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BETWEEN THE CATALAN QUAGMIRE AND THE RED SPECTRE, SPAIN, NOVEMBER 1918 – APRIL 1919*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2017
Abstract
Drawing upon a vast array of primary sources, this article focuses on a key period of modern Spanish history: November 1918 – April 1919. In the aftermath of the First World War and spurred on by the Allied victory, demands by Catalonia's political elites for greater autonomy seized the country's agenda. However, the political tussle between the centre and the Catalan elites ended a few months later with their mutual defeat. The upsurge of labour agitation and the hopes of the proletariat generated by the Bolshevik Revolution combined with bourgeois fear resulted in the question of national identity being superseded by bitter class conflict. This article conveys the thesis that these crucial months crystallized the organic crisis of the ruling liberal regime. Indeed, the outcome of these events proved its fragile foundations, dashed hopes for a reformist and negotiated solution, and constituted a dress rehearsal for the military coup of 1923, a clear example of the reactionary backlash which swept across Europe in the interwar years.
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Footnotes
*
I am grateful to a British Academy Grant which permitted the necessary archival work in Spain. I am indebted to the kindness of the staff at the Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid, Fundación Antonio Maura, Real Academia de la Historia, Archivo General del Palacio Real, and Archivo Histórico Nacional. I would also like to thank Angel Smith, Pablo La Porte, Javier Moreno Luzón, and Marc Comadran for their suggestions to this draft.
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46 Ironically, he would sign the Catalan statute of autonomy as president of the Second Republic in 1932.
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74 A fantastic amount given the fact that the annual income for a working-class household was below 1,000 pesetas.
75 Mar. 1919, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Amaro del Rosal's papers: minutes of the UGT's executive in 1919.
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82 Violence was confined to the killing of the collector Baró, the shooting of a textile foreman following an earlier vendetta, and one bomb in the central Calle de Córcega on 10 Mar. Catalan employers’ mail to king, Mar.–Apr. 1919, AGPR, 15,601/6; and to Maura, 29 Apr. 1919, AAM, 221/4.
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87 Romanones, Notas, p. 434.
88 El Sol, 25 Mar. 1919.
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90 Portillo's spy activities are in ACR, 16/25; and report by the British consul at Barcelona, 5 July 1918, FO 371–3,375/118,036. For his gang, see Mazo, Manuel Burgos y, El verano de 1919 en Gobernación (Cuenca, 1921), pp. 460–2Google Scholar; González Calleja, El Máuser, p. 146; Pradas, L'anarquisme, pp. 44–7.
91 González Calleja and Rey, La defensa, pp. 74–96.
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93 For the Somatén during the strike, see its mouthpiece Paz y Tregua, 3–4, Mar.–Apr. 1919. The establishment of the Somatén in various cities is in AHN, 59A/9.
94 AHN, 57A/4, military bulletins (2–10 Apr. 1919); 1 Apr. 1919, AFTN, Actas, vol. 13, pp. 268–71.
95 There were 450 delegates representing 699,369 members and 56,642 from non-affiliated unions. CNT, Memoria del Congreso celebrado en el Teatro de la Comedia de Madrid, los días 10 al 18 de Diciembre de 1919 (Toulouse, 1948)Google Scholar.
96 Pabón, Cambó, p. 921. Cambó lobbied for the appointment of General Severiano Martínez Anido as civil governor of Barcelona one year later through Piedad Iturbe, a very close friend of the then Prime Minister Dato. Anido presided over a period of veritable manhunt of labour activists. Iturbe, Piedad, Erase una vez (Madrid, 1954), pp. 263–4Google Scholar.
97 Employers’ hostility to the ‘partiality’ of the government is in AFTN, Memoria, pp. 22–4, 34–6.
98 Milans's own exculpatory version is in 18 Apr. 1919, AAM, 263/16. La Correspondencia Militar, 17 Apr. 1919, called the accusation that the army had expelled the civil governor of Barcelona slanderous. Yet, evidence to the contrary was overwhelming: interview with former chief of police of Barcelona Doval in El Sol, 1 Aug. 1919; Romanones, Notas, pp. 436–45; Count Figols to Maura, 15 Apr. 1919, AAM, 219/16; British ambassador's confidential dispatches, 15–16 Apr. 1919, FO 371/4,120/62,519 and 62,523. See also various documents in AED, vol. 83: Milans's first letter of resignation due to discrepancies with the government's conciliatory line, 19 Mar. 1919; declaration of martial law, 25 Mar. 1919; Milans's demands for the removal of Montañés and Doval, undated; Montañés's opposition to Milans's repressive approach, 8 Apr. 1919; Milan's support for Portillo and second resignation, 9 Apr. 1919; the ‘visit’ of some officers before the departure of the civil governor, undated. Equally, crucial documentary evidence can be found in ACR: transcripts of telephonic conferences between Milans and the war minister, 8–9 and 14 Apr. 1919, 20/5; letter from the CPE's secretary, José Pallejá, to Milans backing Portillo, Apr. 1919, 96/38; and Doval's incompatibility with Portillo's dirty work, 8 Apr. 1919, 96/60. Most scholars agree on the army's subversive role: Alonso, Ángeles Barrio, ‘La oportunidad perdida: 1919, mito y realidad del poder sindical’, Ayer, 63/3 (2006), pp. 174–7Google Scholar; Boyd, Praetorian, pp. 26–9; Balcells, El sindicalisme, pp. 84–8; and Bengoechea, Organització, pp. 203–5.
99 Cambó, Memorias, p. 305.
100 Gramsci, Antonio, ‘On fascism, 1921’, in Beetham, David, ed., Marxists in the face of fascism (Manchester, 1983), pp. 82–3Google Scholar.