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Quo vadis Democratic Control? The Afghanistan Decision of the Bundestag and the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the NATO Strategic Concept Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Andreas L. Paulus

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The parliamentary control of executive power in foreign affairs in Germany suffered two severe blows last November; one may wonder whether it will ever recover. First, on 16 November 2001, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder transformed one of the most important foreign policy debates in the Bundestag (Parliament) into a more general policy debate by combining the decision regarding the provision of German troops to the American-led, so-called “War on Terrorism” in Afghanistan with a vote of confidence with respect to his government, pursuant to Article 68 of the Grundgesetz (GG – Basic Law). With the fate of the Red/Green coalition government hinging on the vote, and the very existence of the Green Party at stake, it was not surprising that Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Greens), in his speech on the issue, took a tone more suited for a party convention than for a foreign and security policy debate. And although deploring that posture, most of the opposition speakers followed suit. It was a sad day for German parliamentary democracy. The failure of the Bundestag to live up to its responsibilities is even more apparent in the declarations that accompanied the vote, which show that a considerable number of members of the Bundestag voted for the government in spite of their continuing opposition to the provision of Bundeswehr (German Army) forces, the very conjunction rendered impossible by the use of Article 68. The use of this Article both quashed the existing strong parliamentary backing for the provision of German troops to the anti-terrorism effort in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and denied the Bundestag, and the German public, a serious debate about the first German military operation outside Europe since World War II, excepting the humanitarian contributions to UN missions in Cambodia, East Timor and Somalia.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , January 2002 , E3
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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