1907, Balfour MSS, 49765, fos. 11–16.

51 George Wyndham to J. Chamberlain, 31 July 1912, Joseph Chamberlain MSS, Birmingham University Library, JC 22/152; circular of 10 Sept. 1912, Lord Robert Cecil MSS, 51160, ff. 177–86.

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58 Lowther to Blumenfeld, 7 Sept. 1907, Ralph Blumenfeld MSS, House of Lords Record Office, LOWT, I.

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63 Steel-Maitland MSS, Scottish Record Office, GD 193/108/3. This document was also cited by Young, K. in his Local politics and the rise of party (Leicester, 1975), p. 110Google Scholar, to question Brown's account.

64 Unionist Organization Committee, Index of proceedings to 31 March 1911, reference to p. 5. Walter Long MSS, WRO 947/450/12. Only the index, as well as the interim and final reports, appear to have survived.

65 The Times, 25 Oct. 1909; The Anti-Socialist (Nov. 1909).

66 The Times, 26, 27 Oct. 1909.

67 Ibid. 19 Nov. 1909. The Union, which previously had set a minimum of one shilling for donations, was now willing to accept contributions as low as 3d.

68 Ibid. 2 Mar. 1910.

69 Liberty (May 1910).

70 Ibid. (Mar. 1911). The Union's council, as listed in the Anti-Socialist Union Speakers' Handbook (1911), contained fewer businessmen than is commonly assumed. Those of note included Sir Thomas Wrightson, Sir John Bingham, and the young Stanley Baldwin.

71 Liberty (Aug. 1910).

72 For a typical complaint that the ‘horde of Tariff Reform canvassers did their work – and very dirty work too’, see L. Erskine to Herbert Gladstone, 17 Nov. 1904, Herbert Gladstone MSS, British Library, 46062, fos 39–40.

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80 Undated memorandum, Steel-Maitland MSS, GD 193/108/3.

81 Ramsden, John, The age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902–1940 (London, 1978), pp. 68–9Google Scholar; Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael, British political finance, 1830–1980 (Washington, 1981), pp. 3158Google Scholar

82 See Murray, Bruce K., The people's Budget, 1909/10 (Oxford, 1980)Google Scholar. Two valuable studies of businessmen and politics are Searle, G. R., ‘The Edwardian Liberal Party and business’,English Historical Review, XCVIII (1983), 2860CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Turner, John ed., Businessmen and politics: studies of business activity in British politics, 1900–1945 (London, 1984)Google Scholar.

83 I should like to thank Drs P. F. Clarke, G. R. Searle, and M. Shevin Coetzee for their comments upon an earlier draft of this article, and the Fulbright Commission for their financial support.