Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 June 2013
This article interrogates the intellectual foundations of global legal pluralism as a descriptive and normative position, and assesses its core claims with reference to the changing status of individuals in the postnational realm. In order to uncover the normative core of the pluralist position, the article turns to the rich tradition of value pluralism in political philosophy, particularly as articulated by Isaiah Berlin. It argues that as a normative position, pluralism – whether applied to the abstract sphere of values or the concrete realm of legal regimes – is normatively underdetermined, offering too little guidance as to how the conflicts endemic to a pluralistic world ought to be resolved. Unless it is supplemented by other, more substantive principles of political legitimacy such as democracy, freedom, equality, or justice, the principle of pluralism applied to the global legal realm is poised to reproduce, even exacerbate, existing inequalities of power and resources among those whom it affects.
1 In describing legal pluralism, Gunther Teubner also uses the metaphor of the Roman god Janus, although the duality emphasized by Teubner is not that between its normative and descriptive facets but legal pluralism’s reference to ‘social norms and legal rules, law and society, formal and informal, rule-oriented and spontaneous’. See Teubner, G, ‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1443–62, 1443.Google Scholar
2 See especially, Schiff Berman, P, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 1155–1238; Cohen, J, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012); von Bogdandy, A, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 397–413; Delmas-Marty, M, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World (Hart, Oxford, 2009); Halberstam, D and Stein, E, ‘The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 13–72; Krisch, N, Beyond Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010); Krisch, N, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 247–78; MacCormick, N, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999); Maduro, M, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in Walker, N (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart, Oxford, 2003); Maduro, M, ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism’ in Dunoff, JL and Trachtman, JP (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009); Stone Sweet, A, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 621–45; Teubner, G, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in Teubner, G (ed), Global Law without a State (Dartmouth, Brookfield, VT, 1997); Walker, N, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373–96; Walker, N, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317–59.
3 See especially the essays collected in Berlin, I, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (Alfred A Knopf, New York, NY, 1991); I Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ , ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’ , ‘The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will’  in The Proper Study of Mankind (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, NY, 1998).Google Scholar
4 Maduro, MP, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart, Oxford, 1998).Google Scholar
5 See especially, Ehrlich, E, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1936); Griffiths, J, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1–55; Merry, SE, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 869–96, 870; Moore, SF, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (Routledge, Boston, 1978); Teubner, ‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (n 1). For a critique, see Tamanaha, BZ, ‘The Folly of the ‘‘Social Scientific’’ Concept of Pluralism’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 192–217.
6 Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes’ (n 2) 376.
7 This list draws on ibid 386.
8 Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (n 5) 870.
9 Ibid, 875; Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (n 5) 5.
10 Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (n 5) 3.
11 Ibid 3.
12 Bodin, J, Six Books on the Commonwealth, trans Tooley, MJ (Barnes and Noble, New York, 1967) 43.Google Scholar
13 Austin, J, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, vol I, Campbell, R (ed) (James Cockcroft & Co, New York, 1875) Lecture VI, section 234, 144.Google Scholar
14 Philpott, D, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001) 18.Google Scholar
15 Bodin, Six Books on the Commonwealth (n 12) 28. In this respect Austin adopts Bodin’s formulation almost wholesale, describing the sovereign’s ‘independence … of a determinate human superior’ as the distinguishing ‘negative mark of sovereignty’. Lectures on Jurisprudence (n 13) 117, sections 192 and 193 respectively.
16 See, for instance, Anderson, P, Lineages of the Absolutist State (Verso, London, 1974) 49.Google Scholar
17 This anxiety is palpable not only in Hobbes’s Leviathan, famously written against the backdrop of the English civil wars, but also in Bodin’s fastidious attempt to construct a hierarchy among ‘absolute sovereigns,’ ‘subjects of the Pope’, ‘subjects of the [Holy Roman] Emperor’, dukes, counts, ‘highest officers of state, lieutenant-generals of the king, governors, regents, dictators’, tributary princes, and assorted vassals, liege-vassals, and ‘natural subjects’. See Bodin, Six Books on the Commonwealth (n 12) 36–9, 42.
18 Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (n 13) section 190, 117.
19 Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (n 5) 4–5.
20 Ehrlich, E, ‘The Sociology of Law’ (1922) 36 Harvard Law Review 130–45. Ehrlich defines a ‘Legal Provision’ as ‘an instruction framed in words addressed to courts as to how to decide legal cases (Entscheidungsnorm) or a similar instruction addressed to administrative officials as to how to deal with particular cases (Verwaltungsnorm)’ 132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
21 Ibid 144.
22 Ibid 136.
23 Ibid 133.
24 SF Moore (1986), cited in Tamanaha, ‘The Folly of the “Social Scientific” Concept of Pluralism’ (n 5) 193.
25 Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (n 5) 870–1, references omitted.
26 Ibid, 870–1, references omitted.
27 Paul Schiff Berman argues that ‘the whole debate about law versus non-law is largely irrelevant in a pluralism context because the key questions involve the normative commitments of a community and the interactions among normative orders that give rise to such commitments, not their formal status’. See Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (n 2) 1177.
29 A contemporary example is lex mercatoria, the transnational body of private commercial law that neither issues from states nor is curated by them.
30 Although the term ‘Westphalian’ serves as shorthand for the classical attributes of modern sovereignty, the historical accuracy of the standard narrative is deeply contested. See especially the essays in Kalmo, H and Skinner, Q (eds), Sovereignty in Fragments. The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010); Krasner, S, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1999); Benton, L, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010); Anghie, A, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law’ (1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1–81.
31 See Hans Kelsen’s critical attempt to articulate a sustainable notion of ‘sovereign equality’ in Kelsen, H, ‘The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization’ (1944) 53 Yale Law Journal 207–20. In this article, written at the heels of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 in which the US, UK, USSR, and China stated their intention to create a ‘general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States … for the maintenance of international peace and security’, Kelsen presents a jurisprudential analysis of the idea of a world order founded on sovereign equality, along with his deep misgivings about the stability of such a system. Also see Kelsen, H, ‘Sovereignty and International Law’ (1960) 48 Georgetown Law Journal 627–40.
32 See Jean Cohen’s sophisticated conceptual account and normative defence of an understanding of pluralism ‘which gives both the political values that sovereignty articulates and human rights their due without being “state-centric”’, in ‘Sovereign Equality vs. Imperial Right: The Battle over the “New World Order”’ (2006) 13 Constellations 485–505, 486. Also see Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty (n 2).
33 See, for instance, contributions in Teubner (ed), Global Law without a State (n 2).
36 Teubner, Global Law without a State (n 2) 14.
37 Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (n 5) 871.
38 Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 2) 4.
40 As Cohen explains, the layering of the traditional pluralism of sovereign states with non-traditional legal regimes beyond the state complicates traditional schemes of monist and dualist jurisprudence. See Cohen, J, ‘Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A Constitutional Pluralist Perspective’ in Besson, S and Tasioulas, J (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010).Google Scholar
41 Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes’ (n 2) 376.
42 Ibid 391.
43 MacCormick, ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’ (n 35) 528.
44 Ibid 530.
45 Ibid 530.
46 Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 2).
47 The literature that focuses on the liminal interactions (or ‘plate tectonics’, to borrow an apposite metaphor from Bjørn Kunoy and Anthony Dawes, ‘Plate Tectonics in Luxembourg: The ménage à trois between EC Law, International Law and the European Convention on Human Rights following the UN Sanctions Cases’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 73–104) between global legal regimes often goes under the title ‘constitutional pluralism’, as distinct from mere legal pluralism. In this article, I consider the latter rather than the former, first because legal pluralism is more capacious than constitutional pluralism insofar as it allows for the study of orders which, while having a fair claim to be ‘law’, might nevertheless be of a qualitatively distinct nature from constitutional law. Second, the more general term allows us to leave open highly contentious questions about whether a given regime qualifies as ‘constitutional’ in any conceptually rigorous sense. Last, as Christina Eckes explains in her contribution to the present volume, instances of constitutional pluralism count as ‘extreme’ cases of legal pluralism, whereas the reverse relation does not obtain. Therefore, the more general term allows us to make finer distinctions as necessary within the context of substantive analysis. Key contributions to the debate on constitutional pluralism include Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty (n 2); M Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State’ in Dunoff and Trachtman, Ruling the World? (n 2); Kumm, M, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262–307; Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law’ (n 2); Maduro, ‘Courts and Pluralism’ (n 2); Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (n 2); Avbelj, M and Komárek, J, ‘Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2008) 2 European Journal of Legal Studies 325–70.
48 In Schiff Berman’s words: ‘pluralism offers both a more accurate descriptive account of the world we live in and a potentially useful alternative approach to the design of procedural mechanisms and institutions’. Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (n 2) 1165.
50 It would be impossible to map all of the tributaries to this abundant and fast-moving current in contemporary political theory, but notable interventions include Crowder, G, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (Continuum, New York, 2002); Galston, WA, Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002); Galston, WA, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005); Gray, J, Two Faces of Liberalism (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000) 34–68; Kekes, J, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993); Kekes, J, Against Liberalism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1997) 159–79; Larmore, C, ‘Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement’ (1994) 11 Social Philosophy and Policy 61–79; Lukes, S, ‘Making Sense of Moral Conflict’ in Moral Conflict and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991); Nagel, T, Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979) 128–41; Raz, J, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986); Taylor, C, ‘The Diversity of Goods’ in Sen, A and Williams, B (eds), Utilitarianism and beyond (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982); Williams, B, Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) 71–82.
52 Williams, B, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985) 153.Google Scholar
53 Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’ (n 3) 17.
54 Galston, Liberal Pluralism (n 50) 31.
55 Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (n 50) 6.
56 Ibid 7.
57 Ibid 3.
58 Ibid 2.
59 Ibid 49.
60 Ibid 2.
John Kekes gives a more expansive definition of incommensurability as ‘the denial of (1) a summum bonum, (2) the fungibility of values, and (3) a canonical principle for ranking values’. Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism (n 50) 56. For other accounts of incommensurability, see Williams, Moral Luck (n 50) 77; Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 50) ch 13.
61 Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (n 50) 7.
62 Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’ (n 3) 13.
63 Galston, Liberal Pluralism (n 50) 30.
64 Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism (n 50) 160.
65 Newey, cited in Galston, Liberal Pluralism (n 50) 30.
66 I Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, in Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind (n 3) 66. Berlin’s definition of ‘monism’ is not to be confused with the traditional legal theory sense of that term, which views ‘international and domestic law as together constituting a single legal system,’ as opposed to ‘dualism,’ which views ‘international law as a discrete legal system’ whose domestic effects are conditioned by domestic constitutional law or statute. See Henkin, L, ‘The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny’ (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 853–86, 864.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
67 In Berlin’s words, monism, as ‘the central core of the intellectual tradition in the West has, since Plato (or it may be Pythagoras), rested upon three unquestioned dogmas: (a) that to all genuine questions there is one true answer and one only, all others being deviations from the truth and therefore false …; (b) that the true answers to such questions are in principle knowable; (c) that these true answers cannot clash with one another, for one true proposition cannot be incompatible with another; that together these answers must form a harmonious whole’. See Berlin, ‘The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will’ (n 3) 555. Also see Berlin, ‘The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West’ in The Crooked Timber of Humanity (n 3) 24.
68 Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (n 3) 241.
69 See, among others, Berlin, ‘The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West’ (n 3); ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’ (n 3); ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought’ (n 3); ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’ (n 3).
70 Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (n 3) 241.
71 Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 2) 79.
73 Wiener writes that ‘If democratic processes require contestation as a necessary element in order to generate and maintain legitimacy of legal norms’, then ‘contestation needs to be integrated in supranational institutional settings as a common procedure’ ibid, 6.
75 Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism (n 2) esp 81–5.
79 I Kant, Political Writings, 2nd edn with an introduction by H Reiss, trans HB Nisbet (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) 105.
80 Falk, RA, Johansen, RC and Kim, SS, The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace (SUNY Press, New York, 1993) 9.Google Scholar
81 For a systematic account of overlapping but distinct levels of constituencies, see N Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’ (n 2).
82 George Kateb argues that ‘Whatever he says, Berlin is a relativist.’ Kateb, G, ‘Can Cultures Be Judged? Two Defenses of Cultural Pluralism in Isaiah Berlin’s Work’ (1999) 66 Social Research 1009–38, 1029. Others are more sanguine about the possibility of steering Berlin’s pluralism away from the relativist precipice. See Gutmann, A, ‘Liberty and Pluralism in Pursuit of the Non-Ideal’ (1999) 66 Social Research 1039–62; Riley, J, ‘Interpreting Berlin’s Liberalism’ (2001) 95 American Political Science Review 283–95.
83 Berlin, ‘The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will’ (n 3) 578.
84 Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (n 50) 5.
85 Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids’ (n 2).
86 Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (n 50) 2.
87 Ibid 4.
88 Galston, Liberal Pluralism (n 50) 5. According to Galston, pluralism, unlike relativism, admits of a ‘nonarbitrary distinction between good and bad or good and evil’ 30.
89 Hampshire, S, Morality and Conflict (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983) 155.Google Scholar
90 Kekes, Morality of Pluralism (n 50) 170.
92 The most well-known account of ‘reasonable pluralism’ is that given by John Rawls, who writes:
A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines… Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime.
Rawls, J, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993) xviii.Google Scholar
93 Galston, Liberal Pluralism (n 50) 35.
94 Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (n 50) 57.
95 Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (n 3).
96 Ibid, 198–211; Macedo, S, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) 234–8.Google Scholar
97 Madison, J, ‘No.10: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection’, The Federalist Papers, Shapiro, Ian (ed) (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2009) 48.Google Scholar
98 Ibid, 48.
99 For a critique of this ‘simple argument from indeterminacy’ see Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (n 50) 8.
100 Berlin’s fraught attempt to reconcile his defence of negative liberty with pluralism has been a topic of heated debate. See Galston, WA, ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’ (1999) 93 American Political Science Review 769–78; Gray, J, ‘Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company’ (1998) 6 International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17–36; Honneth, A, ‘Negative Freedom and Cultural Belonging: An Unhealthy Tension in the Political Philosophy of Isaiah Berlin’ (1999) 66 Social Research 1063–77; Lukes, S, ‘The Singular and the Plural: On the Distinctive Liberalism of Isaiah Berlin’ (1994) 61 Social Research 687–717; Riley, ‘Interpreting Berlin’s Liberalism’ (n 82). See also, Crowder, ‘Pluralism and Liberalism’ (n 51).
101 Gray goes on to argue that a consistent value pluralist must espouse a quite different, chastened sort of liberalism, namely that rooted in the search of a ‘modus vivendi’ rather than ‘a quest for some kind of super-value’. See Gray, J, Two Faces of Liberalism (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000) 32, 25 respectively.Google Scholar
102 Galston, The Practice of Liberal Pluralism 188–9 (n 50).
103 Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (n 50) 201.
104 Ibid 199.
105 Ibid 207.
106 Ibid 209.
107 Kekes argues that value conflicts must be alleviated against the background norms and practices of a cohesive community and its traditions: given the pluralist’s rejection of any standard criteria by which to commensurate values, Kekes writes, ‘reasonable conflict-resolution is made possible by the traditions and conceptions of a good life to which people who face the conflicts adhere’. Kekes, Morality of Pluralism (n 50) 76.
108 Crowder, ‘Pluralism and Liberalism’ (n 51) 303. Crowder later retracted his strong claims that ‘value pluralism does not support liberalism’ and that ‘pluralism positively undermines any rational case for liberalism.’ However, he nevertheless remains unpersuaded by Berlin’s argument that pluralism generates support for liberalism, and seeks to bolster it with his virtue-based account of pluralism and liberalism. See Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (n 50) vii–viii, 185–213.
109 Rawls, Political Liberalism (n 92) 63–4.
110 In his essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Kant states this problem in dialectical form, characterizing it as ‘a strange and unexpected pattern in human affairs’ whereby
A high degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people’s intellectual freedom, yet it also sets up insuperable barriers to it. Conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest extent. Thus once the germ on which nature has lavished most care—man’s inclination and vocation to think freely—has developed within this hard shell, it gradually reacts upon the mentality of the people, who thus gradually become increasingly able to act freely.
Kant, Political Writings (n 79) 59. Discounting Kant’s eighteenth-century reservations about a permissive regime of ‘intellectual freedom,’ we can nevertheless find the same concern in contemporary debates about limits of liberal toleration. Many commentators argue that liberal institutions require some form of self-defence against the corrosive effects of illiberal doctrines, whether in the form of hate speech legislation (Waldron), ‘gag rules’ (Holmes) or ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas). To be sure, few liberals would advocate a ‘shell’ quite as ‘hard’ as the one Kant endorsed in the context of Frederick the Great’s Prussia!
111 Galston, Liberal Pluralism (n 50) 65.
112 M Koskenniemi, ‘Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought,’ Keynote Speech, delivered at Harvard University 5 March 2005, 15. On file with the author.
114 That anarchical tendency is often associated with the English pluralists Harold Laski and GDH Cole. See the works compiled by Hirst, PQ, The Pluralist Theory of the State (Routledge, New York, 1989).Google Scholar
115 Galston, Liberal Pluralism (n 50) 65.
117 Galston, Liberal Pluralism (n 50) 66.
118 Ibid 66.
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121 The term ‘multiple legalities’ is coined by Christopher Tomlins in the context of early Anglo-European colonial law. Tomlins defines ‘legalities’ as ‘the symbols, signs, and instantiations of formal law’s classificatory impulse, the outcomes of its specialized practices, the products of its institutions. They are the means of effecting law’s discourses, the mechanisms through which law names, blames, and claims.’ Legalities, moreover, ‘are social products, generated in the course of virtually any repetitive practice of wide acceptance within a specific locale’. Compared to the austere, self-validating term ‘law,’ the term ‘legalities’ exposes the contextuality, contingency, and indeterminacy of norms that claim the status of law. See Tomlins, C, ‘The Many Legalities of Colonization: A Manifesto of Destiny for Early American Legal History’ in Tomlins, C and Mann, BH (eds), The Many Legalities of Early America (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 2001) 2–3, 11.Google Scholar
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124 For one such response, see Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty (n 2), Cohen argues in favour of a global system of constitutional pluralism based on the dual principles of sovereign equality and fundamental human rights. She recognizes that in the absence of such an ordering principle, a radically pluralistic world of sovereign states is vulnerable to abuse, not least the abuse of sovereign prerogative for imperialist ends or gross violations of human rights.
125 For a constitutional theory that takes pluralism seriously as a central constitutional value, see Tully, Strange Multiplicity (n 78).
126 The phrase is borrowed from J Resnik, ‘Law’s Migration’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal and cited in P Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (n 2) 1210.
127 BDS Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito, CA, ‘Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization’ inSantos, and -Garavito, Rodríguez (eds), Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005) 20.Google Scholar
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129 Maduro, We the Court (n 4) 9.
130 Hersch Lauterpacht is one of the earliest and most strident advocates of the idea that international law is coming to recognize ‘the individual as a subject of the law of nations’. See, especially, Lauterpacht, H, International Law and Human Rights (Archon Books, Hamden, CT, 1968 ) 4; also, ch 2.Google Scholar
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134 For instance, multiple arbitral awards by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes have elevated the rights of private investors over the policy decisions of the Argentine government in the face of a massive economic crisis and social unrest. See WW Burke-White, ‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System’, Research Paper No 08-01 (University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics, 24 January 2008), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088837> accessed 31 March 2013.
135 G Shaffer, ‘Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why It Matters, the Barriers Posed’, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 08-50 (University of Minnesota Law School, 2009) 171–5.
136 Paulus, AL, ‘From Territoriality to Functionality? Towards a Legal Methodology of Globalization’ in Dekker, IF and Werner, WG (eds), Governance and International Legal Theory (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2004) 75.Google Scholar
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138 Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane and Slaughter, ‘Introduction: Legalization and World Politics’ (n 131) 387.
139 A far more contentious question concerns assessing the significance of regime pluralism. Sceptics continue to insist that the formal regimes and more diffuse bodies of ‘law-like’ norms highlighted by pluralists hardly amount to a qualitative shift in the nature of the international order, which in their view remains firmly subject to the authority of states and the principle of sovereignty that defines their interactions.
140 Tamanaha, ‘The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism’ (n 5) 194.
141 Plato, Republic, trans GMA Grube (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1992) 338c.