Case n. 380, 22.10.2012, Victims of the earthquake v. Barberi et al., (members of the NationalCommission for the Prediction and Prevention of Major Risks),Tribunal of L'Aquila, grounds delivered on 29.01.2013; (first degree of judgment).

Articles 113, 589, c.1and 3, 590 Criminal Code (113 – Cooperation in negligent homicide, 589 – Negligent homicide, 590 – Negligent personal injury)

The Tribunal of L’Aquila condemned seven members of the National Commission for the Prediction and Prevention of Major Risks to six years in prison for manslaughter because they dismissed the role of scientists in a March 31, 2009 meeting. The meeting was convoked in L’Aquila to provide the population of L'Aquila, which was scared after a continuous series of tremors lasting three months, with serious information on a scientific base. On the contrary, the members of the Commission supported a press campaign launched by the Chief of the National Civil Protection to reassure the population. Five days after the meeting, a serious tremor took place causing more than 300 deaths.

This article investigates the L'Aquila decision. It aims to present a theoretical framework from contemporary disaster research and political philosophy to better understand why blame and responsibility has come to play such a prominent role in the aftermath of disasters. Furthermore, it presents a number of examples from criminal law around the world to provide context to the decision. The central claim in tthis piece is that the decision is not an extraordinary, isolated decision on responsibility following disasters; rather the decision is emblematic to an on-going development of disaster responsibility. Thus, after disaster follows a legal process aimed at identifying, and if necessary, penalizing the mistakes leading to the horrifying outcome. In that way disasters are increasingly like any other event in society with major negative implications; it is evaluated and if appropriate adjudicated.

This article aims to analyse the role of law in the identification of the responsibility domain of ‘regulatory science’ (Jasanoff, 1990) within the risk regulatory process. The main research question is therefore,what kindof relationshipbetween science andpolicy-making lawshould design in risk regulation.

In order to address this issue, this contribution focuses on the recent verdict of the Tribunal of L’Aquila. After the earthquake occurred in L’Aquila on the 6th April 2009, six Italian scientists that had participated in the Major Risks Commission's meeting have been condemned for the multiple manslaughter of 29 people who were among the 309 victims of the earthquake, ‘for having assessed the risks related to seismic activity in the L’Aquila territory in an inaccurate, generic and ineffective way’ and for having provided ‘information which was imprecise, incomplete and contradictory as to the nature, the causes and the hazardousness and on the future development of the seismic activity’.

As far as risk assessment and risk communication are concerned, firstly the tasks of the Major Risks Commission under the Italian Civil Protection law will be analysed. Against this backdrop, the issues related to this expert body's responsibility will be addressed and the gaps in the current accountability regime will be pointed out.

This article aims to consider whether classic criminal offences (such as manslaughter) are adequate to reprove the scientists’ behaviour when major calamities are being judged to have caused the death of people and wide destructions. The fundamental problem hinges on the role of risk-assessment and consultancy carried out by the scientists, as well as on the unknown state of major risks. Then, to establish a link of causality between the defendants’ behaviour and the death-events affecting the victims, it must be proved that: a) the scientists “psychically” influenced the victims to leave any safety precaution in relation to the risk; b) the deaths of the inhabitants are not to be considered an “extraordinary” circumstance, even by experts. The difficulties faced by the Judge to fulfil these tasks prompt us to wonder whether other types of criminal charges would be more appropriate for sanctioning scientists who are found to be derelict in their duty of risk-assessment to authorities and citizens.

This piece critically analyses the development of a novel food technology: the Frankenburger, a type of cultured/in vitro meat (or ‘shmeat’, which stands for ‘sheet of meat’). It assesses the risks raised by cultured meat as well as the role it could play to alleviate environmental and food security concerns. The article argues that the current EU regulatory structures for cultured meat, and for novel foods more generally, ought to be strengthened. There is a necessity to transfer and develop food innovations in partnerships with all the relevant stakeholders (the public, scientists, the food industry, policy-makers and regulators). Including interested parties from the inception of a technology as well as within the decision-making process would provide a supporting framework for cultured meat.

In order to secure their fishery products market share in the EU, third countries, especially the developing ones, tend to transplant EU requirements into their domestic legal order. In reality, theses transplanted laws do not correspond to measures to reach a level of protection needed by the country of destination. Based upon the case of Benin, this paper intends to show that when these legal transplants are adversely made, they can in some cases have disastrous effects. It can be argued that an unintended result of EU policy was that it contributed to the collapse of the shrimp industry in Benin. The paper moreover argues that despite the stringency of the EU requirements, the implementation of its control policy might inadequately protect European consumers of shrimp.

The EU authorization process of the insect-resistant maize 1507, branded by its developer company Pioneer-DuPont as ‘Herculex’, is perhaps the most interesting and emblematic example of the current regulatory crisis of GMO regulation in Europe. The case is particularly controversial, because it concerns the first risk assessment regarding the cultivation of a GMO issued by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) since its establishment in 2005. It involves a long and complicated authorization process marked by persistent contestation of both the EFSA's risk assessment and the Commission's risk management; a total of six EFSA opinions; administrative delay; and ultimately a judicial condemnation of the Commission’s behavior by the EU General Court.

This case is of particular relevance, because it registers a slight yet meaningful change in the EFSA's approach to GMO risk assessment including the way the EFSA has dealt with competing scientific opinions, risks and uncertainty involved in GMO regulation. Moreover, in the field of GMO authorizations under the new legislative framework, the European Parliament (EP) has actively intervened in the administrative authorization process. It should be noted that the outcome of this process remains unclear at the moment, given that at the time of writing the Commission has not yet taken its final decision on Maize 1507. The present report aims to offer an overview of this year-long and controversial process including the approaches taken by the relevant institutions involved therein.

This report discusses a proposal fromthe Center for International Environmental Law(CIEL), ClientEarth and Friends of the Earth Germany (Bund) on the regulation of nanomaterials in the European Union. It discusses in particular, the proposal for a horizontal regulation on nanomaterials (also referred to as a nano-patch for existing legislation) that would fill in the regulatory gap on nanomaterials. The proposal goes beyond a review of the REACH text and encompasses all EU legislation relevant to nanomaterials. The proposed instrument would amend the REACH text with delimitation in scope to all areas relevant to nanomaterials (on the model of Regulation 1272/2008 on the classification, labelling and packaging of chemicals). The main aim of the regulation is to ensure that hazard, risk and exposure assessments for all forms and uses of such materials are adequately carried out and taken into consideration.

In this judgment, the General Court annulled two Commission decisions authorising the placing on the market of the GM potato Amflora. The Court did not base its decision on the arguments put forward by the applicant Hungary, which contested the underlying scientific assessment of the European Food Safety Authority, but found of its own motion a breach of an essential procedural requirement in the applicable comitology procedure.Whilst the Court’s proactive role in scrutinising the Commission's behaviour in the authorisation procedure of GMOs is to be welcomed, the Court arguably missed an opportunity to exercise its role as a deliberative forum for normative controversies underlying the scientific risk assessment.

Directive 2001/18 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, OJ 2001 L 106;Regulation 1829/2003 on geneticallymodified food and feed,OJ 2003 L 268; Article 5 of Commission Decision 1999/468 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ 1999 L 184.

On 22 January 2014, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice confirmed the validity of the powers entrusted to the European Securities Markets Agency under Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 236/2012, upholding their compatibility with the principle of institutional balance, the Lisbon Treaty and established case law of the CJEU.

This case note gives an overview of the ruling and analyses its implications for ESMA and the broader Union institutional setting, with particular regard to the interplay between EU Institutions and agencies. It concludes by highlighting some reasons for potential constitutional concerns resulting from the combination of politically unchecked agencies and highly controlled Institutions.