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Fragmentation and Old Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2021

Will Fleisher Open the ORCID record for Will Fleisher [Opens in a new window]
Will Fleisher*
Affiliation:
Northeastern University, Khoury College of Computer Sciences, 360 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, USA
*
Email: fleishwp@gmail.com
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Abstract

Bayesian confirmation theory is our best formal framework for describing inductive reasoning. The problem of old evidence is a particularly difficult one for confirmation theory, because it suggests that this framework fails to account for central and important cases of inductive reasoning and scientific inference. I show that we can appeal to the fragmentation of doxastic states to solve this problem for confirmation theory. This fragmentation solution is independently well-motivated because of the success of fragmentation in solving other problems. I also argue that the fragmentation solution is preferable to other solutions to the problem of old evidence. These other solutions are already committed to something like fragmentation, but suffer from difficulties due to their additional commitments. If these arguments are successful, Bayesian confirmation theory is saved from the problem of old evidence, and the argument for fragmentation is bolstered by its ability to solve yet another problem.

Keywords

Philosophy of scienceepistemologyBayesianismBayesian confirmation theoryfragmentationproblem of old evidence
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2023 , pp. 542 - 567
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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