* This essay was presented at the International Political Science Association, XIth World Congress, Moscow, USSR 12–18 August 1979: Special Meeting No. 16, ‘Fundamental Rights in a Democratic Order’.

The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions made by his discussions with members of the Yale Faculty Seminar on American Democratic Institutions and the opportunity to read and discuss James Fishkin's Tyranny ξ Legitimpcy: A Critique of Political Theories, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

1 Elsewhere I have called this the criterion of political equality. I have come to realize that this term may prove confusing, since even though I explicitly defined it as above, it may seem to imply the broader kind of political equality that all of the criteria are intended to protect. Except for this difference in terminology, the criteria set out here are described more fully, together with the assumptions from which they are derived, in ‘Procedural Democracy’ in Fishkin, James and Laslett, Peter (eds), Philosophy, Politics, and Society, Fifth Series, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979 Google Scholar. Because the argument works out much more completely in that essay, I only present a compressed account here.

2 The principle comes as close to being a universal assumption in moral reasoning as one is likely to find. Its strength derives in great part, no doubt, from the weakness of any alternative principle, since any alternative principle would have to affirm, in effect, that some human beings are intrinsically more important (and intrinsically entitled to more consideration) than others. It might be said that the interests of some persons or groups ought to be given more consideration because they make a greater contribution to society, to others. But it can be readily shown that this argument presupposes the validity of the principle itself. For what makes the contributions of some persons more valuable than the contributions of others can only be the gains for the good of others. In its general form, the principle would apply to all human beings. Since this raises a host of questions that, though important, are not germane to our considerations here, it is sufficient for the purposes of this essay to think of the principle as applying at least to all persons directly subject to the binding decisions of the association or, if it be such, the state.

3 The argument for the reasonableness of these criteria is developed in ‘Procedural Democracy’, ibid.

4 In Political Parties, Robert Michels used these and other factors in an effort to show that democracy is impossible and government by a ruling class inevitable. However, even if the first is true, the second does not follow, For an analysis from a democratic perspective of the limits imposed by size see Robert Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy.

5 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 227 Google Scholar. I wish to acknowledge here the extent to which Dworkin's book has helped me to clarify my ideas on this subject.

6 In a federal system it is important to distinguish between ‘judicial review’ of laws enacted by state or local legislative bodies, and by the national legislature. While state and local bodies have often violated even primary political rights, whereas on appeal the Supreme Court has much more often upheld these rights, the record of congressional legislation versus judicial review by the Supreme Court is much more ambiguous, especially over the whole history of the constitutional system.