Article 1 is the Basic Law's crown. The concept of human dignity is this crown's jewel: an interest so precious that the state must affirmatively protect and foster its inviolability. This uniquely important status is evident from human dignity's prominence in the constitution, the early Federal Republic's pressing need to repudiate the Third Reich, the many judicial and scholarly exegeses of Article 1, and human dignity's unique claim to absolute protection. The success of the German legal construct of human dignity also is apparent from its influence on the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights. That document likewise begins with a provision nearly identical to the Basic Law's Article 1.

In April, 2002, a 19 year-old pupil ran amok in a high school in Erfurt, killing several teachers and fellow pupils. The young man was reported to have played computer games, in particular games known as “ego-shooter,” quite excessively. These tragic events fueled the plans of the German government and the Federal states to reform the law for the protection of children and young persons. The legislative machinery issued new legislation at a rather impressive pace. Only one year after the tragedy in Erfurt, on 1 April 2003, two major legal documents entered into force: the Jugendschutzgesetz (JuSchG – Juvenile Protection Act) of the Federal government and the Jugendmedienschutz-Staatsvertrag (JMStV – Agreement of the German Federal States regarding the Protection of Human Dignity and Juveniles in Radio and Televised Media). This complicated two-fold structure stems from the federal nature of the German state where the competence to legislate is divided between the Federal Government and the individual Laender (Federal States). The latter, in order to achieve uniformity among themselves and reaching the breadth of the Germany territory, must cooperate and legislate in the form of an interstate agreement. The JuSchG regulates mainly the protection of juveniles in the public and limits the distribution of items, which have been determined to be dangerous, like printed material, videos, DVDs or CD-Roms. In contrast thereto the JMStV pertains to the protection of juveniles in the radio broadcasting industry and in the so called “Telemedia,” in particular the internet. In the following, we will give a short overview of the developments wrought by these new laws.

The decision of the Bundesarbeitsgericht [Federal Labor Court, Abbr. BAG] of October 10, 2002 raises essentially the increasingly important question of the exercise of religious freedom at the workplace. The case concerned the ordinary dismissal of a Moslem saleswoman employed in a big department store claiming to wear during the working time, according to the rules of her religious belief, as headgear a shawl covering the hair. The court has declared that the dismissal is violating section 1 par. 2 Kündigungsschutzgesetz [Act on the Protection against Unfair Dismissal, Abbr. KSchG] and has mainly stated that the wearing of a headgear at the workplace as an expression of the religious belief does not justify as such the ordinary dismissal of an employee.

Food law in the European Community is a touchy subject. One of the big ongoing debates in this area centres on the question of what names we call our foodstuffs by. In an internal market where local supermarket shelves are stocked with products coming from all around the EC and beyond, how can we be sure that the contents of the packets conform to our connotations of the name on the label? For example, if it says “chocolate” on the label, how can we be sure that it really is “chocolate” within our understanding of the word? The question of what names can or should go on labels is, sadly, very complicated. This article therefore intends to look at only one aspect of this problem: when a Member State is allowed to insist that the name of an imported “generic” product be changed. We will begin by briefly looking at the case law and one of the major pieces of legislation in this area – the Labelling Directive – before going on to discuss application of the law to the recent Chocolate Cases, handed down by the European Court of Justice (hereafter the “Court”) at the beginning of this year. This discussion will give some (hopefully) interesting insights into the way in which primary law, as interpreted by the Court, and secondary legislation interact and into the balancing of consumer protection and free trade performed by the Court.

After nearly fifty years of its existence, the European Community currently faces two constitutional challenges: In a conscious effort to bring Europe closer to its citizens and to break away from the undemocratic executive and judicial constitution-making, Europe has set up a “Constitutional Convention” in charge of constitutional soul-searching. The second project – and indeed one of no less “constitutional” significance – is, of course, the Union's enlargement that will turn it into an organization of twenty-five plus. The two projects are in many ways intertwined and can be synthesized into the phrase: “A new Constitution for a new Europe”.

Most European and American attorneys and judges think the U.S.A. has its legal roots in English common law, and that is probably true for the many areas of U.S. law that are still controlled by the traditional common-law process of simultaneously making and applying law. Yet, with respect to constitutional law – America's greatest legal contribution to modern respect for the rule of law, the roots of the U.S. legal system are firmly planted in Europe, not England. The U.S. Constitution was inspired by French revolutionary ideas of rationalism in law; it was intended as an integrated document just like codes; and it has been interpreted by American judges to be not just a political document but binding law – law that is binding on all three branches of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary. In fact that was the holding in Marbury v. Madison, the case decided exactly two hundred years ago.

There is currently a considerable amount of soul-searching underway by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. For the cosmopolitanites of the academic world, the unpleasant disagreements over policy towards Iraq between Old Europe and the New World were not only unsettling but symptomatic of a more deep-seated disagreement between (former) friends. The theme of the Unidem seminar, held at the University of Göttingen on May 23-24, 2003, can be seen as sitting nicely within a desire for an explanation for this tension. Clearly underlying the organization of the conference, choice of themes and the invitation of speakers was the organizer's desire to reach a greater understanding of the difference and similarities between constitutionalism in Europe and in the United States and the reasons for and consequences of these divergences. Thus, although the Iraqi crisis obviously took place long after the theme of the conference had been conceived (and it has to be said that Georg Nolte's conferences appear to have a habit of coming hard on the heels of related dramatic events in the real world, suggesting an almost magical foresight on his part), it should nevertheless be understood as falling within this movement.