This article explores the complex empirical landscape of justice and security provision in post-war Mozambique, and its political dynamics. It scrutinises the formal policy framework, which today recognises legal pluralism. The current legislation not only fails to fully recognise the de facto role played by non-state providers, but also to acknowledge the various layers of informal interaction and competition that in practice occur between these and official state institutions. There are political reasons for this. Justice and security provision constitute a minefield of power interests and overlapping claims to authority, which have deep historical roots. State officials and the national government fear losing power if non-state actors are given clear rights and mandates. Unclear legislation also eases political instrumentalisation by politicians and power-holders. The risk is that justice and security provision becomes more about politics than about problem solving and access to justice.

The Parliament of Kosovo passed a controversial amnesty law in July 2013 within the context of the Brussels-led negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. This article evaluates the law using a functional framework, thus exploring possible implications with regard to legality, the rule of law, security, the economy, and reconciliation. We find that the amnesty law entails serious problems or risks in each aspect except legality due to its broad scope which includes common and economic crimes while providing possibilities for abuse. Moreover, internationals actors involved in the negotiation process exerted considerable pressure to adopt the amnesty law which raises questions concerning their motives and strategy. We argue that their uncritical attitude can be explained by a combination of four principal factors, including a strong focus on the realist exigencies of diplomacy, internal interests of the European External Action Service, a neglect of non-legal consequences of the law, and a general practice of exceptional and unaccountable policy-making in Kosovo. A functional assessment as offered in this article would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of the possible implications of the law, including the serious risks it poses to the fragile post-conflict situation in Kosovo.

This article conceptualises the EU approach to rule of law promotion outside of accession, taking Ukraine as a case study. Empirical evidence, collected through document analysis, expert interviews and participant observation, reveals that the rule of law as a legal and political category in EU external relations has little to do with the essentialist scholarly definitions of the concept. Instead, it constitutes an abstract ideal which frames bilateral cooperation at the political level and a banner under which the parties realise a variety of activities at the practical level. This EU approach is deliberate and meant to allow for defining the rule of law in harmony with the parties' integration ambitions, priorities and domestic institutional contexts. The article concludes with a discussion of the findings' implications for future policy and research.

Japan offers its aid recipients an approach to legal reform that in some ways mirrors, and in others diverges, from the Western approaches to rule of law aid. As a consequence, Japan challenges Western legal assistance generally, and rule of law aid in particular. More particularly, after close scrutiny of the history of Japanese ODA and its mode of legal sector support developed over the last twenty years, we argue that Japanese legal assistance exhibits a range of traits including: incrementalism; comparativism; different aid personnel; focus on self-help; budget restraint; and humility. This approach has attracted robust critics. Nevertheless, this paper asks the question whether the East Asian model of rule of law assistance challenges the West's apparent addiction to rule of law aid.

Universal provision of legal identity, most commonly birth registration, is viewed as both an intrinsic human right and an instrumental development necessity. Legal identity is commonly associated with citizen access to certain benefits and opportunities, protection of human rights, and generation of vital statistics to inform development planning. Research conducted in Nepal, Cambodia, and Bangladesh demonstrates that significant obstacles to obtaining legal identity include financial and procedural barriers, discriminatory laws and policies, institutional incapacity, and citizens' lack of knowledge and motivation. Robust alternative markets for legal identity reveal the true public demand for identity documents. In the developing country context, the provision of legal identity alone does not necessarily deliver desired development outcomes. Thus, universal civil registration is a necessary and worthy goal, but focus should remain on the ultimate development goals behind universal registration.

This paper aims to explore the core characteristics of the so-called black and white tracks of the dual commercial justice system in Ukraine through a five-year ethnographic case study of the court experiences of selected Ukrainian companies. The empirical findings of this study confirm that the majority of litigants in routine cases have rather positive experiences in the courts, while a minority of the cases are diverted to the black track resulting in justice not being delivered. It is argued that the black track within the Ukrainian judiciary is consciously designed and reinforced by the ruling elite as part of the state governance structure and is subjected to more diverse and contradictory pressures than in Russia. At the same time, this study reveals the astonishing efficiency of the commercial courts in terms of time and cost savings. This zebra-like image suggests that the white ‘stripes’ of the Ukrainian courts are brighter, and the black ‘stripes’ are even darker than commonly perceived.

This article investigates the difficulties in transplanting global legal norms into developing countries, specifically the problem of ‘false friends.’ This is a linguistics concept describing the situation where there is a striking resemblance between two words in two different languages, leading speakers of each language to assume, incorrectly, that they understand the word's meaning in the other language. Even more problematically, the misunderstanding is hidden by the assumption of understanding. We argue that similar problems can occur when there is a superficial similarity (but a fundamental mismatch) between particular global and local norms. We illustrate this through the example of global intellectual property regimes and their reception in Vanuatu and Mexico, showing how reforms are sometimes welcomed into developing countries on the basis of false assumptions that their aims are congruent with existing understandings. Finally, the paper develops some policy implications for avoiding the ‘false friends’ problem in a transnational legal context.

New, alternative, forms of cross-border cooperation, in particular processes of informal international lawmaking (‘IN-LAW’), have emerged and gained prominence since the 2000s in response to an increasingly diverse, networked, and knowledge-based society. This transformation impacts on traditional notions of public international law as well as on the conceptualization of an emerging international rule of law. This is all the more the case given the tendency to emphasise the formal characteristics of the latter. The present article, nevertheless, challenges the assumption that informal international law is, because of its informal nature, by definition incompatible with a rule of law approach. The article thereto re-introduces a negative (shielding society from arbitrariness) and a positive (providing requirements for lawmaking) conception of the rule of law. First, it identifies actors and processes of informal international lawmaking and elucidates the extent of their reliance on legal principles as opposed to the wielding of arbitrary power on the international plane. Second, it operationalises a rule of law approach in the three phases of informal lawmaking processes (lawmaking per se, law-application and accountability). As such, it discusses how a number of concrete rule of law requirements related to participation, procedural guarantees, accessibility of norms, and accountability mechanisms are implemented. To conclude, it is submitted that rule of law theories can be reconciled with IN-LAW, without affecting the flexibility that is fundamental to the non-traditional norms produced at the global level.

Although law and order is often conflated with the rule of law, the two concepts are asymmetrically opposed. Asymmetrical opposites do not occupy poles on a scale of shared values. One is not a negative of the other, as rule of men traditionally has been to the rule of law. Nor does one occupy part of a continuum extending down from the other, like rule by law in relation to the rule-of-law ideal. They are not symmetrically related. They are opposed because their specific contents are adverse. Whereas the rule of law is characteristically concerned with eliminating arbitrariness through general rules applied juridically, law and order is primarily concerned with eliminating restlessness through particularistic injunctions delivered administratively. Different values inhere to each. Their opposition is in principle. Consequently, they cannot be conflated without obfuscating their distinctive qualities, thereby casting doubt on the meaning of the rule of law as a political ideal.

We embed a critique of the respective strengths and weaknesses of policy initiatives to ‘build the rule of law’ within the broader literature on political settlements and developmental states, thereby creating a foundation for an alternative framework that takes politics and the legitimacy of change processes seriously. Thus far the dominant terms of debate have been between those advocating or resisting the replication of legal ‘forms’ (i.e., what modern legal institutions, statutes and procedures ‘look like’, such as constitutions) via large, rapid, imported technocratic interventions, and those pushing instead for a focus on enhancing a prevailing legal system's ‘functionality’ (what the existing system actually ‘does’) via a series of local level legal empowerment programs or attempts to redefine state-society relations by adjusting legal configurations. We argue for the inclusion of a third dimension, namely one encompassing procedural legitimacy and equitable contestation as part of the change process.

A major challenge for China is the frequency of so-called ‘mass incidents’ or protests that have been on the rise in recent years. Many such incidents are the result of forced expropriation of farmland by local government authorities for a wide variety of purposes, including the goal of industrialization of the economy. This article examines the challenges faced by rural citizens to access formal systems of justice while seeking a legal remedy. Why are formal systems of justice not effective in settling disputes on land expropriation in China? What are the obstacles faced by landless farmers in accessing justice, and how can such obstacles be overcome? We examine existing regulations for settling compensation disputes in China and discuss several concrete examples from the field in order to identify numerous institutional challenges. These include a very demanding applicant requirement, ambiguous provisions such as no time limit for compulsory mediation, and the inability of the petitions system to address land dispute cases. We argue that the adjudication system itself is an obstacle for farmers who wish to seek an administrative or legal remedy. The political, administrative and judicial authorities in China prefer the maintenance of strict and specific norms rather than facilitating more adaptable and feasible alternatives. Without a major overhaul of current dispute settlement mechanisms, the number and frequency of severe social conflicts between farmers and local governments will continue to increase. Major reforms are required to better protect the rights of landless farmers and other citizens whose properties have been expropriated.