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¹² See Watch, Human Rights, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea 35 (2014). The historic and ethnic relationship shared by Russia and Crimea could explain the interest and the will of the government in Moscow to acton behalf of the Russian community in the Crimea, and conversely a sympathy within Crimea towards Russia. See, e.g., Chase, Philip, Conflict in the Crimea; An Examination of Ethnic Conflict Under the Contemporary Model of Sovereignty, 34 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 219, 227–29, 243 (1996); Solchanyk, Roman, Crimea: Between Ukraine and Russia, in Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges and Prospects 3, 4 (Maria Drohobycky ed., 1995), For a study on the trust-building between the Crimean population and Russia and the promotion of pro-Russian separatism in Crimea, see Roslycky, Lada L., Russia's Smart Power in Crimea; Sowing the Seeds of Trust, 11 Southeast Eur, & Black Sea Studs. 299 (2011).Google Scholar

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¹⁶ In this paper, we use the term unamendability to describe the limitation on the constitutional amendment power from amending certain principles or institutions. Provisions which explicitly protect constitutional subjects from amendments are often termed “eternity clauses.” For a note on this terminology and its normative implication, see Roznai, Yaniv, Unamendability and the Genetic Code of the Constitution, Eur. Rev. Pub. L. (forthcoming 2015). Also, we use the terms “territorial indivisibility” and “territorial integrity” interchangeably. Nevertheless, it can be argued that there is a distinction between territorial indivisibility and territorial integrity. The former emphasizes the negation of secession whereas the latter carries a dual aspect: Internal—which opposes secession—and external—which emphasizes protection against foreign aggression or forcible encroachment of the territory. See Venice Comm'n for Democracy Through Law, Self-Determination and Secession in Constitutional Law, Council of Eur. (Jan. 12, 2000), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-INF(2000)002-e.Google Scholar

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⁸¹ Compare this with the following: Art. 104 of the constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (1991), according to which the territorial integrity shall not be subject to reform, in conjunction with Art. 16, according to which “All Equatorial-Guineans shall have the obligation to … defend [the state's] … territorial integrity and national unity …”; the Bulgarian constitution (1991), according to Art. 2(2) of which “[t]he territorial integrity of the Republic of Bulgaria shall be inviolable,” also recognizes in the Preamble the “duty to guard the national and state integrity of Bulgaria.” See also Christakis, Theodore, Self-Determination, Territorial integrity and Fait Accompli in the Case of Crimea, 75 ZaöRV/Heidelberg JIL 75 (2015) (arguing that more than eighty constitutions out of the 108 the author reviewed “have wording showing that any unilateral attempt to secede should be deemed anti-constitutional, and some of them even provide for the state to adopt concrete measures to combat secessionist activities”).Google Scholar

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⁹⁰ The 1994 Crimean referendum, which proceeded despite being declared illegal by the Ukrainian electoral commission and President, returned positive answers to the questions of whether the region should have greater autonomy, whether its citizens should hold dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship, and whether the decrees of the Crimean provincial President should have the status of law. See Walker, Mark Clarence, The Strategic Use of Referendums: Power, Legitimacy, and Democracy 108 (2003).Google Scholar

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¹⁰¹ For example, see the Opinion of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, in the case upon the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, providing an opinion regarding the constitutionality of introducing amendments to Articles 80, 105, 126, and 149 of the Constitution of Ukraine for immunity to requirements of Arts. 157 and 158. Op. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 01-v/2012, (July 10, 2012) (finding the abolition of immunity of judges as infringing upon their ability to conduct an independent, objective and fair justice for the purpose protecting human and citizens’ rights and freedoms), http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/list?currDir=182897; see also Op. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 1-v/2010, (Apr. 1, 2001) (providing an opinion on the constitutionality conformity of amendments to Articles 80, 105, and 108 of the Constitution of Ukraine, concerning guaranteeing immunities to certain officials, with the provisions of arts. 157 and 158 of the Constitution of Ukraine, in which the court found that providing liability exemption of People's Deputies of Ukraine for statements that contain insult or defamation in Parliament and its bodies might violate fundamental rights and freedoms), http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/list?currDir=108166; Kampo, supra note 96, at 196.Google Scholar

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¹¹⁰ Of course, in some jurisdictions, courts have taken upon themselves such a judicial role, even without an explicit authority in the constitution. See Roznai, Yaniv, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and Success of a Constitutional idea, 61 Am. J. Com. L. 657 (2013); Roznai, supra note 31; Gözler, supra note 97, at 5–7.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ The involvement of courts in questions of territory is not in itself unique. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868) (deciding that despite affiliation with the Confederacy during the Civil War, states did not —and cannot—unilaterally secede from the United States; this was a celebrated decision of the U.S. Supreme Court). A more contemporary notable example is the Canadian Secession of Quebec case, in which the Supreme Court held that although a majority will of a people to secede, as expressed in a referendum, must be taken into a consideration, there are other important principles such as federalism, minority rights and the rule of law which must be observed. According to the rule of law principle, secession of a province should be carried out according to the Canadian constitutional rules which govern the amendment process. Moreover, the Court uncovered an unwritten duty to negotiate in the event of a formal amendment on secession. See Reference re the Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.), http://scc-csc.lexum.com/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do; see also Russell, Peter H., Can the Canadians Be a Sovereign People? The Question Revisited, in Constitutional Politics in Canada and the United States 9, 22 (Stephen L. Newman ed., 2004); Oklopcic, supra note 15.Google Scholar

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¹¹³ According to one study, between 1789 and 1944, almost twenty percent of all new constitutions included unamendable provisions, while, between 1945 and 1988, almost thirty percent of new constitutions included such provisions, and between 1989 and 2013, already over fifty percent of new constitutions include formal unamendable provisions. See Rainai, supra note 16. Unamendability can also be implicit and judge-made through judicial decisions; Roznai, supra note 110; Roznai, supra note 31; Gozler, supra note 97.Google Scholar

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