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Taking Advantage of Difference in Opinion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Richard Bradley
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Abstract

Diversity of opinion both presents problems and affords opportunities. Differences of opinion can stand in the way of reaching an agreement within a group on what decisions to take. But at the same time, the fact that the differences in question could derive from access to different information or from the exercise of different judgemental skills means that they present individuals with the opportunity to improve their own opinions. This paper explores the implications for solutions to the former (aggregation) problem of supposing that individuals exploit these opportunities. In particular, it argues that rational individual revision of opinion implies that aggregation problems are unstable in a certain sense and that solving them by exploiting the information embedded in individual opinion has profound implications for the conditions that we should impose on aggregation procedures.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , October 2006 , pp. 141 - 155
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

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