Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-cf9d5c678-w9nzq Total loading time: 0.163 Render date: 2021-07-31T19:12:02.635Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

Shareholders' Remedies: The Choice of Objectives and the Social Meaning of Derivative Actions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2005

Get access

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to offer a wide-ranging consideration of the policy objectives underlying the derivative action. More specifically, it inquires into an indefinite, but fundamental, question that has received inadequate attention in the literature on corporate law theory in European and English law: what rationale or rationales justify the use of derivative actions? First, an initial analysis of the merits and demerits of the derivative action is presented. The article then analyses the role derivative actions may assume in enforcing corporate accountability. The question addressed is whether its purpose is primarily to deter misconduct or simply to compensate the company for the wrongdoing. The possible benefits and limitations of these rationales are explored. The article then examines the public image, or expressive value, of the derivative action. The purpose is to determine if some of the features inherent in the derivative action procedure enhance or detract from derivative actions being understood as a positive social force. Finally, it briefly considers strategies that can be pursued to reverse the negative effects of those forces that weaken the social meaning of derivative actions so that the action is more likely to be viewed as an instrument that affirms desirable norms in the corporate setting.

Type
Articles
Copyright
© 2005 T.M.C. Asser Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Shareholders' Remedies: The Choice of Objectives and the Social Meaning of Derivative Actions
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Shareholders' Remedies: The Choice of Objectives and the Social Meaning of Derivative Actions
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Shareholders' Remedies: The Choice of Objectives and the Social Meaning of Derivative Actions
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *