Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-55597f9d44-t4qhp Total loading time: 0.453 Render date: 2022-08-14T12:53:58.565Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "useNewApi": true } hasContentIssue true

International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Extract

HTML view is not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

This Article starts from two premises. The first is that power—particularly regulatory power—is increasingly exercised across and between jurisdictions, in particular as a result of the intertwining of economies via trade. The well-being of those involved in the production and trade in goods and services is determined by rules made in multiple jurisdictions, not just their own. Concern about the environmental and social impact of economic activity is a particular reason for jurisdictions to try and impose norms upon each other. The second premise is that the essence of constitutionalism is constitutional values and principles rather than particular institutional forms. Such forms are contingent and instrumental, in the service of the values and principles. Many of those constitutional values and principles are concerned with the exercise of power (e.g., accountability, due process, and non-oppression).

Type
Special Issue: EU Law qua Global Governance Law
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Wiener, Antje, Global Constitutionalism: Mapping an Emerging Field 2-3 (Conference Constitutionalism in a New Key? Cosmopolitan, Pluralist and Public Reason-Oriented, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://cosmopolis.wzb.eu/content/program/conkey_Wiener_Mapping-Field.pdf. See also Ester H. Karnell, The EU as a Promoter of Values and the European Global Project, 13 GERMAN L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2012).Google Scholar

2 Walker, Neil, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 Mod. L. Rev. 317, 320-21 (2002).Google Scholar

3 For a similar argument, see the third claim in Miguel P. Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism, in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 67 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012).Google Scholar

5 See generally Gareth Davies, 'Process and Production Method’ Based Trade Restrictions in the EU, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 69 (Catherine Barnard ed., 2008); Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, 36 J. World Trade 353 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “ppms” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 Yale J. Int'l L. 59 (2002); Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction: An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 Eur. J. Int'l L. 249 (2000); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (2004); Gabrielle Marceau & Joel Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 J. World Trade 811 (2002).Google Scholar

6 For a discussion on the use of the private sector in constructing regulation, see generally Michelle Egan, Constructing a European Market (2001).Google Scholar

7 The phrase is also used where some or most of the regulators are private. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Private Regulation in European Private Law, in Towards a European Civil Code 91 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 4th ed. 2010).Google Scholar

8 See, e.g., Waddington, Lisa, The Internal Market and Disability Accessibility: Using EC Law to Establish an Internal Market in Disability Accessible Goods and Services 7 (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Papers, No. 3, 2008).Google Scholar

9 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-000. See also Laurens Ankersmit, Jessica Lawrence & Gareth Davies, Diverging EU and WTO Perspectives on Extraterritorial Process Regulation, 21 Minn. J. Int'l L. 14 (2012) (specifically discussing the extraterritorial aspects of the case). See the other papers in this special edition for discussion of its wider implications.Google Scholar

10 Erich Vranes, Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issue in International Law, WTO Law, and Legal Theory 166 (2009).Google Scholar

11 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity 19-24 (1992).Google Scholar

12 See supra text accompanying note 5.Google Scholar

13 For other examples, see Ankersmit et al., supra note 9.Google Scholar

14 See supra text accompanying note 5.Google Scholar

15 Miguel P. Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution 69-175 (1998); Joanne Scott, On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO (The Jean Monnet Working Papers, No. 3/99, 1999).Google Scholar

16 See, e.g., Sunstein, Cass, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (2005).Google Scholar

17 See Ankersmit et al., supra note 9; Bartels, supra note 5; Philippe Sands, 'Unilateralism', Values, and International Law, 11 Eur. J. Int'l L. 291, 293 (2000).Google Scholar

18 See Schoenbaum, Thomas J., International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 Am. J. Int'l L. 268, 291 (1997). See also Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules 95-116 (2005); Jansen, Bernhard, The Limits of Unilateralism from a European Perspective, 11 Eur. J. Int'l L. 309, 310 (2000); John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 11 Eur. J. Int'l L. 303, 306-307 (2000).Google Scholar

19 See Bartels, supra note 5; Sands, supra note 17, at 300.Google Scholar

20 See Charnovitz, supra note 5, at 70; Ankersmit et al., supra note 9.Google Scholar

21 See Davies, Gareth, Morality Clauses and Decision Making in Situations of Scientific Uncertainty, 6 World Trade Rev. 249 (2007). See also Charnovitz, Steve, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 Va. J. Int'l L. 689, 695 (1998); Diebold, Nicolas F., The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger and the Undermining Mole, 11 J. Int'l Econ. L. 43, 69 (2008).Google Scholar

22 Jackson, John H., The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven ‘Mantras’ Revisited, 4 J. Int'l Econ. L. 67 (2001).Google Scholar

23 Follesdal, Andreas, Global Distributive Justice? State Boundaries as a Normative Problem, 1 Global Constitutionalism 261, 270-71 (2012).Google Scholar

24 Jackson, supra note 18, at 306-07.Google Scholar

25 C.f. Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty 107 (1999).Google Scholar

26 Davies, supra note 5; Ankersmit et al., supra note 9.Google Scholar

27 Scott, supra note 15; Maduro, supra note 15, at 173.Google Scholar

28 Howse & Regan, supra note 5, at 275-76; Jason Potts, The Legality of PPMs Under the GATT 35-36 (2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/ppms_gatt.pdf.Google Scholar

29 See Follesdal, supra note 23, at 265-68.Google Scholar

30 See Davies, Gareth, Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonization? Lessons in Tolerance and Trade from the European Union for the WTO and other RTAs, in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System 265, 274 (Federico Ortino & Lorand Bartels eds., 2006); Sands, supra note 17, at 302.Google Scholar

31 Such conditionality may also come from multinational corporations acting out of a sense of corporate social responsibility.Google Scholar

32 See, e.g., Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, Constitutions as Expressive Documents, in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy 329 (Barry Weingast & Donald Wittman eds., 2008); Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779, 794-95 (1994); Jenia I. Turner, The Expressive Dimension of EU Criminal Law, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 555, 579-82 (2012).Google Scholar

33 For more examples, see Ankersmit et al., supra note 9.Google Scholar

34 See, e.g., Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (1996); Giandomenico Majone, Europe's ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards, 4 Eur. L. J. 5 (1998).Google Scholar

35 See, e.g., MacCormick, supra note 25; Miguel P. Maduro, Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action, in Sovereignty in Transition 501 (Neil Walker ed., 2003); Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty, 11 Eur. L.J. 262 (2005); Walker, supra note 2; Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Pluralism and Integrity, 23 Ratio Juris 365, 377-78 (2010); Joseph Weiler, Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism: Some Doubts, in The Worlds of European Constitutionalism 8 (2011).Google Scholar

36 Cruz, Julio B., The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, 14 Eur. L.J. 389 (2008).Google Scholar

37 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.Google Scholar

38 Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca, EU Law 268-97 (5th ed., 2011). See also Jan Komarek, Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court's Ultra Vires Revolution, Verfassungblog (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/playing-matches-czech-constitutional-courts-ultra-vires-revolution/#.UJ6QZYfAcpZ (discussing the recent decision of the Czech Constitutional Court).Google Scholar

39 Kumm, Mattias, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, 36 Common Market L. Rev. 351, 351-52 (1999); Kumm, supra note 35.Google Scholar

40 Weiler, Joseph H.H. & Haltern, Ulrich R., The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order—Through the Looking Glass, 37 Harv. Int'l L.J 411, 445-446 (1996); Arthur Dyevre, Judicial Non-Compliance in a Non-Hierarchical Legal Order: Isolated Incident or Omen of Judicial Armageddon? 18-20 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2084639.Google Scholar

41 Dyevre, supra note 40, at 41.Google Scholar

42 For further comments, see Komarek, supra note 38; Dyevre, supra note 40, at 20-27; Jan Komarek, European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: Contrapunctual Principles in Disharmony 6-17 (Jean Monnet Work Papers, No. 10/05, 2005).Google Scholar

43 See Kumm, Mattias, Constitutionalism and the Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism: Institutional Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection, in Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law 163 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012); Maduro, supra note 3.Google Scholar

44 See the ongoing jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court on this point, especially Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155; BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009, 143 BVerfGE 2. See also Craig & de Burca, supra note 38, at 272-283.Google Scholar

45 Walker, supra note 2, at 320.Google Scholar

46 Davies, Gareth, Constitutional disagreement in Europe and the search for pluralism, in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 269 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012); Eleftheriadis, supra note 35, at 377-378.Google Scholar

47 The collection of articles found in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds. 2012) demonstrate this range of viewpoints. See also Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek, Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism (EUI Working Paper Law, No. 2008/21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334219.Google Scholar

48 Both claims are similar to the first two of Maduro's three claims. See Maduro, supra note 3.Google Scholar

49 Tamanaha, Brian Z., Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 Sydney L. Rev. 375, 390-91 (2008).Google Scholar

50 Davies, supra note 46.Google Scholar

51 See Walker, supra note 2, at 341 (regarding the institutional aspect of constitutionalism as necessary). See also Nico Krisch, The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law 40-42 (Law, Society, and Economy, Working Paper 12/2009) (preferring not to call such a state of affairs constitutional); Matej Avbelj, Can European Integration be Constitutional and Pluralist—Both at the Same Time?, in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 381 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012). But see Maduro, surpa note 3. Maduro is prepared to leave institutionalized hierarchy behind. See also Wiener, supra note 1, at 2-3; Jan Komarek, Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism, in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 231 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012).Google Scholar

52 See Maduro, supra note 3; Daniel Halberstam, Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: National, Supranational, and Global Governance 22-23 (University of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 229, 2011).Google Scholar

53 Walker, supra note 2, at 320.Google Scholar

54 The idea has also been referred to as constitutional tolerance. See Joseph Weiler, Federalism Without Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg, in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union 54 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2002).Google Scholar

55 Maduro, supra note 3.Google Scholar

56 Weiler, Joseph H., In Defense of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg, in European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 7 (Joseph Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003); Maduro, supra note 35.Google Scholar

57 Kumm, supra note 35.Google Scholar

58 Id. See also Maduro, supra note 35.Google Scholar

59 Wiener, supra note 1, at 12.Google Scholar

60 See Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); Wiener, supra note 1, at 7-11. See also Halberstam, supra note 52, at 4-5.Google Scholar

61 Halberstam, supra note 52; Peer Zumbansen, Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational Legal-Pluralist Order, 1 Global Constitutionalism 16, 50 (2012).Google Scholar

62 Halberstam, supra note 52, at 37.Google Scholar

63 Walker, supra note 2, at 336.Google Scholar

64 Ladeur, Karl-Heinz, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality—The Viability of the Network Concept, 3 Eur. L.J. 33 (1997).Google Scholar

You have Access
2
Cited by

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *